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Executive Summary 
Nuclear disarmament, including the elimination of all 
nuclear weapons and related development programmes, 
has been a central goal of the international community for 
decades. Under international law, only the 2017 Treaty on 
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) obligates all 
its states parties to destroy all nuclear weapons and other 
nuclear explosive devices under their jurisdiction or control 
and to never develop, produce, or control any such devices, 
much less test or use them. This comprehensive rejection 
by law of a uniquely inhumane and indiscriminate weapon 
is the embodiment of Article VI of the 1968 Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a legally 
binding provision that has been violated by nuclear-armed 
states for far too long.
Using the TPNW as a yardstick against which progress 
towards a world without nuclear weapons may be 
measured, the Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor records 
progress related to signature, ratification, entry into force, 
and universalization of the Treaty. It also evaluates the 
compatibility of each state’s behaviour with the prohibitions 
of the TPNW, regardless of whether the state in question 
has adhered to the Treaty.
The TPNW is moving steadily towards early entry into 
force, despite obstructionism from nuclear-armed states. 
At the time of writing, the TPNW had, by a close margin, 
the second fastest speed of adherence of the treaties on 
weapons of mass destruction. Adopted at the United 
Nations on 7 July 2017, as of 1 October 2019, 32 states 
were party to the TPNW, along with a further 48 signatories. 
The Treaty will formally become binding international law 
90 days after a further 18 states ratify or accede to it. 
Adhering states already include Kazakhstan and South 
Africa, both of which once had nuclear weapons but 
subsequently disarmed; two of only four states ever to do 
so. The international legal landscape governing nuclear 
weapons is being transformed and their fundamental 
illegitimacy further underscored.
At the same time, international tensions in recent months 
have reaffirmed the critical importance of nuclear 
disarmament. Nuclear-armed states India and Pakistan 
engaged in a short-lived but exceptionally dangerous 
armed conflict in April 2019, with India implicitly threatening 
to use nuclear weapons, and the Indian prime minister 
provocatively declaring that it was “now Pakistan’s turn to 
weep”. On 23 July 2019, ahead of a meeting with Pakistan’s 
prime minister, the United States president asserted that 
“I have plans on Afghanistan that if I wanted to win that 
war, Afghanistan would be wiped off the face of the earth, 
it would be gone, it would be over in literally 10 days.” The 
comment was widely read as an allusion to plans to use 
nuclear weapons. North Korea has restarted ballistic 
missile testing, firing missiles into the Sea of Japan and 
ratcheting up tensions in the region.
The Ban Monitor records that 135 (or more than two 
thirds) of all states today support the TPNW and its 
unequivocal renunciation of nuclear weapons, while 45 
states are categorized as non-supporters, and 17 states 
as undecided. Despite voting in favour of adopting the 
TPNW in 2017, Sweden announced in July 2019 that it 
would “refrain from signing or pursuing ratification of the 
TPNW at the present time” though it has also indicated 
that it might reassess its position following the next NPT 
review conference in 2020. Switzerland’s government is 
defying an instruction from both houses of the Swiss 
Parliament to sign and ratify the TPNW “without delay”. 
The Swiss government has committed to review its 
decision by the end of 2020.
Moreover, the Ban Monitor finds that a total of 155 of the 
world’s 197 states currently maintain policies and practices 
that are compliant with all the Treaty’s core prohibitions. 
These are states that have already signed or adhered to 
the TPNW and fully comply with its provisions, or which 
are in a position to adhere without making changes to 
existing practices or policies.
In stark contrast, all nine nuclear-armed states are currently 
investing heavily in their nuclear forces. Most are branding 
their ongoing development efforts as “modernisation”, a 
euphemism for what has been termed a “ritual squandering 
of national resources on weapons of horror that can never 
reasonably be used.” China, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States also retain large stocks 
of fissile material even though they stopped production 
for nuclear weapons in the 1990s. Russia and the United 
States, in particular, possess enormous quantities of 
fissile material that could be used to produce tens of 
thousands of new nuclear explosive devices. 
In total, 42 states engage in conduct that contravenes one 
or more of the TPNW core prohibitions. The non-compliant 
states are first and foremost the nine nuclear-armed 
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states. A further 31 non-nuclear-armed states are “nuclear-
weapon complicit” because they endorse the possession 
and potential use of nuclear weapons on their behalf, 
through arrangements of extended nuclear deterrence. 
Two states, Kazakhstan and the Marshall Islands, have 
rejected any role for nuclear weapons in their security 
policies, but do not comply with the TPNW’s prohibition 
on assistance because they host sites where missiles 
designed to deliver nuclear warheads are periodically 
tested by foreign powers (Russia and the United States, 
respectively). Kazakhstan has signed and ratified the 
TPNW. It will need to exercise due diligence to ensure that 
any unlawful testing ends. The other 40 non-compliant 
states may of course also lawfully sign and ratify the 
TPNW, but they too would have to make changes to their 
policies and practices to become compliant. 
Europe is the region with the most states whose practices 
and policies contravene the TPNW. A total of 30 of the 49 
states in Europe (61%) currently maintain policies and 
practices that contravene one or more of the prohibitions 
in Article 1 of the TPNW. 
In the other regions, compliance is generally high. In Africa, 
all states have been found to be compliant. In the Americas, 
only 2 states – Canada and the United States – of the 35 
across the region (less than 6%) are not compliant. In Asia, 
where most of the nuclear-armed states are located, 8 of 
the 43 states (almost 19%) are not compliant: China, India, 
Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Pakistan, and 
South Korea. In Oceania, Australia and the Marshall Islands 
are the 2 states among the total of 16 that are not 
compliant with the TPNW.
The prohibitions in Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW on assisting, 
encouraging, or inducing prohibited acts are the ones that 
are contravened by the greatest number of states. A total 
of 11 states (Belarus, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, 
Kazakhstan, the Marshall Islands, the Netherlands, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom, and United States) assist acts that 
are prohibited by the TPNW. Thirty-four states currently 
encourage or induce such acts: Albania, Armenia, Australia, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. The prohibition 
on allowing the “hosting” (stationing, installation, 
or deployment) of nuclear weapons is contravened by 
five states (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
and Turkey).
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Nuclear disarmament has been a central goal of the 
international community for more than seven decades. 
Through its first-ever resolution, adopted on 24 January 
1946, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly called 
for the establishment of a commission that would make 
proposals for the “elimination from national armaments 
of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons 
adaptable to mass destruction.”1  
A lack of political will on the part of a minority of states still 
stands in the way of disarmament and elimination of 
nuclear weapons. For decades, the focus of the international 
community has been on non-proliferation and limited arms 
control measures, where the very logic is that nuclear 
weapons have value and that nuclear deterrence as a 
system will continue. This approach has helped to limit and 
reduce nuclear arsenals, yet the failure to consider nuclear 
weapons as illegitimate has brought us to the beginning of 
a new nuclear arms race focused on qualitative 
“improvements” that risk destabilizing the world and 
triggering the use of these weapons.
The world has on several occasions been brought to the 
brink of nuclear war or nuclear accidents through 
miscommunication, misunderstandings, and technical 
malfunctions.2 The intellectual “straightjacket” of nuclear 
deterrence has prevented states from drawing lessons 
from these dangerous realities and thus from pursuing 
sustainable security solutions.3 
If we have learned one thing from the last couple of 
decades of non-compliance with the disarmament 
requirements of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it is that nuclear-armed states 
consider nuclear weapons to be acceptable, desirable, and 
even essential for their security needs, and that they do 
not intend at any point in the foreseeable future to eliminate 
their arsenals. They have been unable on their own to 
overcome their dependence on nuclear weapons. Action 
by the entire global community, which would pay the price 
of a nuclear conflagration, is a prerequisite for progress. 
As long as nuclear weapons are seen as acceptable, the 
vision of a world without nuclear weapons will remain an 
empty, rhetorical shell. 
1 UN General Assembly, Resolution 1(I), “Establishment of a Commission to Deal with the Problems Raised by the Discovery of Atomic Energy”,  
London (1946).
2 P. Lewis et al., “Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy”. Chatham House (2014), at: bit.ly/2zxFAGE.
3 B. Pelopidas, “The Nuclear Straitjacket: American Extended Deterrence and Nonproliferation”, pp. 73–105 in S. von Hlatky and A. Wenger (eds), The Future 
of Extended Deterrence. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press (2015).
All successful treaty-based efforts on a global level to 
eliminate specific weapons (including chemical weapons, 
biological weapons, anti-personnel landmines, and cluster 
munitions) have been based on a widespread under- 
standing that the weapon in question is indiscriminate or 
excessively harmful (or both) and should be made illegal 
in international law. Until the adoption in July 2017 of the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), this 
international affirmation by treaty of the fundamental 
unacceptability of nuclear weapons had been lacking. 
By prohibiting its states parties from developing, testing, 
possessing, hosting, using, and threatening to use nuclear 
weapons, as well as assisting, encouraging, or inducing 
those prohibited acts, the TPNW codifies the norms and 
actions that are needed to create and maintain a world 
free of nuclear weapons. The Treaty institutes a 
comprehensive rejection of nuclear weapons on moral, 
humanitarian, security, and legal grounds.
Despite the absence of nuclear-armed states from the 
TPNW negotiations at the UN, the Treaty provides a 
pathway to their adherence and lays down a mechanism 
for the adoption of “a legally binding, time-bound plan for 
the verified and irreversible elimination of [a] State Party’s 
nuclear-weapon programme”. Similarly, the Treaty imposes 
an obligation on states parties that host nuclear weapons 
to ensure their prompt removal. 
Non-nuclear-armed states (including Kazakhstan and 
South Africa, both of which once had nuclear weapons but 
subsequently gave them up) are now taking the lead by 
becoming the first states parties to the TPNW. In doing so, 
these states are creating a long-overdue international 
framework for elimination of nuclear weapons. They and the 
other states parties have a responsibility to go beyond mere 
adherence to the TPNW to use this tool to break decades of 
acquiescence to the nuclear threat and to encourage other 
states to stop justifying the “benefits” of nuclear weapons. 
The impact of the TPNW will be built gradually and will 
depend on how it is received and used by each and every UN 
member state.
In the current international environment in which nuclear 
weapons are a source of continuous tension and a 
1 Introduction
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potential trigger for catastrophic war, the TPNW is the only 
global initiative that provides an adequate response. The 
value of the TPNW as a contribution to both disarmament 
and non-proliferation goals should be explicitly recognised 
even by those states not yet ready to adhere to the Treaty 
themselves.
The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons 
(ICAN), which was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017 
for its advocacy for the TPNW, calls for the universalisation 
and faithful implementation of the TPNW to advance 
progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons. In 
support of the Treaty and ICAN’s objectives, Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) researches and publishes the Nuclear 
Weapons Ban Monitor. Data collection and analysis are 
assisted by research institutes, particularly the Norwegian 
Academy of International Law (NAIL).
Using the TPNW as a yardstick against which progress 
towards a world without nuclear weapons may be 
measured, the Ban Monitor records progress related to 
signature, ratification, entry into force, and universalization 
of the Treaty. It also evaluates the extent to which the 
policies and practices of all states comply with the core 
obligations in the TPNW. The term “compliance” is used in 
a broad sense to refer to the compatibility of each state’s 
behaviour with the prohibitions of the TPNW, regardless 
of whether the state in question has adhered to the TPNW. 
A central purpose of the Ban Monitor is to highlight the 
specific activities that stand between the international 
community and the fulfilment of one of its most urgent 
and universally accepted goals: the elimination of nuclear 
weapons. This edition tracks compliance during 2018 and 
the first nine months of 2019. 
In addition to its comprehensive prohibitions on all nuclear 
weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, the TPNW 
contains a series of positive obligations. These include 
reporting; accepting international safeguards on nuclear 
material; the duty to destroy any stockpiles and eliminate 
nuclear-weapon prgrammes; the duty to ensure the 
removal of any foreign nuclear weapons from a state 
party’s territory; the duty to implement the Treaty at 
domestic level, including through the adoption of national 
legislation; the duty to assist victims of the use or testing 
of nuclear weapons and to remediate contaminated land; 
and the duty to promote adherence to the Treaty. The Ban 
Monitor will also be evaluating states parties’ compliance 
with these positive obligations once the Treaty has entered 
into force. 
The report is based entirely on open sources. We welcome 
comments, clarifications, and corrections. 
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Only 25 states are known (or credibly suspected) to have 
pursued or seriously explored nuclear weapons,4 and only 
ten states have manufactured some form of nuclear 
explosive device. One of them, South Africa, subsequently 
disarmed. Three states – Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine – inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union 
but gave up those weapons in the 1990s. Disarmament is 
possible. 
According to the Federation of American Scientists, the 
number of nuclear weapons in the world peaked in 1986 
at around 70,300 warheads (see Figure 1). That number 
was subsequently hugely reduced, and in early 2019 the 
global estimate was of 13,890 nuclear warheads 
remaining.5 A large portion of this reduction in nuclear 
weapon stockpiles took place in the 1990s, and nearly all 
of the reduction occurred in the massive US and Russian 
arsenals, but there were also reductions in France and the 
United Kingdom, and, as noted above, South Africa 
destroyed its entire (small) arsenal of nuclear explosive 
devices. 
Studies published more than a decade ago showed that 
a war between India and Pakistan involving 100 Hiroshima-
sized bombs could kill 22 million people directly in less 
than a week, and that the fires triggered by these weapons 
would cause worldwide climate disruption and a global 
famine that would put two billion people at risk.6 
4 S. Singh and C. R. Way, “The Correlates of Nuclear Proliferation”, Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 1 (2007), Appendix.
5 SIPRI, “World Nuclear Forces”, SIPRI Yearbook (2010).
6 I. Helfand, “Nuclear Famine: Two Billion People at Risk?”, PSR and IPPNW (2013), at: bit.ly/2ZyqwmX.
7 bit.ly/31KsUJ3 . See also J. Coupe, C. G. Bardeen, A. Robock, and O. B. Toon, (2019). “Nuclear winter responses to nuclear war between the United States
      and Russia in the Whole Atmosphere Community Climate Model Version 4 and the Goddard Institute for Space Studies Model E”, Journal of Geophysical 
      Research: Atmospheres, 124, 8522–8543, at: bit.ly/2OpXILC.
8 See e.g. L. Eden, “The U.S. Nuclear Arsenal and Zero”, pp. 69–88, in C. M. Kelleher and J. Reppy (eds), Getting to Zero. Stanford: Stanford University Press 
(2011).
A new study in Science Advances, published in early 
October 2019, which updates those earlier reports, makes 
similarly sobering reading. The study examines a specific 
scenario in which India employs 100 nuclear weapons 
against urban targets in Pakistan and Pakistan uses 150 
warheads against urban Indian targets. The authors 
considered a range of consequences depending on the 
size of the weapons used. If all the weapons are relatively 
small Hiroshima-sized 15 kiloton bombs, 50 million people 
would be killed as a direct result of the explosions, fires, 
and initial radiation effects. If 100 kiloton weapons were 
used, the immediate death toll would be 125 million. The 
study also shows that the global climate effects would be 
even more catastrophic and the impact on food supplies 
much more severe than that predicted in the earlier studies 
of a more limited nuclear war.7 
The number of nuclear weapons in the world is only one 
dimension of the “arms race”. Other important indicators 
include the average and maximum yields of each warhead, 
the extent of financial investments in nuclear weapons 
technology, and the precision and nature of delivery platforms. 
Measuring nuclear “lethality” as a combination of warhead 
yield and the precision of the available means of delivery, Lynn 
Eden, Senior Research Scholar Emeritus at the Center for 
International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, 
asserts that the US nuclear arsenal “peaked” not in the 1960s 
or 1980s, as the conventional narrative of the history of arms 
control has it, but in the 2000s.8 
2 The Nuclear Condition in 2019
Fig 1:  Estimated Global Nuclear Warhead Inventories 1945–2019.
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It should also be noted that the reduction in the number 
of nuclear weapons is not, in itself, an indicator of intent 
to move towards the elimination of nuclear weapons. The 
reductions made thus far were results of arms limitations 
agreements and stockpile management, and arguably did 
not form part of a coherent plan to “ultimately eliminate” 
such weapons. In fact, while the overall trend towards 
fewer nuclear warheads in the world is positive, other 
developments point in the opposite direction:
1. Disarmament obligations and commitments are not 
being implemented: Almost fifty years after the entry 
into force of the NPT, a shocking image of non-
compliance with the Treaty’s Article VI disarmament 
obligation presents itself. Despite praising the 2010 NPT 
Action Plan as a “realistic”9 and “practical step-by-step”10 
approach to non-proliferation and disarmament, the five 
NPT nuclear-weapon states have simply refused to 
implement a large number of the disarmament 
commitments contained in the Plan. Nor have the four 
nuclear-armed states outside the NPT (the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), India, Israel, 
and Pakistan) taken steps towards disarmament. One 
important area where progress has been lacking is in 
reducing the roles of nuclear weapons in military and 
security concepts, doctrines, and policies. Since the 
adoption of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, the only 
noteworthy advance in multilateral nuclear disarmament 
and in fulfilling the collective Article VI obligation of all 
states parties to the NPT was the adoption in 2017 of 
the TPNW. 
2. The pace of nuclear reductions has slowed considerably 
since the 1990s: China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan 
appear to be increasing their stockpiles. And despite 
their repeated claims that they are pursuing nuclear 
disarmament, there have been no negotiations about 
total nuclear disarmament between the United States 
and the Russian Federation (Russia) since the Reagan–
Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik in 1986, or even on 
reductions to 1,000 nuclear weapons each . The United 
States has recently stated that the security environment 
is not conducive to further reductions, seemingly 
abandoning even the “step-by-step” or “progressive” 
approach to nuclear disarmament in favour of a new 
initiative labelled “creating the environment for nuclear 
disarmament” (CEND). 
3. Three additional states have acquired nuclear 
weapons: Since the end of the Cold War, North Korea, 
9   United States, Statement to the UN General Assembly First Committee, New York. UN doc: A/C.1/69/PV.11 (20 October 2014).
10 P5 announcement, available at: bit.ly/2m5J2EZ.
11 India completed a so-called “peaceful” nuclear explosion before the end of the Cold War, in 1974. In 1998, it test-detonated two nuclear explosive devices     
         and declared itself a nuclear-weapon state.
12 Al Jazeera, “India–Pakistan tensions: All the latest updates” (10 March 2019), at: bit.ly/2L299XG.
13 See, e.g., M. Gorbechev, “A New Nuclear Arms Race has begun”, The New York Times (25 October 2018), at: nyti.ms/2ELCaFP.
14 N. Tannenwald, “The Vanishing Nuclear Taboo”, Foreign Affairs 97, no. 6 (2018), p. 17.
15 Global Zero, “Global Zero Military Incidents Study” (1 May 2017), at: bit.ly/32k4p5z.
India,11 and Pakistan have become nuclear-armed 
states, increasing the number of locations where nuclear 
accidents or escalation to nuclear war could take place. 
Brinkmanship during fighting between India and 
Pakistan in early 2019 showed the potential for rapid 
escalation between nuclear-armed states (despite bold 
claims of the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence).12 The 
prospect of nuclear war between North Korea and the 
United States has also loomed large.
4. All nine nuclear-armed states are “modernising” their 
nuclear arsenals: They have continued to develop new 
nuclear delivery vehicles and/or warheads, spending 
vast sums on upgrading and perpetuating their nuclear 
capabilities. Several observers have argued that the 
world has entered a “new nuclear arms race”.13 Many of 
the systems currently being developed are set to remain 
operational for at least another fifty years. This 
demonstrates the nuclear-armed states’ intent to 
possess nuclear weapons for the coming decades, if 
not indefinitely.
5. There is a “trend among some leaders to glorify the 
world’s most destructive weapons”:14 In recent years, 
leaders of nuclear-armed states have on several occasions 
engaged in aggressive rhetoric and issued threats to use 
nuclear weapons, challenging the norm of non-use of 
nuclear weapons, increasing the risk of nuclear accidents 
and war, and worsening the environment for disarmament. 
6. The existing arms control and disarmament architec-
ture is eroding: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty has broken down and is now dead letter. 
The prospects for an extension of New START, set to 
expire in February 2021, look bleak. The Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains in limbo, still 
not in force more than two decades after its adoption. 
And after decades at the top of the disarmament com-
munity’s to-do list, negotiations on a Fissile Material 
(Cut-off) Treaty have not even begun. The Conference 
on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva has entered its third 
decade of inaction.
7.    The risks of nuclear weapon use have increased: The 
organization Global Zero documented some 650 “mili-
tary incidents” over three years (2014–2017) involving 
nuclear-weapon states or their allies that occurred in 
Europe, East Asia, and South Asia – levels not seen since 
the Cold War.15 Of these, 54 incidents were classified as 
“provocative”, risking escalation and the possibility of 
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armed conflict. Former US Defence Secretary William 
Perry stated in 2016 that the likelihood of a nuclear ca-
tastrophe is “greater than during the Cold War and ris-
ing”.16 And in April 2018, the UN Secretary-General in-
formed the UN Security Council that the Cold War “is 
back … but with a difference. The mechanisms and the 
safeguards to manage the risks of escalation that ex-
isted in the past no longer seem to be present”.17
Nuclear-Weapon Policies
The vast majority of states already reject nuclear weapons. 
The Ban Monitor finds that, as of 1 October 2019, 157 
states – four-fifths of the world’s 197 states18 – have 
excluded any role for nuclear weapons in their military 
postures. A total of 135 states have signed, ratified, acceded 
to, and/or voted in favour of the TPNW and are identified by 
the Ban Monitor as “TPNW supporters” (see Chapter 3). 
Twenty-two further states also maintain non-nuclear 
security policies but have not yet adhered to or voted in 
favour of the TPNW. For the purposes of this report, they 
are classified as “other non-nuclear-armed states”.  
Table 1: The world’s 197 states by nuclear-weapons policy
Category States
Nuclear-armed states (9 states) China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States.
Nuclear-weapon-complicit states
(31 states)
Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, 
Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, 
Spain, Turkey.
TPNW supporters (135 states) Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, 
Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, DR Congo, 
Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, 
Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Palau, 
Palestine, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, 
Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Other non-nuclear-armed states 
(22)
Argentina, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Finland, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Marshall Islands, 
Micronesia, Monaco, Nauru, Niue, North Macedonia,* Serbia, Singapore, Somalia, South Sudan, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
 * As of writing, North Macedonia was in the process of joining NATO. If it does so without repudiating the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons 
on its behalf, it will be deemed to be a nuclear-weapon-complicit state.
16 Cited in J. Borger, “Nuclear weapons risk greater than in cold war, says ex-Pentagon chief”, The Guardian (7 January 2016), at: bit.ly/2UgUfQd.
17 UN, “UN Secretary-General’s remarks to the Security Council” (13 April 2018), at: bit.ly/2MJIC3i.
18 As of 1 October 2019, the Secretary-General of the UN considered that a total of 197 states could become party to global treaties for which he is the 
        depository: all 193 UN member states, the two UN observer states (the Holy See and the State of Palestine), and two other states (Cook Islands and Niue).
A minority of 40 states, however, explicitly base their 
security strategies on the retention and potential use of 
nuclear weapons, perpetuating nuclear risks and 
undermining the international community’s longstanding 
goal of nuclear disarmament. Nine of these 40 are nuclear-
armed states: China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. The remaining 31 states do not possess nuclear 
weapons but have outsourced their nuclear postures to 
one or more nuclear-armed allies. In this report they are 
referred to as “nuclear-weapon-complicit states”. 
A nuclear-weapon-complicit state is a state that assists, 
encourages, or induces activities prohibited under the 
TPNW.
Table 1 below and Figure 2  overleaf categorize the world’s 
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Fig 2: States by nuclear-weapons policies
 TPNW supporters
 












The role of the nuclear-weapon-complicit states in 
assisting, encouraging, and /or inducing continued retention 
of nuclear weapons had not been given much attention prior 
to the humanitarian initiative and the process that led to the 
negotiation and adoption of the TPNW. 
The nuclear-weapon-complicit states have incorporated 
extended nuclear deterrence (sometimes called a nuclear 
“umbrella”) in their military doctrines. They have officially 
endorsed or acquiesced in the retention and potential use 
of nuclear weapons on their behalf. Even with the obvious 
credibility problem inherent in the policy of extended 
nuclear deterrence (a nuclear-armed state is exceedingly 
unlikely to risk nuclear war for anything other than serious 
or even existential threats to its own national security) 
these  31 states function as enablers of nuclear armament 
and share responsibility for the perpetuation of nuclear 
risks. All of the nuclear-armed members of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – France, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States – frequently use their 
allies’ avowed demand for nuclear protection as an 
argument for their own nuclear possession and 
modernisation. In the case of the United States, NATO’s 
institutionally enshrined plea for alliance-wide nuclear 
defence functions not only as a justification for nuclear 
armament in general, but also as an argument for the 
retention of “numbers or types of nuclear capabilities that 
it [the United States] might not deem necessary if it were 
concerned only with its own defense.”19
19 W. Perry et al., America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington  
DC: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2009), p. 8.
20 As noted above, as of writing, the Republic of North Macedonia was in the process of joining NATO.
21 NATO, “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review” (20 May 2012), para.II(9).
22 “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Toward a More Robust Alliance and Greater Shared Responsibilities”, 3 October 2013, at:  
 bit.ly/2MeBsVk.
23 See, e.g., The White House, “Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea”, 16 June 2009, at: on.cfr.org/2KckdS0.
Note, however, that not all military alliances that include a 
nuclear-armed state are automatically an extended-
nuclear-deterrence arrangement or nuclear “umbrella”. For 
example, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, 
Tajikistan, and Thailand all maintain military alliances with 
either Russia or the United States but have through 
national statements, or signature and ratification of 
international agreements signalled that they do not 
support the use of nuclear weapons under any 
circumstances. 
The 29 (soon to be 30)20 members of NATO have accepted 
potential nuclear weapon use through their endorsement 
of various alliance documents. According to NATO’s 2012 
“Deterrence and Defence Posture Review”, the “supreme 
guarantee” of the allies’ security “is provided by the 
strategic nuclear forces of the alliance”.21 While some of 
the alliance’s members maintain policies not to allow the 
stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories, none of 
them has so far rejected the use, or even the first use, of 
nuclear weapons on its behalf.
US allies Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea 
(South Korea) have also made explicit statements or 
published strategy documents endorsing the potential use 
of nuclear weapons on their behalf. The governments of 
the United States and Japan expressed through a joint 
statement in 2013 that they remained committed to the 
security of Japan “through the full range of US military 
capabilities, including nuclear and conventional.”22 South 
Korea has endorsed similar statements.23 With respect to 
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Australia, a 2016 Australian White Paper on defence 
appears to directly encourage the United States to retain 
nuclear weapons: “Only the nuclear and conventional 
military capabilities of the United States can offer effective 
deterrence against the possibility of nuclear threats 
against Australia.”24 
The Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO) has also been understood by certain observers as 
a nuclear alliance. In 2010, the CSTO’s Secretary-General 
suggested Russia had extended a “nuclear umbrella” over 
all members of the alliance.25 Yet, the CSTO’s members do 
not appear to have adopted official documents stipulating 
a nuclear dimension to the alliance. On the contrary, three 
of the CSTO’s members have actively distanced them-
selves from nuclear deterrence. Through the 2006 Treaty 
of Semipalatinsk – the treaty establishing Central Asia as 
a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) –  
Table 2: Extended-nuclear-deterrence arrangements
Nuclear alliance States 
NATO Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.
Bilateral - Russia, Belarus (CSTO/Union State).
- Russia, Armenia (CSTO).
- United States, Australia (ANZUS).
- United States, Japan (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan (Anpo)). 
- United States, South Korea (Mutual Defense Treaty).
24 Australian Department of Defence, “Defence White Paper”, 2016, p. 121, at: bit.ly/2HMbnJ9.
25 International Law and Policy Institute, “Under my Umbrella”, Report, 2016, p. 8, at: bit.ly/2mWvRHp.
26 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (adopted 2006, in force 2009), Art. 1(1)(c).
27 Ibid.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan have committed 
never to “assist or encourage” the development, 
manufacture, or possession of nuclear weapons.26 
Kazakhstan has also signed and ratified the TPNW. 
Belarus, however, which is allied to Russia through the 
CSTO and the Union State, has previously expressed public 
support for nuclear deterrence.27 Armenia, the last CSTO 
member, has, to our knowledge, not explicitly endorsed 
the potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, but has 
also not publicly rejected this (or the statement of the 
CSTO Secretary-General). Armenia is therefore in this 
report included among the list of nuclear-weapon-
complicit states. 
An overview of the members of extended-nuclear-
deterrence arrangements is presented in Table 2.
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Fig 3: Locations of foreign deployed nuclear weapons, 2019 
Host States
Among the nuclear-weapon-complicit states, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey have a 
particular, operational role in assisting and encouraging 
the retention of nuclear weapons. They host approximately 
150 American B-61 nuclear gravity bombs between them 
on their metropolitan territories,28 as shown in Figure 3 
above. The B-61 bombs are assumed to have explosive 
yields ranging from an equivalent of 0.3 to 170 kilotons of 
TNT. They are believed to be located at six bases: Kleine 
Brogel Air Base in Belgium; Büchel Air Base in Germany; 
Aviano and Ghedi air bases in Italy; Volkel Air Base in the 
Netherlands; and Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. The “deterrent” 
value of these foreign-deployed nuclear weapons is a 
subject of debate.29
The respective hosting arrangements are thought to be 
governed by classified bilateral agreements between the 
United States and the host states. Representatives of the 
host states have traditionally been reluctant to discuss 
their governments’ hosting policies, in part due to the 
28 T. Sauer and B. van der Zwaan, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe After NATO’s Lisbon Summit”, Harvard Kennedy School (2011), at: bit.ly/32cXbA4.
29 For a review of this issue see: Todd Sescher, “Sharing the Bomb” (2017), at: at.virginia.edu/2PlVDlW.
30 H. M. Kristensen, “Nukes in Europe: Secrecy Under Siege”, Federation of American Scientists (13 June 2013), at: bit.ly/2L68B37.
31 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “One-time Leaders May Face Charges for Discussing Dutch-Based Nukes” (14 June 2013), at: bit.ly/2zw6Jda.
classification of the respective hosting arrangements as 
state secrets. In 2013, two former Dutch prime ministers 
publicly confirmed that the Netherlands hosts nuclear 
weapons. Ruud Lubbers, prime minister from 1982 to 
1994, stated that he “would never have thought those silly 
things [nuclear bombs] would still be there in 2013”. Dries 
van Agt, prime minister from 1977 to 1982, said the bombs 
“are there and it’s crazy they still are”.30 Both were 
threatened with prosecution,31 but formal charges were 
never laid.  
The nuclear weapons stored in Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Turkey are all believed to be under 
the control of the United States. Yet arrangements are 
reportedly in place for the bombs to be transferred to and 
used by the host state in an emergency. Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, and the Netherlands all have a nuclear role and retain 
nuclear-capable aircraft and pilots trained in the use of the 
weapons at the bases in question. The aircraft are 
sometimes referred to as “dual-key”, as their employment 
of nuclear weapons would have to be approved both by 
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the US government and the government of the respective 
host state. In the case of the B-61 bombs stationed at 
Incirlik in Turkey, however, any use of the weapons would 
reportedly be carried out by aircraft stationed at other 
bases, but it is not known whether they are US or Turkish 
aircraft. There are ostensibly no nuclear-capable aircraft 
at Incirlik.32 
Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands have recently, 
or are still, undergoing processes to procure new fighter 
aircraft. In October 2018, after years of debate, the Belgian 
government announced its decision to replace Belgium’s 
fleet of nuclear-capable F-16s with a fleet of nuclear-
capable F-35s. Italy was involved in the development of 
F-35 from the mid-2000s and decided in 2012 to purchase 
90 planes.33 The F-35s will replace Italy’s nuclear-capable 
Tornado fighters. The Netherlands was also heavily 
involved in the development of the F-35 and decided in 
2013 to buy 37 planes. However, a majority of Dutch MPs 
supported a motion in the Dutch parliament stating that 
the F-35s should have no nuclear role, reducing the role of 
nuclear weapons in the Netherlands’ military doctrine.34 
Yet the Dutch government decided to ignore the 
parliamentary vote, opting for nuclear-capable F-35s after 
all. In 2018, the government decided to increase the 
number of planes being ordered from 37 to 67.35 The final 
technical adjustments necessary to make the F-35 able to 
employ nuclear weapons (“Block 4”) are expected to be 
implemented across the relevant host states between 
2019 and 2024. Germany is due to replace its fleet of 
Tornado fighters over the next few decades. In January 
2019, the German government announced that it would 
pick either the Eurofighter or Boeing’s F/A-18. Sources 
reportedly specified that any replacement aircraft “must 
be able to carry U.S. nuclear weapons”.36 
32 H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 5 (2017), at: bit.ly/2NEA1yL.
33    Reuters, “Italy cuts spending on F-35 fighter plane” (14 February 2012), at: reut.rs/2ZjrsAe. 
34 DutchNews.nl, “Ministers ignore vote, JSF jet fighter could carry nuclear weapons” (14 January 2014), at: bit.ly/2Zp6NuS. 
35 De Telegraaf, “Ruimer budget aanschaf F-35” (18 September 2019).
36 A. Shalal, “Germany drops F-35 from fighter tender; Boeing F/A-18 and Eurofighter to battle on”, Reuters (31 January 2019).
37 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Belgian Senate Calls for Removal of U.S. Nukes” (22 April 2005), at: bit.ly/2NH12Bl.
38 M. Skjønsberg, “Nato og amerikanske kjernevåpen i Europa”, Internasjonal Politikk 75, no. 2 (2017), pp. 187–88.
39 NATO, “Brussels Summit Declaration” (11 July 2018), at: bit.ly/30HzwYc.
40 The figure does not include territories that during the relevant period were under the direct jurisdiction or administration of a nuclear-armed state (Guam, 
Okinawa, and the Marshall Islands). Sources: H. M. Kristensen, “Where the Bombs Are”, FAS (9 November 2006); M. Furmann and T. S. Sechser, “Appen-
dices for ‘Signalling Alliance Commitments’” (6 April 2014); R. S. Norris, W. M. Arkin, and W. Burr, “Where they Were”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no. 
6 (1999), E. N. Rózsa and A. Péczelli, “Nuclear Attitudes in Central Europe”, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, no. 42 (2015).
There have been several attempts by European 
policymakers to have the remaining weapons removed 
from European soil. For example, in 2005, the Belgian 
Senate unanimously adopted a resolution calling for the 
removal of nuclear weapons from Belgian territory.37 In 
2009, the German coalition government committed 
through its governing platform to have the remaining 
nuclear weapons in Germany withdrawn. The then Foreign 
Minister Guido Westerwelle promoted the initiative 
enthusiastically for some time, but the United States 
responded negatively, and the initiative was quietly shelved 
the next year.38 At the NATO summit in 2018, the allies 
collectively declared that NATO’s deterrence posture 
“relies on the United States’ nuclear weapons forward-
deployed in Europe and the capabilities and infrastructure 
provided by Allies concerned.”39 
Only the United States is believed to station nuclear 
weapons in other countries today, but Russia and the 
United Kingdom have also done so in the past. A total of 
23 states are believed to have hosted such deployments, 
in some cases without their knowledge (see Table 3 
overleaf).40 Most nuclear hosting arrangements were put 
in place in the 1950s and 1960s, and all but the above-
mentioned five cases in Europe are believed to have since 
been discontinued. Most deployments were ended in the 
1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, when British, Soviet, and US 
nuclear weapons were withdrawn from Bulgaria, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, Cyprus, the German Democratic Republic 
(East Germany), Hungary, Mongolia, the Philippines, 
Poland, Singapore, South Korea, and Spain. Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine gave up the nuclear weapons 
they inherited upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Since the withdrawal of the nuclear weapons from Greece 
in 2001, however, the rate of discontinuance of nuclear 
hosting arrangements has effectively ground to a halt. 
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 Table 3: Nuclear-weapon hosting, 1945–201941
State Owner Start of deployment End of deployment
Belgium United States 1963 Active 
(West) Germany United States; United Kingdom* 1955 Active
Italy United States 1957 Active
Netherlands United States 1960 Active
Turkey United States 1959 Active
United Kingdom United States 1954 2008
Greece United States 1960 2001
Mongolia Soviet Union 1967 1992
East Germany United States 1958 1991
South Korea United States 1958 1991
Czechoslovakia Soviet Union 1968 1990
Poland Soviet Union 1968 1990
Hungary Soviet Union 1974 1988
Canada United States 1963 1984
Philippines United States 1957 1977
Spain United States 1958 1976
Cyprus United Kingdom 1961 1975
Taiwan United States 1958 1975
Singapore** United Kingdom 1963 1970
Morocco United States 1954 1963
Cuba Soviet Union 1962 1962
Iceland United States 1956 1959
Denmark (Greenland) United States 1958 1958
* The United Kingdom stationed nuclear weapons in (West) Germany from 1972 to 1998.
** Singapore initially formed part of the British Empire, then merged with the independent state of Malaysia in 1963, before gaining independence in 1965.
41 H. M. Kristensen, “Where the Bombs Are”, FAS (9 November 2006); M. Furmann and T. S. Sechser, “Appendices for ‘Signaling Alliance Commitments’” (6 
April 2014); R. S. Norris, W.M. Arkin, and W. Burr, “Where they Were”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 55, no. 6 (1999); E. N. Rózsa and A. Péczelli, “Nuclear 
Attitudes in Central Europe”, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, no. 42 (2015).
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 Fig 4: The world’s nuclear arsenals.
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INDIA 
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ISRAEL
  Total 80
USA  
  Total 6,185
Russia    Total: 6,500
 Deployed,  Nondeployed,  Retired
Source: Hans. M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, ”Status of World Nuclear Forces”, Federation of American Scientists (May 2019).
Deployed:	 Nuclear warheads deployed on intercontinental missiles and at heavy bomber bases or on bases with operational short-range delivery systems.
Nondeployed:	 Nuclear warheads not deployed on launchers but in storage.
Retired: Retired, but still intact, nuclear warheads awaiting dismantlement.
The deployed and non-deployed warheads together constitute a state’s military stockpile, which means that they are in the custody of the military and earmarked for use by military forces. The military stockpile and retired warheads together constitute a state’s total
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Nuclear Arsenals
As of May 2019, the nine nuclear-armed states retained 
approximately 13,890 nuclear warheads between them. 
Of these, 9,335 warheads were deployed or in storage, 
forming the active stockpile available for use by these 
states’ armed forces. The rest were retired nuclear 
warheads awaiting dismantlement.42 The United States 
and Russia together possess about 93 per cent of the 
world’s nuclear arsenal (see Figure 4 above). 
The Ban Monitor’s estimate is that the total explosive yield 
of the nine nuclear-armed states’ active stockpiles of 
nuclear warheads is equivalent to almost 1.9 gigatons (1.9 
million kilotons) of TNT. With a world population of 7.7 
billion, this means that a minority of nine states have a 
combined, active nuclear arsenal capable of unleashing 
firepower equal to around 245 kilograms of TNT per 
person on earth. The estimated yield of each nuclear-
armed state’s active arsenal is shown in Figure 5.43 
For context, Figure 6 also translates the estimated yield 
of the active nuclear arsenals into Hiroshima-bomb 
equivalents. Most nuclear weapons today have an 
explosive yield that is many times higher than that of the 
nuclear weapon dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, whose 
explosive force was the equivalent of 15 kilotons of TNT 
and ultimately led to the deaths of an estimated 200,000 
people.44  
A typical nuclear weapon in today’s global arsenal has a 
yield of around 100 kilotons, approximately seven times 
that of the Hiroshima-bomb. For further context, Figure 7 
overleaf provides an overview of the immediate estimated 
fatalities and injuries which a 100-kiloton nuclear weapon 
would cause if it were dropped today on Pyongyang, 
Tehran, New York City, Beijing, or Moscow.45
42 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces”, Federation of American Scientists (May 2019), at: bit.ly/2Ph4KUH.
43 Calculations of explosive yield were largely based on data from the Nuclear Notebooks by Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2miTj16. For 
warheads with a range of yields listed by the Federation of American Scientists, the average yield was used in the calculation. For warheads without 
previously estimated yields or undefined numbers, a best approximation was made based on average warhead sizes and known information about the 
country’s arsenal. Total arsenals and yield estimates are based on active arsenals and do not include warheads waiting to be retired.
44 M. Hall, “By the Numbers: World War II’s atomic bombs”, CNN (6 August 2013), at: cnn.it/2NOW9Xl.
45 Statistics on the number of fatalities and injured are from NUKEMAP by Alex Wellerstein, using population density information and nuclear effects  
information, at: bit.ly/2kTpBiH. Fatalities and injuries are based on the immediate impact of the detonation and do not account for long-term radiation 
deaths and injuries or the lasting environmental impact a large-scale nuclear detonation could cause. All of the detonations calculated were airbursts,  
not surface detonations.
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Five of the nine nuclear-armed states – France, Pakistan, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – 
maintain written nuclear doctrines that allow for the “first 
use” of nuclear weapons. Two of the nine, India and China, 
have long had so-called no-first-use policies, declaring that 
they will only use nuclear weapons in retaliation to the use 
of such weapons by an adversary (Indian policy allowed 
for the use of nuclear weapons in response to chemical 
or biological attack in 2003). Yet both are in the process 
of expanding their arsenals, which many analysts have 
interpreted to suggesting that they might be envisioning 
pre-emptive use under certain circumstances.46  Kim Jong-
un stated in 2016 and 2018 that North Korea will not use 
nuclear weapons unless “its sovereignty is encroached 
upon by any hostile force with nuclear weapons”.47 
However, other statements issued by the same 
government, including threats of a “pre-emptive nuclear 
strike of justice” against Japan and South Korea, have 
negated the credibility of these comments. Russian 
President Vladimir Putin’s apparent claim in October 2018 
that Russia would not use nuclear weapons first is not 
reflected in Russia’s official nuclear-weapons doctrine, 
which explicitly stipulates that Russia would consider their 
46 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2019”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019), at: bit.ly/2ZuC0Yx; H. M. Kristensen and 
M. Korda, “Indian nuclear forces, 2018”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 6 (2018), at: bit.ly/32fNiS7.
47 R. Smart, “North Korea will not use nuclear weapons first, says Kim Jon-un”, The Guardian (8 May 2016), at: bit.ly/2mvie1C.
48 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014), at: bit.ly/2neZDH8.
49     H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 5 (2017), at: bit.ly/2NEA1yL. 
50  SSBN stands for “submersible ship, ballistic missile, nuclear powered”.
use in response to the use of “weapons of mass destruction 
against it and/or its allies, as well as aggression against 
Russia with the use of conventional weapons when the 
very existence of the state is in jeopardy”.48  The last 
nuclear-armed state, Israel, has not formally admitted to 
possessing nuclear weapons, and has thus not made clear 
its policy on use. 
Theorists often distinguish between strategies aimed at 
destroying the adversary’s missile bases and other nuclear 
assets (“counter-force”) and strategies aimed at killing 
civilians and destroying the adversary’s population centres 
(“counter-value”). Counter-force strategies are commonly 
presumed to require larger nuclear arsenals and more 
sophisticated command and control structures than do 
counter-value strategies. Russia and the United States are 
believed to have maintained plans for both counter-value 
and counter-force strikes since the 1960s. The remaining 
seven nuclear-armed states have maintained smaller 
nuclear arsenals primarily structured to facilitate counter-
value strikes in response to an initial attack. However, there 
are now signs that certain nuclear-armed states, China 
and India in particular, are expanding their arsenals in such 
a way as to enable counter-force strikes against certain 
potential opponents.
Facilities and Deployments
As of 2017, nuclear weapons were believed to be stored 
or deployed at a minimum of 108 locations across the nine 
nuclear-armed states and the five host states.49 Nuclear 
weapons are also frequently transported between these 
locations, be it for deployment, retirement, maintenance, 
or modifications. A significant number of nuclear weapons 
are also on active patrol, carried through the world’s 
oceans on nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines 
(SSBNs50) (often referred to as “continuous-at-sea-
deterrence”). Between them, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States are believed to have 
around 15 SSBNs on active duty at any given time. Each 
of these submarines carries incredible nuclear firepower. 
For example, a single UK Vanguard-class submarine 
carries 40 nuclear warheads with estimated explosive 
yields equivalent to 100 kilotons of TNT each, meaning 
that a single UK SSBN carries firepower more than 250 
times greater than the yield from the Hiroshima bomb. The 
United States retains 14 SSBNs, Russia 10, the UK 4, and 
France 4. All are in the process of building or procuring a 
new generation of submarines.
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France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
all maintain nuclear weapons on alert, that is, warheads 
mated with means of delivery and ready to be launched 
on short notice (within 5 minutes). Combined, these four 
states are estimated to deploy about 1,800 alert nuclear 
warheads between them, with Russia and the United 
States accounting for more than 90 per cent of that 
number. 51 As discussed above, France, Russia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States all have SSBNs on duty at 
all times. Russia and the United States also deploy several 
hundred alert ground-launched nuclear missiles. 
Table 4: Alert status of nuclear forces
State Capability Alert status
China
Air-delivered nuclear weapons Not on alert
Land-based nuclear missiles Not on alert
Nuclear-armed submarines Unknown
France
Air-delivered nuclear weapons Not on alert
Nuclear-armed submarines On alert
India
Air-delivered nuclear weapons Not on alert
Land-based nuclear missiles Not on alert
Ship-launched nuclear weapons Not on alert
Israel
Air-delivered nuclear weapons Unknown
Land-based nuclear missiles Unknown
Nuclear-armed submarines Unknown
North Korea Land-based nuclear missiles Unknown
Pakistan
Air-delivered nuclear weapons Not on alert
Land-based nuclear missiles Not on alert
Russia
Air-delivered nuclear weapons Not on alert
Land-based nuclear missiles On alert
Nuclear-armed submarines On alert
United Kingdom Nuclear-armed submarines On alert
United States
Air-delivered nuclear weapons Not on alert
Land-based nuclear missiles On alert
Nuclear-armed submarines On alert
51 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “Status of World Nuclear Forces”, Federation of American Scientists (May 2019), at: bit.ly/2Ph4KUH.
52 T. Zhao, Tides of Change (Washington DC: Carnegie, 2018), pp. 16–17.
The remaining nuclear-armed states are thought not to 
maintain nuclear weapons on alert, storing their nuclear 
warheads separately from their respective delivery 
vehicles. However, it has been suggested that this might 
change as China, India, Israel, and Pakistan are in the 
process of fielding or upgrading their submarine forces. It 
is not clear whether China, which has already fielded a fleet 
of such submarines, equips its SSBNs with nuclear 
weapons in peacetime.52 Table 4 below summarizes best 
available knowledge on the alert status of nuclear forces.
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War Games and Missile Tests
The nuclear-armed states routinely engage in military 
exercises involving manoeuvres by nuclear-capable 
aircraft, submarines, and surface ships. They also routinely 
test their nuclear command-and-control infrastructure and 
missiles. 
Several non-nuclear-armed states have in recent years 
taken part in such exercises, in particular through NATO’s 
nuclear sharing scheme. Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the 
Netherlands are all believed to engage in exercises to use 
the US nuclear weapons stationed on their territory with 
their own dual-capable aircraft. Czechia and Poland have 
practised the support of nuclear operations with conven-
tional aircraft (the so-called “SNOWCAT”53 mission).54
Table 5: Nuclear-capable-missile tests, Sept. 2018–Aug. 201955  
State Date Missile Location
China 24 November 2018 SLBM (JL-3) Bohai Sea.
China January 2019 IRBM (DF-26) Launched from Northwest China.
China January 2019 ICBM launch reported (suspec-ted DF-41) Unknown.
China 2 June 2019 SLBM (JL-3) Flight from the Bohai Sea to a desert area in western China.
France 4 February 2019 ALCM (ASMP-A) Bordeaux.
India 20 September 2018 SRBM (Prahaar) Flight from Chandipur, Odisha to the Bay of Bengal.
India 6 October 2018 SRBM (Prithvi II) Flight from Chandipur, Odisha to the Bay of Bengal.
India 30 October 2018 SRBM (Agni I) Flight from Abdul Kalam Island.
India 10 December 2018 ICBM (Agni V) Flight from Abdul Kalam Island.
India 23 December 2018 IRBM (Agni IV) Flight from Abdul Kalam Island.
India 15 April 2019 GLCM (Nirbhay) Flight from Abdul Kalam Island.
India 27 June 2019 SRBM (Prithvi-II) Flight from Chandipur, Odisha.
North Korea 3 May 2019 Multiple short-range missiles Flight from Wonsan, Kangwŏn Province to the Sea of Japan.
North Korea 9 May 2019 2 short-range ballistic missile (SRBMs) Flight from North Pyongan, possibly Kusong.
North Korea 25 July 2019 2 SRBMs Flight from Wonsan, Kangwŏn Province to the Sea of Japan.
North Korea 30 July 2 unidentified rockets Flight from Wonsan, Kangwŏn Province to the Sea of Japan.
North Korea 2 August 2019 2 SRBM (likely KN-23) Missiles landed in the Sea of Japan.
North Korea 5 August 2019 2 SRBMs (likely KN-23) Flight from Kwail, South Hwanghae Province, to the Sea of Japan.
North Korea 6 August 2019 2 SRBMs (KN-23) Flight from Kwail, South Hwanghae Province, to an islet in the Sea of Japan.
North Korea 10 August 2019 2 SRBMs Flight from Hamhŭng, Hamgyŏng Province, to the Sea of Japan. 
North Korea 16 August 2019 2 unidentified missiles Flight from Tongchon, Kangwŏn Province, to the Sea of Japan.
53 Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air Tactics.
54 H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, “United States nuclear forces, 2018”, 5 March 2018, at: bit.ly/33vDyoo.
55 The list summarises reporting by Ankit Panda and Franz-Stefan Gady in The Diplomat and news updates published by Missile Threat, Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS).
Tests of nuclear-capable missiles in particular may 
function as sabre-rattling and escalate tensions. As 
explained in Chapter 5, tests of nuclear-capable missiles 
amount to development of nuclear weapons and are as 
such prohibited by the TPNW. In some situations, missile 
tests may also amount to threatening to use nuclear 
weapons, which is also prohibited by the TPNW.
Table 5 lists tests of nuclear-capable missiles from 
September 2018 to August 2019. Russia, India, Pakistan, 
North Korea, and the United States stand out as the most 
active testers of such missiles. Note that the list is based 
on public reports and may therefore not be exhaustive.
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State Date Missile Location
Pakistan 8 October 2018 IRBM (Hatf-5) Unknown.
Pakistan 24 January 2019 4 SRBMs (Nasr) Unknown.
Pakistan 29 January 2019 SRBM (Nasr) Unknown.
Pakistan 31 January 2019 SRBM (Nasr) Unknown.
Pakistan 23 April 2019 SLCM (likely nuclear capable) Flight from the Arabian Sea to a target on land.
Pakistan 23 May 2019 IRBM (Shaheen II) Missile landed in the Arabian Sea.
Pakistan 29 August 2019 SRBM (Hatf 3) Unknown.
Russia 2017–2018 SRBM (Iskander-M)
In December 2018, the Russian Ministry of Defence  
confirmed that Russia had used multiple Iskander-M missiles 
– with conventional warheads – in Syria.
Russia 11–17 September 2018
Several anti-ballistic/air-defence 
missiles Siberia (“Vostok” war games).
Russia 26 September 2018 Multiple ASCMs (Onyx) Launched from Kotelny Island, Bulunsky. 
Russia 6 October 2018 2 SLCMs (3M-14 Kalibr) Caspian Sea (flight to Chechen Island).
Russia 11 October 2018 Several ballistic and cruise missiles Barents and Okhotsk seas (annual nuclear war games).
Russia 1 December 2018 Anti-ballistic missile (likely nucle-ar-capable) Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan.
Russia 6 December 2019 SRBM (Iskander-M) Flight from Kapustin Yar, Astrakhan Oblast.
Russia 23 December 2018 Anti-satellite missile (PL-19 Nudol) Flight likely from Plesetsk range, Arkhangelsk Oblast.
Russia 29 January 2019 GLCM (Burevrestnik) Flight from Kapustin Yar, Astrakhan Oblast.
Russia 5 February 2019 ICBM (RS-24 Yars) Flight from Plesetsk Cosmodrome, Arkhangelsk Oblast to the Kura missile-test range, Kamchatka peninsula.
Russia 5 April 2019 SLCM (Kalibr) Launched from port in Zapadnaya Litsa, Kola Peninsula.
Russia 1 July 2019 Anti-ballistic missile (likely 53T6M) Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan.
United States 6 November 2018 ICBM (Minuteman III) Flight from Vandenberg, California to Kwajalein Atoll,  Marshall Islands.
United States 5 February 2019 ICBM (Minuteman III) Flight from Vandenberg, California to Kwajalein Atoll,  Marshall Islands.
United States 25 March 2019 ICBM and ICBM interceptors
ICBM flight from Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands.  
Target shot down by interceptor missiles launched from  
Vandenberg, California.
United States 1 May 2019 ICBM (Minuteman III) Flight from Vandenberg, California to Kwajalein Atoll,  Marshall Islands.
United States 9 May 2019 ICBM (Minuteman III) Flight from Vandenberg, California to Kwajalein Atoll,  Marshall Islands.
United States 9 May 2019 SLBM (Trident II) Flight from Cape Canaveral, Florida to the South Atlantic,  off the coast of Namibia.
United States 19 May 2019 GLCM (Tomahawk)
Flight from San Nicolas Island, California. The missile was, 
according to the US Department of Defense, “conventionally 
configured”.
Dangerous Nuclear Rhetoric and Threats
The last few years have seen a spike in dangerous nuclear 
rhetoric and outright threats to use nuclear weapons. 
During the Cold War period, it was widely understood that 
a conflict involving nuclear-armed states could escalate 
to the use of nuclear weapons. “Signalling” of nuclear 
intentions was usually understated and often occurred in 
the context of military-to-military contacts. In contrast, 
today’s reality involves much more explicit threats and 
aggressive rhetoric. Recent explicit and implicit threats of 
nuclear-weapon use by leaders of several nuclear-armed 
states have contributed to the creation of an unstable 
security environment. While certain threats and/or 
aggressive statements were made in the context of 
escalating tensions, others were issued almost entirely 
without preface and were ostensibly designed to achieve 
political objectives. This trend of using threatening rhetoric 
involving nuclear weapons against specific states for 
political purposes entails a broadening of their role beyond 
nuclear deterrence towards their use in nuclear “blackmail” 
or “compellence”.
For example, in 2015, the Russian ambassador to Denmark 
stated that “Danish warships will be targets for Russian 
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nuclear missiles” should Denmark join NATO’s missile 
defence system.56 In March 2016, in reaction to the 
commencement of a US-South Korean military exercise, 
North Korea threatened to turn Washington and Seoul into 
“flames and ashes”.57  In August 2017, US President Donald 
Trump asserted that North Korea “best not make any more 
threats to the United States”, or “they will be met with fire 
and fury and frankly power, the likes of which this world 
has never seen before.”58 The next month, following the 
adoption by the UN Security Council of new sanctions 
against North Korea, the Korea Asia-Pacific “Peace 
Committee”, which oversees the country’s external 
relations, stated that the United States should be “beaten 
to death like a rabid dog” and Japan “sunken into the sea 
by the nuclear bomb of Juche”.59  The trend has continued 
in 2018 and 2019:
• In his New-Year’s-Day speech of 1 January 2018, the 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un stated: “The entire 
United States is within range of our nuclear weapons, 
and a nuclear button is always on my desk. This is reality, 
not a threat”.60
• On 2 January 2018, in response to Kim Jong-un’s 
“button” comment, US President Donald Trump tweeted: 
“Will someone from his depleted and food starved 
regime please inform him that I too have a Nuclear 
Button, but it is a much bigger & more powerful one than 
his, and my Button works!”61 
• On 1 March 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
announced the development of an “invincible” new 
nuclear cruise missile. An accompanying video showed 
a computer animation of missiles raining down on 
Florida.62 
• On 12 March 2018, in the context of UK investigations into 
the attempted murder of a former Russian double-agent 
and his daughter in Salisbury, a spokesperson for the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs warned: “Who does 
Britain think it is, issuing ultimatums to a nuclear power?”63
• On 22 July 2018, US President Trump tweeted (in capital 
letters) to Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani: “Never, ever 
threaten the United States again or you will suffer 
consequences the likes of which few throughout history 
have ever suffered before.”64 
56 Reuters, “Russia threatens to aim nuclear missiles at Denmark ships if it joins NATO shield” (22 March 2015), at: reut.rs/348UNfr.
57 AP, “North Korea threatens to reduce US and South Korea to ‘Flames and Ash’,” The Guardian (7 March 2016), at: bit.ly/2ZvHxOt.
58 P. Baker and C. Sang-Hun, “Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ Against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.”, New York Times (8 August 2017), at: nyti.ms/2HtIO2s.
59 J. McCurry, “We will sink Japan and turn US to ‘ashes and darkness’, says North Korea”, The Guardian (13 September 2017), at: bit.ly/30L7ZoI. “Juche” is 
North Korea’s state ideology of self-reliance.
60    Newshub, “‘Nuclear button is always on my desk’” (1 January 2018), at: bit.ly/2MIjn1l. 
61 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (2 January 2018), at: bit.ly/2UgleeP.
62 BBC, “Russia’s Putin unveils ‘invincible’ nuclear weapons” (1 March 2018), at: bbc.in/2ZvgHdn.
63 P. Gourtsoyannis, “Russia warns UK”, The Scotsman (13 March 2018), at: bit.ly/2zrSZjG.
64 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (22 July 2018), at: bit.ly/2Zvhc7f.
65 D. Williams, “At Dimona reactor, Netanyahu warns Israel’s foes they risk ruin”, Reuters (29 August 2018), at: reut.rs/2UdDNAe.
66 N. MacFarquhar, “Threatening U.S., Putin Promises Russians Both Missiles and Butter”, New York Times (20 February 2019), at: nyti.ms/2ZtakDq.
67 J. Trevitchick, “Pakistan Promises Retaliation, Makes Nuclear Threats After Indian Jets Bomb Its Territory”, The Drive (26 February 2019), at: bit.ly/2NDaxS9.
68 E. Zuesse, “Trump Threatens Nuclear War if Russia Protects Venezuela”, Modern Diplomacy (1 April 2019), at: bit.ly/32dGwws.
69 C. McGrath, “Modi Warns Pakistan Against ‘Threats’”, Express (18 April 2019), at: bit.ly/2ZrqCl2.
70 Donald J. Trump, Twitter (19 May 2019), at: bit.ly/2HyN3tB.
• Visiting the Dimona facility on 29 August 2018, Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned Israel’s 
enemies that Israel has the means to destroy them. 
Netanyahu stated: “Those who threaten to wipe us out 
put themselves in a similar danger”.65 The Dimona 
reactor is believed to have produced the fissile material 
for Israel’s nuclear weapons.
• On 20 February 2019, in his annual State of the Nation 
speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin warned that, if 
the US stationed intermediate-range missiles on the 
European continent, “Russia would aim its weapons at 
those missiles and at targets in the United States.”66
• On 26 February 2019, amid rising tensions between 
India and Pakistan, the latter publicly announced that it 
would convene a meeting of the National Command 
Authority (NCA), which oversees Pakistan’s nuclear 
arsenal. According to one observer, the disclosure of the 
NCA meeting was “clearly meant to be a threat of nuclear 
retaliation. ‘I hope you know what that [convening the 
meeting] means,’ the Pakistani spokesperson said. They 
also declared that Pakistan would ‘dominate the 
escalation ladder.’”67
• On 27 March 2019, US President Donald Trump stated 
that Russia had to “get out” of Venezuela, and that “all 
options” were on the table if they did not.68 
• On 17 April 2019, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
stated: “In the past our people would weep, go around 
the world saying Pakistan did this, did that. It is now 
Pakistan’s turn to weep.” He further noted that India has 
“the mother of nuclear bombs”, and that he had told 
Pakistan: “do whatever you want to do but we will 
retaliate.”69
• On 19 May 2019, US President Donald Trump declared 
on Twitter that he would bring about “the official end of 
Iran” should the latter want to fight.70 US nuclear-capable 
bombers had been deployed to a US base in Qatar, 
neighbouring Iran, the week before.
• On 23 July 2019, ahead of a meeting with Pakistan’s 
prime minister, US President Donald Trump asserted 
that “I have plans on Afghanistan that if I wanted to win 
that war, Afghanistan would be wiped off the face of the 
earth, it would be gone, it would be over in literally 10 
days.” The comment was widely read as an allusion to 
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plans to use nuclear weapons.71 At a news conference 
with Australia’s prime minister on 20 September 2019, 
Trump repeated this point, saying that “We’ve been very 
effective in Afghanistan, and if we wanted to do a certain 
method of war, we could win that very quickly, but many, 
many, really, tens of millions of people would be killed, 
and we think it’s unnecessary.”72
While many of these outbursts arguably do not qualify as 
“threatening” to use nuclear weapons in a legal sense, they 
nevertheless challenge the norms of nuclear restraint and 
tradition of non-use. They also further increase incentives 
for nuclear proliferation and are incompatible with the NPT 
and the 2010 NPT Action Plan commitments to adopt 
policies compatible with achieving a world without nuclear 
weapons and to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in 
military and security policies. See Chapter 5 and the 
section on Article 1(1)(d) for an analysis of the TPNW 
prohibition on threatening to use nuclear weapons.
Development, Production, and Maintenance 
of Nuclear Weapons
All nine nuclear-armed states are currently investing 
heavily in their nuclear forces. Most of the nuclear-armed 
states brand their ongoing development efforts as 
“modernisation”, a euphemism for what the editor in chief 
of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has labelled a “ritual 
squandering of national resources on weapons of horror 
that can never reasonably be used.” 73 
The nuclear weapon “modernisation” programmes are the 
most visible sign that the commitment in Action 1 in the 
NPT 2010 Action plan to adopt policies “fully compatible 
with the objective of achieving a world without nuclear 
weapons”74  is not being respected. Many weapon systems 
currently being built are set to remain operational into the 
2070s and 2080s, meaning that the states in question are 
committing themselves to nuclear armament for at least 
half a century into the future. In other words, ongoing 
modernisation projects “indicate that genuine progress 
towards nuclear disarmament will remain a distant goal”.75 
They also generate a dynamic that has been described as 
a “new nuclear arms race”.76  
71 A. Ward, “Trump says he could wipe Afghanistan off face of the earth in 10 days”, Vox (22 July 2019), at: bit.ly/2ZCuRWp.
72 J. Wagner, “Trump says he could end Afghanistan war quickly but “tens of millions” of people would die, Washington Post (20 September 2019), at: wapo.
st/2m6agLK.
73 J. Mecklin, “The wasteful and dangerous worldwide nuclear modernization craze”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 1 (2019), at: bit.ly/2Zm3VPf.
74 NPT 2010 Action Plan, at: bit.ly/2nnMJ9M.
75 S. Kyle, “Modernization of nuclear weapons continues”, SIPRI (18 June 2018), at: bit.ly/2MK3CHe.
76 B. Zala, “How the next nuclear arms race will be different from the last one”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2 January 2019), at: bit.ly/2UgyjVj.
77 F. S. Gady, “Russia (Once Again) Announces Start of Sea Trials of ‘Doomsday Weapon’”, The Diplomat (27 December 2018), at: bit.ly/2NFuloa.
78 K. Reif with A. Sanders-Zakre, “U.S. Nuclear Excess”, Arms Control Association (April 2019), at: bit.ly/2zt2yyL.
79 K. Reif, “Congress Funds Low-Yield Nuclear Warhead,” Arms Control Today (November 2018), at: bit.ly/327OJly.
80    H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2019”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019), at: bit.ly/2ZuC0Yx. 
81 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “French nuclear forces, 2019”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 1 (2019), at: bit.ly/2MKhqBr.
Russia is reportedly adding a range of new nuclear-weapon 
systems, including a nuclear-powered cruise missile and 
a nuclear-armed underwater drone capable of delivering 
a “radioactive tsunami”.77 Russia is also building new 
ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers, 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Russia is also 
widely believed to have developed and deployed a new 
missile system with a range exceeding 500 km, precipitating 
the demise of the INF Treaty in 2018–2019.
The United States is in the midst of a full overhaul of all 
three legs of its nuclear triad, an effort that will, over the 
next 30 years, commit expenditure on nuclear weapons 
of as much as $2 trillion (accounting for inflation).78 The 
United States is also developing new low-yield capabilities 
as outlined in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, and in 2018 
the US Congress approved funds to begin developing a 
ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile of INF 
range (500–5,500 km).79  
China is developing a new generation of ICBMs capable 
of carrying multiple independently targetable re-entry 
vehicles (MIRVs).80 France is in the process of acquiring a 
new generation of submarine-launched ballistic missiles 
and air-launched cruise missiles. Development of a new 
class of ballistic missile submarines is expected to begin 
during the 2019–24 military planning period.81 The United 
Kingdom is already in the process of building a new class 
of ballistic missile submarines. India, North Korea, and 
Pakistan continue to build new warheads and are 
reportedly working to develop ICBMs and sea-based 
nuclear forces.
Although some features of the modernisation projects 
now underway are intended to increase safety and ensure 
better command and control, they also involve an 
expansion in capabilities, including making the weapons 
smaller and faster. According to the Nuclear Threat 
Initiative (NTI), “[i]n some respects, TNWs [tactical nuclear 
weapons] are more dangerous than strategic weapons. 
Their small size, vulnerability to theft, and perceived 
usability make the existence of TNWs in national arsenals 
a risk to global security. And the new perception of the 
usability of nuclear weapons in both Russia and the United 
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States, albeit for different reasons, could create a dangerous 
precedent for other countries.”82 Other aspects of ongoing 
modernisation efforts increase the dependence of nuclear 
command and control systems on digital technologies. This 
may make such systems vulnerable to cyber interference 
and result in human errors, false alerts, and malicious 
hacking by hostile states or even non-state actors.83  
All the nuclear-armed states maintain strict government 
control over their nuclear-weapon programmes. However, 
a number of private companies are involved in the nuclear-
armed states’ development, production, and maintenance 
of nuclear-weapon systems in various ways. Most of these 
companies are headquartered in the nuclear-armed states, 
but some have headquarters or divisions in non-nuclear-
armed states. For example, the Belarusian company Minsk 
Automotive Factory is the only manufacturer of the self-
propelled mobile launchers for the Russian Topol-M 
ICBM.84  The multinational company Airbus Group, legally 
incorporated in the Netherlands is currently involved in the 
development and production of the French Navy’s M51 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, through its German-
headquartered division Airbus Defence and Space. The 
M51 will, over time, represent the main delivery system for 
France’s strategic nuclear weapons. The French Air Force’s 
ASMP-A missiles – designed to deliver nuclear warheads 
by air – were developed by the joint venture company 
MDBA, which was made up of Dutch/German-
headquartered Airbus, UK-headquartered BAE Systems, 
and Italian-headquartered Leonardo (formerly known as 
Finmeccanica). 
The development and production of nuclear weapons 
constitutes a multi-billion-dollar industry, with numerous 
large companies and universities profiting from, and 
lending their legitimacy to, the industrial effort.85 
Investment in the major nuclear-weapon developers is 
continuing to increase, although the number of investors 
is declining. A report published in June 2019 by PAX and 
ICAN found that a total of US$748 billion has been invested 
in nuclear weapon-producing companies by 325 banks 
and other financial institutions in the last two years.86  
Under the TPNW, a company that develops or produces 
key components for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device would be engaging in prohibited 
assistance. See Chapter 5 for the Ban Monitor’s analysis 
of the prohibition on assistance and corporate and state 
responsibility.
82 H. M. Kristensen and M. Korda, “French nuclear forces, 2019”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 1 (2019), at: bit.ly/2MKhqBr.
83 For an overview see: NTI, “Nuclear Weapons in the New Cyber Age” (26 September 2018), at: bit.ly/2Ug0OT7.
84 A. M. Dyner, “The Armed Forces of Belarus”, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs 26, no. 1 (2017), p. 54.
85 See, e.g., S. Snyder, Producing Mass Destruction: Private Companies and the Nuclear Weapon Industry, PAX, Utrecht, The Netherlands, May 2019.
86 S. Snyder, Shorting our Security – Financing the Companies that Make Nuclear Weapons, PAX and ICAN, Utrecht, The Netherlands, June 2019, at: bit.
ly/2KwIGBH. 
87 J. MacDonald, “What Is Enriched Uranium?”, JSTOR, 8 August 2019, at: bit.ly/2mA2SIW.
Fissile Material
Fissile Material Production
Fissile material – highly enriched uranium or reprocessed 
plutonium – is the key ingredient in nuclear weapons. 
Production of fissile material for nuclear weapons 
continues in North Korea, India, Pakistan, and, possibly, 
Israel (see Table 6). Argentina, Brazil, China, France, 
Germany, India, Iran, Japan, the Netherlands, Pakistan, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States produce 
or procure nuclear material that could potentially be used 
for non-peaceful purposes (see Table 7). 
To enrich uranium is to increase the percentage of U235 it 
contains. Natural uranium contains almost all U238 and 
very little U235. Conventional nuclear reactors require the 
fuel to be only about 3.5-4.5% U235. Although small 
amounts of uranium enriched to up to about 20% may be 
used in research, highly enriched uranium beyond that 
threshold is not needed for standard power generation. 
Atypical modern HEU-based weapon requires the amount 
of U235 to be be at least 90%.87 
Enrichment of uranium may be accomplished using a 
range of methods, including, gaseous or thermal diffusion, 
by use of laser, or through electromagnetic isotope 
separation. Today, however, this occurs most often by 
means of centrifuges. Plutonium is normally generated as 
a by-product of the operation of nuclear reactors by 
transmutation of individual atoms of a uranium isotope.
The NPT guarantees the “inalienable right” of all its states 
parties to “develop research, production and use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes”, and the preamble of the 
TPNW confirms that nothing in the Treaty should be 
interpreted as affecting that right. There is some 
disagreement about whether the “right” under the NPT and 
the TPNW to develop nuclear energy extends to a right to 
produce fissile material. Such production is not explicitly 
prohibited by either the NPT or the TPNW. Under the 
TPNW, production of fissile material amounts to prohibited 
development when it is done with a view to producing 
nuclear weapons (see Chapter 5, in particular the section 
on Article 1(1)(a)).
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Table 6: States producing fissile material for nuclear weapons88
Facilities States
Uranium enrichment North Korea (suspected), Pakistan.
Plutonium production India, Israel (suspected), North Korea (suspected), Pakistan.




Argentina, Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Iran, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Russia, United Kingdom, 
United States.
Plutonium production China, France, India, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom.
Fissile Material Stocks
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States stopped producing fissile material for nuclear 
weapons in the 1990s but retain large stocks. Russia and 
the United States, in particular, possess enormous 
quantities of fissile material that could be used to produce 
tens of thousands of new nuclear explosive devices (see 
Figure 8 and Table 8).
There is also highly enriched uranium held by non-nuclear-
armed states, as Table 9 summarizes. A total of 15 non-
nuclear-armed states have highly enriched uranium 
stockpiles and one of these – Japan – also has a very 
large plutonium stockpile on its territory, sufficient for the 
production of 1,800 nuclear weapons.
88 IPFM, “Fissile material stocks” (February 2018), at: fissilematerials.org/.
89 Ibid.
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China 14 933 2.9 967 0.04 8 1,908
France 30.6 2,040 6 2,000 65.4 13,080 17,120
India 4 267 7.07 2,357 0.4 80 2,704
Israel 0.3 20 0.9 300 - - 320
North Korea 0 0 0.04 13 - - 13
Pakistan 3.4 227 0.28 93 - - 320
Russia 679 45,267 128 42,667 59 11,800 99,734
United Kingdom 21.2 1,413 3.2 1,067 110.3 22,060 24,540
United States 574.5 38,300 79.8 26,600 8 1,600 66,500











Japan < 10 ~350 9* ~1,800 
Canada < 10 ~350 0 N/A
Kazakhstan < 10 ~350 0 N/A
Belgium < 1 ~35 0 N/A
Belarus < 1 ~35 0 N/A
Germany < 1 ~35 0 N/A
Italy < 1 ~35 0 N/A
Netherlands < 1 ~35 0 N/A
South Africa < 1 ~35 0 N/A
Australia < 0.01 0 0 N/A
Iran* < 0.01 0 0 N/A
Norway < 0.01 0 0 N/A
Syria < 0.001 0 0 N/A
Argentina 0 N/A 0 N/A
Brazil 0 N/A 0 N/A
*      “Status of plutonium management in Japan in 2018”, IPFM Blog, 30 July 2019, at: bit.ly/2n8ZkxE. Japan also holds a further 36.7 tons of civilian pluto-
nium abroad in France and the United Kingdom.
**     In July 2019, Iran exceeded the limit on the amount of low enriched uranium in its stockpile set out in the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal according to the IAEA. 
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif was reported by the state-run Iranian broadcaster IRIB as saying that Iran’s next step would be to 
enrich uranium beyond the 3.67% cap allowed by the 2015 JCPOA. “Iran nuclear deal: Tehran exceeds enriched uranium limit”, Aljazeera, 1 July 2019, at: 
bit.ly/2n4n59T.
90 Ibid. HEU conversion rate is 15kg per nuclear weapon. Military plutonium conversion rate is 3kg per nuclear weapon. Civilian plutonium conversion rate is 
5kg per nuclear weapon. See: See Z. Mian and A. Glaser, “Global Fissile Material Report 2015”, International Panel on Fissile Materials (May 2015), at:  
bit.ly/2Pj8NzY.
91 Sources: International Panel on Fissile Material data, at: bit.ly/2kNa83B and bit.ly/2mkjYKO. Information on HEU stockpiles as at December 2018 and 
information on Pu stockpiles as at December 2016.
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3  Status of the TPNW
The TPNW was adopted on 7 July 2017 at a diplomatic 
conference established by the UN General Assembly. A 
total of 122 states, more than three-fifths of the world’s 
197 states, voted in favour of the Treaty’s adoption.92 Only 
one state participating in the conference, the Netherlands, 
voted against, while a second, Singapore, abstained. The 
Treaty was opened for signature on 20 September 2017, 
with Brazil becoming its first signatory. It can be signed by 
any state, also after its entry into force. The TPNW will 
enter into force 90 days after the 50th state has ratified or 
acceded to it. 
TPNW Support
Two years after the TPNW was opened for signature, the 
Ban Monitor identifies a total of 135 states, or more than 
two thirds of the world’s states, as “TPNW supporters”. 
These are states that have signed, ratified, acceded to and/
or voted in favour of the TPNW at the UN.93 
As of 1 October 2019, 80 states had adhered to or signed 
the TPNW. Seventy-nine states had signed, of which 31 
had also ratified. In addition, one state – Cook Islands – 
92 Subsequently, the delegation of Maldives informed the Secretariat that it too had intended to vote in favour of the Treaty’s adoption. This was noted in the 
report of the conference. See: undocs.org/A/72/206.
93 Thus far, there have been two opportunities for states to signal their views on the TPNW during votes at the UN: when the Treaty was adopted in July 
2017, and on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. The TPNW resolution is expected to become an annual feature at the UN General 
Assembly.
had acceded. Thus, 32 states have adhered to the TPNW, 
and a further 48 states are signatories that have not yet 
ratified the Treaty. This is illustrated in Figure 9 and Table 10 
overleaf. 
In addition, the Ban Monitor includes among the TPNW 
supporters the category “other supporters”, which consists 
of an additional 55 states that have not yet signed or 
adhered to the Treaty, but which adopted the TPNW at the 
UN diplomatic conference in July 2017 and/or voted yes 
on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 
2018. If a state that voted in favour of the adoption of the 
TPNW later votes against or abstains on the TPNW 
resolution at the UN General Assembly, the Ban Monitor 
will remove it from the “other supporters” category.
The 55 other supporters make up the most immediate 
potential for new signatories to the TPNW. Many have 
already started the process to sign. For details about the 
level of backing that the TPNW has in the respective states 
in the other-supporters category, see the state profiles in 
Chapter 8. The Ban Monitor encourages those states that 
have not yet done so to move swiftly to full adherence.
Moment of adoption of the TPNW, 7 July 2017. Photo, Clare Conboy.
NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     29    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Fig 9: Global status of the TPNW
Table 10: The world’s states by their position on the TPNW
Category States
Adhered (32 states) Austria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Gambia,  
Guyana, Holy See, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Lao PDR, Maldives, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua,  
Palau, Palestine, Panama, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, 
South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam. 
Signed, but not yet ratified (48 
states)
Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Benin, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, 
Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Honduras, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Jamaica, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Seychelles, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Zambia.
Other supporters
(55 states)
Afghanistan, Andorra, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Cyprus, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Guinea, Haiti, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Malta, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Niger, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, 
Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, 
Tonga, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Zimbabwe.
Undecided (17 states) Argentina, Finland, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Serbia, Singapore, 
Somalia, South Sudan, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.
Non-supporters (45 states) Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, China, 
Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Micronesia, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, 
North Korea, North Macedonia, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, 
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Undecided States
A total of 17 states (8.6% of the global total) are, for the 
purposes of this report, categorised as “undecided”. This 
means that they have neither signed or adhered to the 
TPNW nor declared that they will not do so, and their last 
vote in the UN was not in favour of or against the TPNW. 
The current “undecided” states all have nuclear-weapon-
free security strategies but are otherwise a mixed group. 
Some have the Treaty under review domestically. Others 
are in fact already making preparations to sign. Yet others 
are, for various reasons, including internal challenges, at 
this stage not considering whether to join the Treaty or not. 
Argentina, the Marshall Islands, and Switzerland all voted 
in favour of adopting the TPNW in 2017, but the Ban 
Monitor has moved them to the undecided category after 
they abstained on the TPNW Resolution at the UN General 
Assembly in 2018. All three states are in protracted 
processes to arrive at a national position. Argentina’s 
consistent line has been that they are still examining the 
Treaty.94 The Marshall Islands’ Foreign Minister John Silk 
has said that his government cannot back the TPNW 
without US involvement, but has also communicated that 
ongoing internal consultations have prompted the 
government to take more time for consideration before 
joining the Treaty.95 In Switzerland, the government decided 
in 2018 not to join the TPNW “at the present time”.96 
However, both houses of the Swiss Parliament 
subsequently instructed the government to sign and ratify 
without delay.97 In response, the government has 
committed to review its decision by the end of 2020.98 
Non-Supporters
Forty-five states (22.8%) are categorised as “non-
supporters” of the TPNW, meaning that they have taken a 
stance against signing or adhering to the Treaty. The non-
supporters comprise the nine nuclear-armed states and 
all of the current nuclear-weapon-complicit states. The 
category also includes North Macedonia, which is in the 
process of acceding to NATO and joined the NATO states 
in voting against the UN General Assembly resolution on 
the TPNW in 2018. 
Finally, the Ban Monitor includes among the non-supporters 
the following four states with nuclear-weapon-free security 
94 Argentina, statement in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, 2018, at: bit.ly/2kVHjSF.
95 The Marshall Islands Journal, vol. 49, no. 44 (2 November 2018). 
96 Press release, at: bit.ly/2nGIhQr.
97 Motion, at: bit.ly/2kTeiqI.
98 Press release, at: bit.ly/2ktmTQF.
99    Article from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at: bit.ly/2Gc1lzR.
100  Ibid.
101  Transcript from meeting in the Norwegian Parliament 14 November 2018, at: bit.ly/2m2RrZP.
102 Report from the French Parliament’s foreign affairs committee, at: bit.ly/2mtx3l2.
103 Article from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at: bit.ly/2Gc1lzR.
strategies: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Micronesia, Monaco, 
and Sweden. The first three states voted against the UN 
General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. 
Sweden voted in favour of adopting the TPNW in 2017 but 
then abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution in 
2018, before announcing in July 2019 that it would “refrain 
from signing or pursuing ratification of the TPNW at the 
present time”.99  It also indicated, however, that Sweden 
might reassess its position following the NPT review 
conference in 2020.100 
The 45 non-supporters are not a uniform group. Most of 
them voted against the UN General Assembly resolution 
on the TPNW in 2018, while others , like Sweden, abstained. 
Interestingly, both Belarus and Armenia – the only two 
states that have explicit or implicit extended-nuclear- 
deterrence arrangements with Russia – both abstained 
on this resolution. By contrast, all the NATO states and 
states in bilateral extended-nuclear-deterrence arrange-
ments with the United States voted against. Armenia also 
participated in the negotiations on the TPNW in 2017 but 
did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty.
Many of the non-supporters, and particularly some of the 
nuclear-armed states, are outspoken opponents of the 
TPNW. For example, they have fallaciously claimed that the 
TPNW undermines the NPT. Other states in this category 
have been more nuanced in their opposition. A 2018 
government enquiry in Norway, for instance, concluded that 
the TPNW reinforces the obligations contained in the NPT. 
In November 2018, Norwegian Foreign Minister Ine Søreide 
stated in Parliament that “there is no legal obligation barring 
Norway from signing or ratifying [the TPNW], but strong 
political commitments amounting from the Atlantic Treaty 
and the strategic documents we have adopted.”101  In 
France, an information enquiry set up by the parliamentary 
foreign affairs committee concluded in July 2018 that 
France should “mitigate its criticism of the [TPNW] and the 
countries that have contributed to its adoption, to show that 
we understand and take into account the concerns of States 
and their desire for more balanced global governance.”102 
The Swedish government on its part has already announced 
that it will participate as an observer at the meetings of 
states parties to the TPNW when it enters into force.103  
Political debate about the merits of the TPNW is ongoing 
in several of the non-supporter states. In September 2018, 
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the left-wing party Podemos obtained a commitment from 
the Spanish government to sign the TPNW, in exchange 
for Podemos’ support for the 2019 national budget. The 
government has not commented on how or when it will 
implement this agreement.104 The Italian parliament in 
September 2017 adopted a resolution committing the 
government to “pursue a nuclear-weapon-free world” and 
“in a way compatible with its NATO obligations and with 
the positioning of allied states, to explore the possibility of 
becoming a party to the legally binding treaty prohibiting 
nuclear weapons, leading to their total elimination, as 
adopted on 7 July 2017”.105 The Dutch House of 
Representatives supports the Netherlands joining the 
TPNW and in November 2018 adopted a series of motions 
on nuclear disarmament including a call for an investigation 
into the compatibility of the TPNW with existing Dutch 
legislation. The Dutch foreign and defence ministers 
responded that there are no fundamental obstacles within 
the Dutch law preventing the Netherlands from joining.106 
In Australia, the incumbent government has opposed the 
idea of a ban on nuclear weapons since the beginning, 
while the opposition Labor Party has formally 
acknowledged the “value of the Treaty … and its aspiration 
to rid the world of nuclear weapons for all time”. In 
December 2018, the Labor Party committed to “sign and 
ratify the Ban Treaty” when it next forms a government, 
after taking into account the need to ensure 
complementarity with the NPT and an effective verification 
and enforcement architecture.107 
More information on the latest developments in the states 
in the non-supporters category can be found in their 
respective profiles in Chapter 8. 
Support by Region
Breaking down the 135 TPNW supporters by region, Figure 
10 shows that support for the TPNW is already high in all 
regions apart from Europe, with more than 94% of the states 
in Africa supporting it by either having adhered, signed, or 
voted in favour, followed by the Americas with more than 
91%, Asia with 72%, and Oceania with almost 69%. 
In Europe only three states (Austria, Holy See, and San 
Marino) have adhered, and two (Liechtenstein and Ireland) 
have signed but not yet ratified, while another five (Andorra, 
Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Malta, and Republic of Moldova 
(Moldova)) have voted in favour of the TPNW at the UN 
and are in the category of “other supporters”. 
104 ICAN news article, at: bit.ly/2koiOgA.
105 ICAN news article, at: bit.ly/2lY88FY.
106 PAX news article, at: bit.ly/2P730d7.
107 ICAN news article, at: bit.ly/2mmfEdT.





































All regions have a small group of undecided states. There 
is just 1 undecided state in the Americas (Argentina), 
3 in Africa, 3 in Oceania, 5 in Europe, and 5 in Asia. 
The highest number of non-supporters is in Europe, where 
34 states (69%) currently are opposed to signing the 
TPNW. There are no non-supporters in Africa, 2 in the 
Americas, 2 in Oceania, and 7 in Asia.
For a clear picture of which states in the respective regions 
that have adhered, signed but not yet ratified, are other 
supporters, undecided, and non-supporters, see Figures 
11 to 15. 
 Adhered
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Saint Kitts and Nevis
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Signed, not yet ratified 4.1%
Ireland
Liechtenstein
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Just after two years since the TPNW opened for signature, 
a total of 32 states had adhered to the Treaty. Thirty-one 
states had signed and ratified as of 1 October 2019, and 
one state – the Cook Islands – had acceded. To trigger 
entry into force, the TPNW needs 18 more states to adhere 
to the Treaty by means of ratification or accession. 
Figure 16 shows the rate of adherence108 to the TPNW 
compared to the other treaties on weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD): the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), 
the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the NPT. 
While the TPNW almost 25 months after opening for 
signature had 32 adherents, the NPT had 52 adherents after 
25 months, the BWC 30, the CWC 20, and the CTBT 21. As 
Figure 16 demonstrates, the TPNW’s adherence rate is on 
average the same as for other WMD treaties. In fact, at the 
time of writing, the TPNW had, by a close margin, the second 
fastest speed of adherence of all the WMD treaties – 
108 Rate of adherence means rate of ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession.
109 Chair’s summary, at: bit.ly/2kHK228.
although significantly slower than for the NPT. This progress 
is taking place despite the fact that the TPNW is the only 
treaty in this list whose negotiation and entry into force has 
been actively opposed by permanent members of the UN 
Security Council and some of their allies.
On the other hand, Figure 17 clearly illustrates that the 
number of states that have signed the TPNW is still low 
compared to all of the other WMD treaties. Since the first 
edition of the Ban Monitor in October 2018, though, ten 
states have signed the TPNW. 
Universalization Efforts
Article 12 of the TPNW obliges all states parties to 
encourage states not yet party to adhere to the Treaty, with 
the goal of universal adherence of all states. 
To promote adherence to the TPNW, a number of regional 
events took place in 2018 and 2019. South Africa and ICAN 
co-hosted a regional workshop in Pretoria, on 16–17 August 
2018.109 Thailand, together with New Zealand and the 
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United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), 
hosted a regional workshop in Bangkok, on 31 August 2018.110 
New Zealand hosted a regional workshop in Auckland, on 
5–7 December 2018.111 Guyana and ICAN co-hosted a 
regional forum for CARICOM states in Georgetown, 
Guyana, on 19–20 June 2019.112  And finally, ICAN hosted 
a regional forum for ECOWAS members in Abuja, Nigeria, 
on 15–16 August 2019.113 
On the International Day for the Total Elimination of 
Nuclear Weapons (26 September), Austria, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, Indonesia, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, 
South Africa and Thailand as long-time champions of the 
TPNW hosted a special High-Level Ceremony on the 
TPNW at the UN Headquarters in New York, enabling 
presidents and foreign ministers from 12 states to sign 
and/or ratify the Treaty while at the UN General Assembly.114 
Fig 16: Adherence speed – WMD treaties




















110 Press release, at: bit.ly/2m2Sucd.
111 Auckland statement, at: bit.ly/2mnZJfd.
112 Georgetown Statement, at: bit.ly/2kRrE6R.
113 ECOWAS members statement, at: bit.ly/2m3doYI.
114 ICAN news article, at: https://bit.ly/2mQmJUI.
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4 Compliance with the TPNW
The heart of the TPNW is its Article 1, which contains the 
Treaty’s core prohibitions. The Ban Monitor evaluates the 
degree to which the world’s 197 states – adherents and 
non-adherents alike – act in accordance with these core 
prohibitions. The term “compliance” is used in a broad 
sense to refer to the compatibility of each state’s behaviour 
with the Treaty. In this edition of the Ban Monitor, 
compliance is assessed on the basis of active policies and 
acts carried out in 2018 and 2019, while reference is also 
made to certain significant earlier events. Interpretations 
of each of the prohibitions in Article 1 are set out in Chapter 
5 of this report.
Overall, compliance with the core prohibitions in Article 1 
of the TPNW across all states continues to be very high. 
As illustrated in Figure 18 and summarised in Table 11, the 
Ban Monitor finds that a total of 155 states currently 
maintain policies and practices that are compliant with all 
the Article 1 prohibitions. These are states that have 
already signed or adhered to the TPNW and fully comply 
with its provisions, or which are in a position to adhere 
without making changes to existing practices or policies.
Box 1: Article 1 of the TPNW
Article 1. Prohibitions
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, 
possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices;
(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly;
(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices;
(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage 
in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty;
(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone 
to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under 
this Treaty;
(g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in its 
territory or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.
115 For the same reason, Kazakhstan is also contravening the provisions of existing obligations under the regional nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaty to which 
           it is party.







A minority of 42 states were found to currently engage in 
behaviour that contravenes one or more of the Article 1 
prohibitions. The non-compliant states are first and 
foremost the 9 nuclear-armed states and the 31 states 
which for the purposes of this report are categorised as 
“nuclear-weapon-complicit states” (see Chapter 2), but 
also include 2 states that have rejected any role for nuclear 
weapons in their security policies: Kazakhstan and the 
Marshall Islands. Kazakhstan has also signed and ratified 
the TPNW. The two states are, however, not fully compliant 
with the TPNW’s prohibition on assistance because they 
host sites where missiles designed to deliver nuclear 
warheads are periodically tested by foreign powers (Russia 
and the United States, respectively).115 Both Kazakhstan 
and the Marshall Islands can lawfully be states parties to 
the TPNW, but to become fully compliant they will need to 
exercise due diligence to ensure that any unlawful testing 
ends. This is discussed further in the section concerning 
Article 1(1)(e) in Chapter 5. The other 40 non-compliant 
states may of course also lawfully sign and ratify the 
TPNW, but they too would have to make varying degrees 
of changes to their policies and practices to become 
compliant.
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Table 11: Overall compliance with Article 1 of the TPNW
Compliance status Total List of states
Not compliant 42 Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, 
Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Montenegro, Netherlands, North Korea, Norway, Pakistan, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States.
Compliant 155 Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Austria, Azerbaijan, 
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, 
Cyprus, DR Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, 
Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru, 
Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Niue, North Macedonia,* Oman, Palau, Palestine, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi 
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South 
Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, 
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
* As of writing, North Macedonia was considered to be in full compliance with Art 1 of the TPNW. It was, however, in the process of joining NATO, and if it 
does so without repudiating the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, it will be deemed to be encouraging assistance with acts 
prohibited by the TPNW and not in compliance with Art 1(1)(e).
As set out in Figure 19, Europe is the region with the most 
states whose practices and policies contravene the TPNW. 
A total of 30 of the 49 states in Europe (61%) currently 
maintain policies and practices that contravene one or 
more of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW. In the 
other regions, compliance is generally high. In Africa, all 
states have been found to be compliant. In the Americas, 
only 2 states – Canada and the United States – of the 35 
across the region (less than 6%) are not compliant. In Asia, 
where most of the nuclear-armed states are located, 8 of 
the 43 states (almost 19%) are not compliant: China, India, 
Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, North Korea, Pakistan, and 
South Korea. In Oceania, Australia and the Marshall Islands 
are the 2 states that are not compliant with the TPNW 
among the total of 16 states in the region.
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Compliance by Prohibition
Figure 20 disaggregates compliance for each of the Article 
1 prohibitions. Most importantly, the nine nuclear-armed 
states are not in compliance with either the prohibitions 
on developing, producing, manufacturing, or acquiring 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or the 
prohibitions on possessing or stockpiling them. 
The prohibitions in Article 1(1)(e) on assisting, encouraging, 
or inducing prohibited acts, however, stand out as the ones 
that are contravened by the greatest number of states. 
The nuclear-armed states’ retention of nuclear weapons 
is abetted in many ways. We find that a total of 11 states 
(Belarus, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Kazakhstan, the 
Marshall Islands, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
and United States) assist acts that are prohibited by the 
TPNW. Thirty-four states (Albania, Armenia, Australia, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czechia, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Fig 20: Compliance by prohibition
 Compliant states  Non-compliant states





















Iceland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, and United States) currently encourage 
or induce such acts. 
The specific prohibition on allowing the “hosting” 
(stationing, installation, or deployment) of nuclear 
weapons is contravened by five states (Belgium, Germany, 
Italy, Netherlands, Turkey).
An overview of which states have been found to be non-
compliant with each of the prohibitions is contained in 
Tables 12 to 16, broken down by region. 
For further background on the non-compliant states’ 
policies and practices in relation to each of the prohibitions, 
see the analysis in Chapter 5. 
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Table 12: TPNW Compliance in Africa
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Table 13: TPNW Compliance in the Americas
























































St Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia






NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     40    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Table 14: TPNW Compliance in Asia
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Table 15: TPNW Compliance in Europe
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Table 16: TPNW Compliance in Oceania
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5 Interpretations and Analysis
The core prohibitions of the TPNW are all contained in 
Article 1. States parties undertake never under any 
circumstances to develop, test, produce, manufacture, 
otherwise acquire, possess, stockpile, transfer, receive the 
control over, use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices. It is further prohibited to 
any state party to assist, encourage, or induce, in any way, 
anyone to engage in any activity outlawed by the TPNW, 
or to seek or receive such assistance. Finally, it is prohibited 
to allow any stationing, installation, or deployment of any 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
These prohibitions apply at all places and in all 
circumstances, including when an armed conflict is 
ongoing, and even if a state party is the victim of aggression. 
In addition, reservations to any of the Treaty’s substantive 
provisions, including those set out in Article 1, are unlawful. 
That means that the scope and content of the prohibitions 
and obligations may not be limited by any state party to 
the TPNW.
This Chapter provides interpretations of each of the 
prohibitions in Article 1(1) of the TPNW. It also summarises 
the states that are not in compliance and explains what 
conduct amounts to the violation of the respective 
provisions.
For an overview of the core prohibitions and obligations in 
the TPNW, and a comparison with the core provisions in 
the NPT, see Table 17 on page 55.
Box  2: The Definition of Nuclear Weapons and Other Nuclear 
Explosive Devices
Explosive Devices
As is the case with the NPT, the TPNW does not define “nuclear 
weapons” or “other nuclear explosive devices”. There is, though, 
a settled understanding among states of what these terms mean. 
A nuclear explosive device is an explosive device whose effects 
are derived primarily from nuclear chain reactions. A nuclear 
weapon is a nuclear explosive device that has been weaponised, 
meaning that it is contained in and delivered by, for example, a 
missile, rocket, or bomb. Thus, all nuclear weapons are a form of 
nuclear explosive device but not all nuclear explosive devices are 
nuclear weapons.
The key components of a nuclear explosive device are fissile 
material (typically highly enriched uranium or reprocessed 
plutonium) and the means of triggering the nuclear chain reaction. 
Also key components are the precursors to fissile material, which 
are termed source material (e.g. naturally occurring uranium). As 
set out in the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), fissile material (termed special fissionable material in the 
Statute) “means plutonium-239; uranium-233; uranium enriched 
in the isotopes 235 or 233….” Source material “means uranium 
containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium 
depleted in the isotope 235….” (Article XX, 1956 Statute of the IAEA 
(as amended))
In a nuclear weapon, additional key components are widely 
accepted to be the missile, rocket, or other munition, including 
both the container and any means of propulsion. Delivery 
platforms such as bombers and submarines are not key 
components of nuclear weapons as such, but they may be integral 
to a nuclear-weapon system and, in certain circumstances, 
investment in such a system, or the transfer of nuclear-capable 
bombers or submarines, could amount to prohibited assistance.
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Article 1(1)(a): The Prohibition on 
Developing, Producing, Manufacturing, and 
Otherwise Acquiring Nuclear Weapons or 
Other Nuclear Explosive Devices
Compliance status Total List of states
Not compliant 9 China, France, India, Israel, North 
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United 
Kingdom, United States.
Development, production, manufacture, and other forms 
of acquisition of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive devices are prohibited under Article 1(1)(a) of 
the TPNW.
The prohibited development of a nuclear weapon or other 
nuclear explosive device means any of the actions and 
activities intended to prepare for its production. This covers 
relevant research, computer modelling of weapons, and the 
testing of key components, as well as sub-critical testing 
(i.e. experiments simulating aspects of nuclear explosions 
using conventional explosives and without achieving 
uncontrolled nuclear chain reactions). Explosive testing 
constitutes unlawful development, but as discussed below 
this is also explicitly prohibited in Article 1(1)(a).
Production or procurement of fissile material constitutes 
prohibited development when this is done with the intent 
to produce nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices. This is the case even though the production or 
procurement of fissile material is not explicitly mentioned 
in Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW. 
The concepts of production and manufacture overlap 
significantly, covering the processes that are intended to 
lead to a completed, useable weapon or device. In general 
parlance, “production” is a broader term than “manufacture”: 
manufacture describes the use of machinery to transform 
inputs into outputs. Taken together, these concepts 
encompass not only any factory processes, but also any 
improvisation or adaptation of a nuclear explosive device.
The prohibition on “otherwise acquiring” a nuclear weapon 
or other nuclear explosive device is a catch-all provision 
that encompasses any means of obtaining nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices other than 
through production. This could be through import, lease, 
or borrowing from another source or, in theory, by 
recovering a lost nuclear weapon or capturing or stealing 
one. This prohibition overlaps with the one in Article 1(1)
(c) not to receive the control over nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices, which is discussed below.
116 ”Saudi Arabia plans uranium enrichment for nuclear reactors”, Teller Report, 9 September 2019, at: bit.ly/2kscKnq.
Under Article II of the NPT, a similar obligation is imposed 
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices, but this applies only to 
non-nuclear-weapon states. That provision — and indeed 
the NPT as a whole — does not generally prohibit the 
development of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices.
All the nine nuclear-armed states have been actively 
engaged in development and production of new nuclear 
weapons in 2018–2019. Although explosive testing has 
been curtailed, North Korea has conducted ballistic missile 
tests and is believed to be continuing to produce fissile 
material for military purposes.
For more information on the ongoing development and 
production of nuclear weapons, see the section on 
Development, Production, and Maintenance in Chapter 2. 
There are also potential compliance concerns on the 
horizon with respect to Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran has 
recently restarted uranium enrichment (albeit not to a level 
sufficient for use in a nuclear explosive device) and has 
threatened to no longer comply with its obligations under 
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The United States 
had previously withdrawn its support for the agreement 
and re-imposed economic sanctions on Iran. 
Saudi Arabia has explicitly threatened to swiftly acquire 
nuclear weapons should Iran do so. Saudi Arabia has also 
refused to accept adequate safeguards on nuclear 
material under its jurisdiction or control. It maintains in 
force a Small Quantities Protocol with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) even though the fissile 
material it possesses exceeds the maximum allowed 
under that protocol. In September 2019, Saudi Arabia’s 
new energy minister, Prince Abdulaziz Bin Salman, 
announced at a conference in Abu Dhabi that the country 
wants to extract and enrich uranium for its new nuclear 
energy programme, including construction of two nuclear 
reactors. Saudi Arabia is already in talks with companies 
from the United States, Russia, South Korea, China, and 
France for the project. However, Saudi Arabia is unwilling 
to sign a contract that forbids them from enriching 
uranium or from reusing used raw materials. These are 
techniques that can also be used to make weapons.116 
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Article 1(1)(a): The Prohibition on Testing 
of Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear 
Explosive Devices
Compliance status Total List of states
Not compliant 0
The prohibition on testing in Article 1(1)(a) of the TPNW 
bans the detonation of a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device. It is therefore limited to explosive testing. 
All non-explosive forms of testing are covered by the 
prohibition on development in the TPNW. All explosive 
testing is similarly prohibited under the CTBT, but that 
treaty is, as is the case with the TPNW, not yet in force. 
(Because of the relative simplicity of the entry-into-force 
provision of the TPNW, it can be expected that it will enter 
into force before the CTBT.) 
Since the first nuclear test explosion on 16 July 1945, at 
least eight states have between them conducted an 
estimated 2,056 nuclear test explosions at dozens of test 
sites around the world.117 No explosive testing is known 
to have occurred in the period covered by this edition of 
the Ban Monitor.
North Korea is the only state that is known to have engaged 
in explosive nuclear testing since 1998, with its last test 
occurring in 2017. India and Pakistan both exploded 
nuclear devices in 1998. France completed its last nuclear 
explosive test in 1996. The United States conducted its 
last explosive tests in 1992. In November 2017, however, 
the United States decided to shorten its testing readiness 
timeline from between 24 and 36 months to only 10 
months.118 The United Kingdom undertook its last 
explosive test in 1991. China’s last explosive nuclear test 
was in July 1996, only a few months prior to the adoption 
of the CTBT by the UN General Assembly. 
The Soviet Union/Russia ostensibly undertook its last 
explosive test in 1990.119 In late May 2019, a senior United 
States official accused Russia of potentially having 
conducted low-yield explosive testing of nuclear weapons 
but did not adduce any evidence in support of this 
assertion.120 Other authorities within the US Government, 
however, contested the official’s allegations, which were 
also angrily rebutted by Russia.121 
117 Arms Control Association, “The Nuclear Testing Tally”, Last updated February 2019, at: bit.ly/2Z2t0dz.
118 See, e.g., A. Sanders-Zakre and D. Kimball, “NPR Rejects CTBT Ratification; NNSA Shortens Testing Readiness Timeline”, Project for the Comprehensive
     Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (2 April 2018), at: bit.ly/2K8mIVs.
119 Arms Control Association, “The Nuclear Testing Tally”, Last updated February 2019.
120 M. Eckel, “US: Russia May Be Testing Low-Yield Nukes, in Violation of Treaty”, Radio Free Europe, 29 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2WyD9ky; see also J. E. Barnes
           and W. J. Broad, “Russia Has Restarted Low-Yield Nuclear Tests, U.S. Believes”, The New York Times, 29 May 2019, at: nyti.ms/2XF24Qy.
121 Reuters, “Russia says U.S. nuclear accusation is an attack on global arms control”, 30 May 2019, at: reut.rs/2WyCzTK.
Article 1(1)(a): The Prohibition on 
Possession and Stockpiling of Nuclear 
Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive 
Devices
Compliance status Total List of states
Not compliant 9 China, France, India, Israel, North
Korea, Pakistan, Russia, United
Kingdom, United States.
The prohibition on possession of any nuclear weapon or 
other nuclear explosive device under Article 1(1)(a) makes 
it illegal to have a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device. Possession does not necessarily entail 
ownership. In contrast, the notion of stockpiling implies 
(but does not require) that the possessor also has 
ownership of that weapon or device. One nuclear weapon 
or other nuclear explosive device is sufficient to constitute 
a stockpile.
As of October 2019, nine states possessed and stockpiled 
nuclear weapons. Through the Manhattan Project in the 
first half of the 1940s, the United States became the first 
state to develop and possess nuclear weapons. The Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom, France, and China followed in 
1949, 1952, 1960, and 1964, respectively. India conducted 
a “peaceful” nuclear explosion in 1974 but did not at that 
time advance to weaponisation of a nuclear explosive 
device. In 1998, however, India and Pakistan both 
conducted nuclear explosive tests and proceeded to build 
up their nuclear arsenals. North Korea announced its 
withdrawal from the NPT in 2003 and accelerated its 
nuclear-weapons programme. A first nuclear explosive 
device was completed and tested in 2006. Israel has never 
openly admitted to possessing nuclear weapons but is 
widely believed to have acquired nuclear weapons in the 
late 1960s. 
South Africa produced nuclear weapons in the late 1970s 
but decided in 1989 to give up its nuclear-weapon capability 
and acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state 
in 1991. In 1994, the IAEA confirmed that South Africa had 
converted its nuclear programme to exclusively peaceful 
applications. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine acquired 
nuclear weapons following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union but voluntarily handed them over to Russia and 
joined the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states in the 
1990s. 
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Article 1(1)(b): The Prohibition on Transfer 
of Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear 
Explosive Devices
Compliance status Total List of states
Not compliant 1 United States.
The transfer of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device or control over them “to any recipient 
whatsoever” is prohibited under Article 1(1)(b) of the 
TPNW. This is so whether this occurs “directly or indirectly”. 
This makes it illegal to transmit possession or ownership 
to any other state or to any natural or legal person (e.g. a 
company or organisation). Unlawful transfer does not 
necessarily involve payment or other form of consideration. 
The prohibition on indirect transfer means it is unlawful to 
transmit the key components of any nuclear explosive 
device in separate instalments or via intermediaries or 
third parties where there is knowledge that they will be 
used to produce a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device.
Nuclear sharing was one of the key issues in the NPT 
negotiations. Several of the 18 participating states 
disagreed strongly about the degree to which allies should 
be allowed to share hardware and decision-making 
powers. In the end, a tacit agreement was made between 
key states that foreign deployment would be acceptable 
as long as the weapons were kept under the control of the 
owner/possessor state. However, any transfer of weapons 
to the control of the host state was deemed unacceptable. 
Under Article I of the NPT, the five “nuclear-weapon states” 
parties have committed never to transfer nuclear weapons 
“to any recipient whatsoever”. The NPT does not include 
a corresponding prohibition on non-nuclear-weapon states 
to transfer nuclear weapons, directly or indirectly. This 
means that non-nuclear-weapon states are not explicitly 
prohibited under the NPT from providing others with the 
key components for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device. This important lacuna is addressed by 
Article 1(1)(b) and (e) of the TPNW. If a single state 
provides another state with all the key components of a 
nuclear weapon or nuclear explosive device, the former 
state violates subparagraph (b) on transfer. If a single state 
provides another state with only one of the key components, 
the former state would normally violate subparagraph (e) 
on assistance.
The United States violates this provision by virtue of its 
export of key components of nuclear weapons to the 
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom and the United 
States have long been engaged in close nuclear 
122 D. Pleasch and J. Ainslie, “Trident: Strategic Dependence & Sovereignty”, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, 2006, p. 10, at: bit.ly/30QaA1j; S. 
           Jones, “A wonk’s guide to the Trident nuclear deterrent”, Financial Times, 18 July 2016, at: on.ft.com/30ShqDo.
cooperation and trade. The United Kingdom’s nuclear-
weapon system is in large measure imported from the 
United States: the UK Trident warhead design is based on 
the US W-76 warhead; the Trident SLBM guidance system 
and a number of Trident warhead components are 
imported directly from the United States; the Trident 
detonator is designed and built in the United States; and 
the United Kingdom’s Trident II SLBMs are on lease from 
the United States.122 This does not comply with the 
prohibition on indirect transfer of nuclear weapons in the 
TPNW (and its compliance with the corresponding 
obligation under the NPT is highly questionable).
Under NATO’s nuclear-sharing scheme, nuclear weapons 
stationed in Europe by the United States may be transferred 
to and used by host states Belgium, Germany, Italy, and 
the Netherlands prior to their use as part of a “dual key” 
arrangement. Such transfers, were they to ever occur, 
would violate both the NPT and the TPNW.
Article 1(1)(c): The Prohibition on 
Receiving Transfer or Control of Nuclear 
Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive 
Devices
Compliance status Total List of states
Not compliant 1 United Kingdom.
Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW prohibits receiving the transfer 
of or control over any nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices directly or indirectly. To “receive” a 
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device is to take 
possession or control over it. This broad notion does not 
require that ownership also passes to the recipient. The 
prohibition on indirect receipt covers accepting the key 
components of any nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device as well as an assembled version. This 
extends to transfers made through intermediaries. 
Article 1(1)(c) of the TPNW follows a similarly worded 
provision in Article II of the NPT, but the corresponding 
prohibition in that treaty applies only to those states that 
are designated as non-nuclear-weapon states. 
As discussed above, the United Kingdom leases Trident 
missiles and imports other nuclear components from the 
United States, which does not comply with the prohibition 
on receiving the transfer or control of nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices. 
If the United States ever handed over control over the 
nuclear weapons stationed in Belgium, Germany, Italy, or 
the Netherlands to the host states for use in their aircraft 
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this would amount to a violation of Article 1(1)(c) of the 
TPNW by those four states (as well as of the NPT).
Article 1(1)(d): The Prohibition on Using 
Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear 
Explosive Devices
Compliance status Total List of states
Not compliant 0
Under Article 1(1)(d) of the TPNW, states parties undertake 
never under any circumstances to use nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices. Preventing use of is a 
central aim of the Treaty. 
To use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device 
is to launch, release, deliver, or detonate it with hostile 
intent or for so-called “peaceful” use.123 Intent can be 
discerned from the circumstances and does not have to 
be publicly declared. Possession or deployment of nuclear 
weapons for the purpose of “deterrence” does not amount 
to their use for the purpose of the TPNW but is caught by 
the prohibition on possession in Article 1(1)(a).
Nuclear weapons have not been used since August 1945 
when the United States dropped a nuclear weapon first on 
Hiroshima and then, three days later, on Nagasaki. 
Other nuclear explosive devices have not been used in 
armed conflict, though so-called “peaceful” nuclear 
explosions were conducted for civil engineering purposes 
between the second half of the 1950s and the end of the 
1980s by the Soviet Union and the United States. The aims 
of the detonations were to achieve large-scale excavation 
for canals, ports, and reservoirs; facilitate oil and gas 
recovery; create underground cavities for gas, oil, or waste 
storage; and extinguishing fires in gas fields.124 
Article 1(1)(d): The Prohibition on 
Threatening to Use Nuclear Weapons or 
Other Nuclear Explosive Devices
Compliance status Total List of states
Not compliant 2 India, United States.
Threatening to use a nuclear weapon or other nuclear 
explosive device is also a violation of Article 1(1)(d) of the 
TPNW. This is the case whether such use would itself be 
a violation of international law or whether the device is 
used in legitimate self-defence against foreign aggression. 
It is therefore broader in scope than the prohibition on 
123 World Nuclear Association, “Peaceful Nuclear Explosions”, Updated December 2018, at: bit.ly/2wGTC7z.
124 Ibid.
125 B. Brown, “India Threatens Pakistan With ‘Mother of Nuclear Bombs’; Where’s Trump?”, CNN, 18 April 2019, at: bit.ly/2Qz7J85.
126 Donald J. Trump, Tweet, 22 July 2018, at: bit.ly/2wIkWm6.
127 Donald J. Trump, Tweet, 19 May 2019, at: bit.ly/2EXlVmI.
threat of force within Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. 
To violate the TPNW, a threat of use must be credible in 
the circumstances. This means that the threat must 
emanate from a person in a position to either effect or 
direct the use of a nuclear explosive device. Typically, 
therefore, such a threat would be made by a senior 
government official in a nuclear-armed state. 
While some take the view that a policy of nuclear 
“deterrence” in and of itself constitutes an unlawful threat 
to use nuclear weapons, the Ban Monitor is more 
conservative. It believes that in addition to being credible 
in the circumstances, a prohibited threat must also be 
specific as to the target of threatened use. Prohibited 
threats may, however, be implicit as well as explicit. A 
stated threat does not, therefore, have to refer to use of 
nuclear weapons, though it is more likely to violate the 
TPNW should it do so. But merely enunciating the 
circumstances under which nuclear weapons will be used, 
such as through a policy of “deterrence”, is not sufficient.
In certain circumstances of tension — for example where 
a nuclear-armed adversary is on the brink of war — a show 
of force by means of ICBM testing or an explosive test of 
a nuclear weapon could amount to an unlawful threat to 
use nuclear weapons (along with other violations of the 
TPNW). 
In mid-April 2019, as India and Pakistan came close to the 
point of major conflict and the risk of actual use of nuclear 
weapons loomed large, Indian Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi said publicly: “We have the mother of nuclear bombs. 
I decided to tell [Pakistan], do whatever you want to do but 
we will retaliate.”125 In the view of the Ban Monitor, this is 
the most overt instance of a state threatening to use 
nuclear weapons in recent times. 
In July 2018, US President Donald Trump tweeted the 
following message (all in capitals in the original text) to 
Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani: “Never, ever threaten the 
United States again or you will suffer consequences the 
likes of which few throughout history have ever suffered 
before.”126 This can be considered an implicit threat to use 
nuclear weapons against Iran. In May 2019, President 
Trump also declared on Twitter that he would bring about 
“the official end of Iran” should the latter want to fight.127 
While ambiguous, some consider this also to constitute 
threatening to use nuclear weapons.
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Article 1(1)(e): The Prohibition on Assisting 
Prohibited Activities
Compliance status Total List of states
Not compliant 11 Belarus, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Kazakhstan, Marshall Islands, 
Netherlands, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States.
Under Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, states parties undertake 
never under any circumstances to assist anyone to engage 
in any activity prohibited to a state party under the Treaty. 
This paragraph is one of the most discussed and debated 
of all the provisions in the TPNW. The Ban Monitor has 
concluded that a total of 11 states currently do not comply 
with this obligation. Their practices contravene the 
prohibition on assistance in different ways, discussed 
under the headings below.
The prohibition on assistance in the TPNW means a state 
party is precluded from knowingly128 assisting any other 
state or natural or legal person to develop, test, produce, 
manufacture, otherwise acquire, possess, stockpile, 
transfer, receive, threaten to use, or use nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices. Also outlawed is 
assistance for the deployment by any other state of any 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
anywhere under a state party’s jurisdiction or control. The 
assistance must make a substantive contribution to a 
prohibited activity:129 insignificant contributions (for 
example, a screw or bolt that is used in a nuclear missile) 
would not violate the prohibition.
The forms of assistance that are unlawful can be, among 
others, financial (such as through economic assistance 
for nuclear-weapon production); technological (for 
example, by the export of equipment/components for 
such production); operational (for instance, by conventional 
military support for nuclear bombing); technical (through 
the provision of expert information); or human (such as 
by seconding nuclear scientists to assist in another state’s 
nuclear-weapon programme). 
Under the NPT, there is no general obligation imposed on 
all states parties not to assist the development or 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices. Under NPT Article I, each nuclear-
weapon state party undertakes not in any way to assist, 
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to 
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or 
128 See Article 16 of the International Law Commission (ILC)’s 2001 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts; and its
           interpretation in: International Court of Justice (ICJ), Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of  
           Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, 26 February 2007, para. 420.
129 See the commentary by the Rapporteur on Article 16 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001).
130 C. Murray et al., The Law and Practice of International Trade, 12th Edn, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, §28-009.
131 See, e.g., Hughes Hubbard & Reed, “Supreme Court ruling clarifies parent company liability”, International Law Office, 6 July 2015, at: bit.ly/2YIrQDL.
other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices. There is, however, no 
similar prohibition on any of the five nuclear-weapon 
states parties of assisting, encouraging, or inducing 
another nuclear-weapon state to engage in those activities.
Trade in Nuclear Material
The transfer of nuclear technology or material is not 
prohibited by the TPNW unless the state party responsible 
for the transfer knows that the nuclear technology or 
material in question is likely to be used in a way that 
contravenes the prohibitions of the TPNW. Such transfers 
by nuclear-weapon states to any recipient are also 
prohibited under Article I of the NPT. Otherwise, states 
parties to the TPNW – just like parties to the NPT and the 
CTBT – are implicitly permitted to trade in nuclear raw 
materials, fuel, and equipment for purely peaceful 
purposes, including with nuclear-armed states and states 
not party to the TPNW. 
If, for instance, a TPNW state party exports uranium to a 
nuclear-armed state on the understanding that the 
uranium would be used for nuclear energy production or 
research, the exporting state could not be held responsible 
if the nuclear-armed state unexpectedly decided to use 
the uranium for weapons development instead. This 
would, though, be likely to affect the legality of future 
exports of nuclear material to that state. 
Corporate and State Responsibility
A company that develops or produces key components 
for a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device 
would be engaging in prohibited assistance under the 
TPNW. The provision of ballistic missile technology, for 
example, would amount to unlawful assistance where it 
was known that the missile programme of the recipient of 
the assistance was intended to deliver nuclear warheads. 
Depending on the circumstances, a parent company can 
also be legally responsible for the acts of its subsidiary. 
The general position in domestic law is that a parent 
company is not liable where  its subsidiary acts unlawfully. 
However, jurisprudence has established a number of 
exceptions to this general principle, allowing the “veil of 
separate legal status … to be pierced”.130 One is where there 
is wrongdoing by the parent company; another concerns 
activity that gives the impression that the parent company 
has made a commitment on behalf of its subsidiary; and 
a third is where there is interference by the parent company 
in the management of its subsidiary.131  Under international 
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law, violation of a disarmament treaty or customary 
disarmament law would suffice to render the state on 
whose territory the parent company is incorporated and/
or where it has its headquarters responsible.
In addition, any company that is engaged in a joint venture 
that develops or produces key components for a nuclear 
weapon or other nuclear explosive device could thereby 
be engaging in prohibited assistance even if it does not 
itself contribute materially to the nuclear-weapon 
development or production. This is so wherever a joint 
venture is akin to a partnership with unlimited liability. It 
may also occur when the participating companies 
establish the joint venture as a new body corporate, 
holding shares in that company. Under international law, 
the states on the territory of which the participating and 
shareholding companies are incorporated and/or have 
their headquarters would be responsible for the acts of 
the joint venture where those do not comply with an 
international treaty or customary law on disarmament.
Belarus, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands are not in 
compliance with the prohibition on assisting development 
and manufacturing because they allow companies that 
are incorporated or have headquarters or production 
facilities on their territory to be involved in activities that 
constitute assistance for development and/or production 
of nuclear weapons.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the Belarusian company, Minsk 
Automotive Factory, is the manufacturer of the self-
propelled mobile launchers for the Russian Topol-M ICBM. 
Leonardo (Italy) (formerly Finmeccanica) is involved in the 
design, development, and delivery of Transporter Erector 
Replacement Vehicles for the US Minuteman III ICBM 
arsenal.132 
The multinational company Airbus Group is legally 
incorporated in the Netherlands and falls under Dutch law 
and jurisdiction. It is currently involved in the development 
and production of the French Navy’s M51 nuclear-tipped 
SLBM (but not the warhead) through its German-
headquartered subdivision Airbus Defence and Space. 
Since Airbus Group considers that the actions of its 
subsidiaries form part of the work of Airbus as a group 
entity, should either Germany or the Netherlands sign and 
ratify or accede to the TPNW, they would not be in compliance 
with Article 1(1)(e) if Airbus and its subsidiaries were to 
engage in any further assistance of the development and 
production of nuclear-capable weapons.     
132 Don’t bank on the Bomb, “Leonardo”, Last updated January 2018, at: bit.ly/2WEsaqD.
133 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
           for Cooperation on the uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes.
134 See the UK Explanatory Memorandum of 2014, at: bit.ly/2Z0Qqj2.
135 B. Spence, “The UK now relies on Trump for our nuclear weapons – we need to spend more than ever to free ourselves”, The Independent, 23 January 
           2017, at: bit.ly/301Huv2.
136 See, e.g., P. Ricketts, “National Security Relations with France after Brexit”, Briefing Paper, RUSI, January 2018, at: bit.ly/2HLfyot.
137 FOI, “The United Kingdom and France closer to each other than ever on nuclear weapons cooperation”, Press release, 19 June 2018, at: bit.ly/2Z2b2v5.
Under Article 5 of the TPNW, states parties are obligated 
to adopt measures to implement their obligations under 
the Treaty and to suppress violations by persons, or on 
territory, under their jurisdiction or control. Allowing private 
companies to produce or assist in the production of 
nuclear weapons would clearly constitute a violation of 
Article 5 of the Treaty as well as Article 1(1)(e).
Financing
The TPNW does not explicitly prohibit financing of nuclear-
weapon programmes. However, the prohibition on 
assistance renders unlawful direct funding of any of the 
prohibited activities listed in the other subparagraphs of 
Article 1(1). This prohibition encompasses not only 
sovereign funds but also private banks and individuals, as 
discussed above in the section on corporate and state 
responsibility.
While the mere purchase of shares in a company that is 
engaged in nuclear-weapon activities is not per se a 
wrongful act under the TPNW, divestment from such 
companies is a growing trend. When screening criteria are 
applied that exclude companies engaged in nuclear-
weapons activities from investment, these companies 
could in the future be influenced to alter their practices.
Assistance with the Possession and Stockpiling of 
Nuclear Weapons
As discussed above, continuing non-compliance with the 
prohibition on assistance concerns the extensive nuclear 
cooperation between the United Kingdom and the United 
States with respect to the Trident SLBM. The 1958 Mutual 
Defense Agreement is a bilateral treaty between the United 
States and the United Kingdom on nuclear weapons 
cooperation.133 It has been renewed several times, most 
recently in 2014 covering the period through to 2024.134  In 
2017, it was reported that the United Kingdom’s Trident 
missiles are in a “common pool” shared with the US and 
maintained at Kings Bay, in the US state of Georgia.135 
The cooperation between the United Kingdom and France 
for the maintenance of nuclear weapon stockpiles also 
amounts to prohibited assistance under the TPNW.136 In 
June 2018, the Swedish Defence Research Agency 
reported that the United Kingdom and France were “closer 
to each other than ever on nuclear weapons cooperation”.137 
The two states’ cooperation on nuclear weapons’ issues 
is supported by the 2010 Teutates Treaty to develop 
technologies for safe and effective maintenance of both 
states’ nuclear stockpiles. The Teutates Treaty concerns 
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two main areas: simulation of nuclear detonations and 
simulation of nuclear warhead function.138
The hosting of US nuclear warheads by five non-nuclear 
NATO allies (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Turkey) is explicitly prohibited by Article 1(1)(g), but also 
constitutes prohibited assistance with possession and 
stockpiling. Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands 
also assist possession and stockpiling when they 
participate with nuclear-capable aircraft in NATO’s annual 
nuclear drill, Steadfast Noon. 
Allowing the Testing of Nuclear-Capable Missiles
When a state allows the testing of nuclear-capable 
missiles by foreign nuclear-armed states on a test site on 
its territory, this contravenes the prohibition on assistance 
(with respect to the development of nuclear weapons). 
Two non-nuclear-armed states host such sites: Kazakhstan 
hosts Russian missile tests at Sary Shagan test site, while 
the Marshall Islands hosts US missile tests at Kwajalein 
Atoll. In both cases, the tests are carried out on land that 
is leased to the respective nuclear-armed state through 
long-term contracts. The test site at Kwajalein Atoll is 
periodically used for testing of the intercontinental-range 
Minuteman and Trident (nuclear) missiles. Russian missile 
tests at Sary Shagan amount to prohibited assistance in 
contravention of Article 1(1)(e) where the missiles used 
are designed to carry nuclear warheads. In late July 2019, 
Russia’s official news agency, TASS, reported that Russian 
strategic missile forces conducted a test launch of a Topol 
ICBL from the Kapustin Yar practice range in Astrakhan in 
Russia. The missile targeted and reportedly successfully 
hit the target at the Sary-Shagan range in Kazakhstan.139 
Kazakhstan is already obligated not to “assist” the 
development or manufacture of nuclear weapons through 
its adherence to the Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free-
zone treaty. Kazakhstan ratified the TPNW in August 2019. 
When the Treaty enters into force and Kazakhstan is fully 
bound by the obligations set out in the Treaty, the hosting 
of tests of nuclear-capable missiles would amount to 
assistance with development of nuclear weapons. It is not, 
however, the existence of the testing site itself that is the 
cause of the violation, but Russia’s use of it to develop 
nuclear-weapon missile technology. 
Now that Kazakhstan has ratified the TPNW it should 
submit a statement making it clear that it does not 
authorise the testing of nuclear-capable missiles on its 
territory and outline the steps it has taken to communicate 
138 N. Granholm and J. Rydqvist, Nuclear weapons in Europe: British and French deterrence forces, FOI doc. FOI-R--4587—SE, Stockholm, April 2018, p. 19, at: 
           bit.ly/2KIFYHM, citing B. Tertrais: Entente Nucléaire: Options for UK-French Nuclear Cooperation, Discussion Paper 3 of the BASIC Trident Commission,
           London, BASIC (2012); and J. Lewis and B. Tertrais: “Deterrence at Three: US, UK and French Nuclear Cooperation”, Survival, Vol. 57, No. 4 (2015).
139 TASS, “Russia test launches Topol intercontinental missile from Kapustin Yar range”, 26 July 2019, at: bit.ly/2MZgvMZ.
140 See, e.g., Article XIV, Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction; 
           adopted at Geneva, 3 September 1992; entered into force, 29 April 1997.
that position to Russia. Under international law, a state is 
required to act in good faith. The Kazakhstani government 
should remind Russia of Kazakhstan’s obligations under 
the TPNW and formally request that as soon as the TPNW 
enters into force Russia must cease testing of missiles 
intended to deliver nuclear warheads. 
If this does not occur, there will be a question of compliance 
to discuss among the states parties to the TPNW. 
Compliance issues arise in the implementation of almost 
every disarmament treaty. The TPNW has what has 
become a standard dispute settlement clause. Thus, 
Article 11(1) stipulates that when a dispute arises between 
two or more states parties relating to the interpretation or 
application of the treaty, the parties concerned must 
consult together with a view to the settlement of the 
dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means of the 
parties’ choice. Under Article 11(2), the Meeting of States 
Parties may contribute to the settlement of the dispute. 
This gives the opportunity to resolve the issue peacefully 
and to every state party’s satisfaction. 
More problematic are treaties such as the NPT, which has 
no dispute settlement clause or mechanism, and where 
there are serious compliance and interpretation concerns. 
(These include transfer of nuclear weapons between the 
United Kingdom and the United States and the US policy 
to transfer nuclear weapons on bases in Europe to use by 
non-nuclear weapon states in the event of major armed 
conflict.) In the 1992 Chemical Weapons Convention 
(CWC), which does have dispute settlement provisions,140 
states parties have had to address use of chemical 
weapons in Syria since it became a state party, as well as 
use by Russian agents of a toxic chemical in the United 
Kingdom. 
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Article 1(1)(e): The Prohibition on 




Total List of states
Not compliant 34 Albania, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, 
Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Turkey, 
United Kingdom, United States.
Under Article 1(1(e) of the TPNW, states party also 
undertake never under any circumstances to encourage 
or induce, “in any way, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a state party” under the Treaty. Encouragement 
in the context of the TPNW means persuading or seeking 
to persuade any other state or any legal or natural person 
to carry out a violation or continue an ongoing violation of 
any of the Article 1 prohibitions. Encouragement could 
take the form of verbal, written, material, or institutional 
support , both from governments as a whole (such as by 
adoption of a particular policy) and from senior government 
or military officials. Where such support has been given, 
the encouragement is understood to be ongoing until the 
point at which it is clearly withdrawn. 
Inducing a prohibited activity means offering someone 
something in exchange for the performance of that 
activity. Thus, inducing will always involve encouragement.
The prohibition on encouraging illegal activities is the 
provision of the TPNW which is most frequently 
contravened. Thirty-four states were found to currently 
encourage the continued possession and potential use of 
nuclear weapons.
Endorsement of Nuclear-Weapons Doctrines, 
Policies and Statements
The TPNW does not preclude participation in security 
alliances or joint military operations with nuclear-armed 
states as long as this does not involve assistance, 
encouragement, or inducement of prohibited activities.141 
While the TPNW does not contain an express licence to 
engage in cooperation with states not party to the Treaty, 
along the lines of the 2008 Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, there is nothing in the TPNW that suggests that 
such cooperation would be unlawful per se. The 1997 
141 See, e.g., S. Casey-Maslen, The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: A Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2019), paras. 1.112, 1.113.
142 NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
           Brussels, 2010.
143 Such footnotes or statements could be simple and for instance phrased as follows: “State X does not support the possession or use of nuclear weapons 
           or other nuclear explosive devices on its behalf and will not assist the development, possession, acquisition, or use of such weapons or devices in any way.”
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, the 1971 Biological 
Weapons Convention, the 1992 Chemical Weapons 
Convention, and various protocols to the 1980 Convention 
on Certain Conventional Weapons similarly do not contain 
any such express formulations and have not been 
interpreted by their parties as proscribing participation in 
alliances with states that do not observe those agreements.
The main reason for concluding that the 34 states 
encourage activities prohibited by the TPNW is that they 
all subscribe to doctrines, policies, and/or statements that 
endorse one or more allies’ retention and potential use of 
nuclear weapons. The largest group of encouraging states 
are the 29 member states of NATO. NATO’s foundational 
document, the North Atlantic Treaty, does not mention 
nuclear weapons, but a number of the Alliance’s strategy 
documents do. 
Combining alliance membership and adherence to the 
TPNW is entirely feasible. For example, NATO member 
states may adhere to the TPNW and remain within the 
Alliance as long as they explicitly distance themselves 
from specific statements or formulations in Alliance 
documents, particularly the Strategic Concept,142  which 
can be understood as an encouragement of the retention 
of nuclear weapons and their possible use. 
It could be argued that a NATO member may, without 
having to explicitly “override” previous endorsement of 
extended nuclear deterrence, become compliant with the 
TPNW through the very acts of signing and ratifying the 
Treaty. However, having adhered to the TPNW, such a state 
would certainly be obliged to refrain from endorsing future 
Alliance language supporting the retention and potential 
use of nuclear weapons. This could be done either by 
adjusting the current language or by the state clearly 
rejecting possession or use of nuclear weapons on its 
behalf, for instance through “footnotes”, an interpretive or 
declaratory statement, or other unequivocal means of 
signalling disagreement.143 NATO members are not obliged 
to endorse every line of Alliance language. Indeed, there 
is a tradition of member states “footnoting” or otherwise 
distancing themselves from specific statements in 
Alliance documents.
Beyond NATO, three states engaged in bilateral defence 
arrangements with the United States have expressed 
public support for extended nuclear deterrence: Australia, 
Japan, and South Korea. Finally, Belarus, which is allied to 
Russia through the CSTO and the Union State, has 
expressed public support for nuclear deterrence and is 
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therefore not in compliance with the TPNW’s prohibition 
on encouragement and inducement.144 Armenia, the last 
CSTO member, has not explicitly endorsed the potential 
use of nuclear weapons on its behalf. Armenia would, 
though, need to actively distance itself from nuclear 
deterrence in order to be considered compliant with Article 
1(1)(e). See Chapter 2 and the section on extended-
nuclear-deterrence arrangements for more information.
Conventional Participation in Nuclear Strike 
Exercises
Although military preparations to use nuclear weapons are 
not explicitly outlawed by the TPNW, participating in 
exercises that involve the simulated use of nuclear 
weapons is a violation of Article 1(1)(e) of the Treaty. This 
is the position, for example, of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICRC affirms that where 
conduct contributes significantly to a prohibited activity 
(or renders it more attractive), and where there is 
knowledge that the conduct would, in the ordinary course 
of events, result in assisting, encouraging, or inducing a 
prohibited activity, training with others specifically for the 
use of nuclear weapons would be unlawful for any state 
party to the TPNW.145 
Participation by non-nuclear-armed states in nuclear strike 
exercises amounts to encouragement to possess nuclear 
weapons. In October 2017, for instance, conventional 
aircraft from Czechia and Poland participated in the 
nuclear exercise known as Steadfast Noon as part of their 
SNOWCAT (Support of Nuclear Operations with 
Conventional Air Tactics) role in NATO.146 Of course, during 
a conflict, assisting nuclear bombing raids, such as 
through the provision of conventional air support, would 
clearly constitute unlawful assistance to use nuclear 
weapons.
Article 1(1)(f): The Prohibition on Seeking 
or Receiving Assistance to Engage in 
Prohibited Activities
Compliance status Total List of states
Not compliant 4 France, Russia, United Kingdom, 
United States.
Under Article 1(1)(f) of the TPNW, states parties undertake 
never under any circumstances to “[s]eek or receive 
assistance, in any way, from anyone to engage in any 
activity prohibited to a state party” under the Treaty. This 
precludes any state party from asking any other state or 
any legal or natural person to help it to develop, possess, 
144 Ibid.
145 ICRC, “The prohibition to assist, encourage or induce prohibited activities under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, ICRC Briefing Note, 
           Geneva, undated but 2019, p. 8..
146 H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, “United States nuclear forces, 2018”, 5 March 2018, at: bit.ly/33vDyoo.
147 S. Shuster, “How North Korea Built a Nuclear Arsenal on the Ashes of the Soviet Union”, Time, 1 February 2018, at: bit.ly/2JLVzs7.
stockpile, test, produce, use, transfer, or receive nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
In contrast to Article 1(1)(e) of the TPNW, which prohibits 
states from assisting prohibited acts by others, Article 1(1)
(f) prohibits states from seeking or receiving assistance 
to violate the Treaty themselves. A similar prohibition, 
imposed only on non-nuclear-weapon states, is contained 
in Article II of the NPT, though it only applies to manufacture: 
the undertaking is “not to seek or receive any assistance 
in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices”.
Most of the nuclear-armed states in the past received 
some form of assistance to develop their nuclear weapons. 
More recently, North Korea’s advances in ICBM technology 
also appear to have been fuelled by outside sources. Some 
have suggested that North Korea either stole information 
or received assistance to copy Ukrainian (ex-Soviet) 
missiles, but the reports have not been confirmed.147 
France and the United States continue to receive 
assistance to develop their nuclear arsenals from 
multinational companies. In the case of France, this 
concerns the Airbus Group (legally incorporated in the 
Netherlands) and specifically its subsidiary Airbus Defence 
and Space (headquartered in Germany). 
The United Kingdom appears to be seeking more or less 
continuous assistance from the United States to maintain 
its nuclear capability. The United Kingdom also receives 
continuous assistance with stockpile stewardship from 
France and vice versa. The United States, for its part, 
receives assistance from Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Turkey to stockpile and deploy nuclear 
weapons in Europe. The United States also receives 
support for the development of nuclear weapons by the 
Italian company Leonardo. Further, the US missile-testing 
programme is indirectly assisted by the Marshall Islands. 
Russia, for its part, receives indirect assistance to test and 
develop nuclear ICBMs and anti-ballistic missiles from 
Kazakhstan. Russia also receives assistance to develop 
nuclear weapons by the Belarusian company Minsk 
Automotive Factory. 
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Article 1(1)(g): The Prohibition on Allowing 
Stationing, Installation, or Deployment of 
Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear 
Explosive Devices
Compliance status Total List of states
Not compliant 5 Belgium, Germany, Italy,  
Netherlands, Turkey.
Article 1(1)(g) of the TPNW outlaws a particular form of 
assistance or encouragement of prohibited action: 
allowing any stationing, installation, or deployment of any 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in a 
state party’s territory or at any other place under its 
jurisdiction or control. The TPNW’s prohibition against 
such hosting of nuclear weapons applies at all times, 
including during escalating tension or armed conflict. 
There is no corresponding prohibition in the NPT. 
The concept of jurisdiction refers primarily to a state’s 
sovereign territory, while control extends to areas that the 
state party occupies or otherwise controls extraterritorially. 
This is irrespective of the legality of this control under 
international law.
Deployment is the broadest of the three types of prohibited 
conduct. A violation would not require any prolonged 
duration, agreement, or infrastructure. Thus, although 
transit of nuclear weapons is not explicitly prohibited by 
the TPNW, if movement into the sovereign territory of a 
state party is not swiftly followed by exit, this might 
amount to prohibited deployment.
All parties to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties have 
committed not to allow the stationing of nuclear weapons 
on their territories. Certain states that are not members of 
such zones have made similar commitments not to host 
nuclear weapons, with some limiting their commitment 
only to times of peace.
The United States is the only state currently known to 
station nuclear weapons on the territory of another state. 
As of 1 October 2019, five states were hosting US nuclear 
bombs (type B-61): Belgium, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Turkey.
Comparison of the Key Provisions in the TPNW and 
the NPT
Table 17 summarises the key provisions in the TPNW and 
the NPT, highlighting in particular areas where the TPNW 
prohibits activities that the NPT does not.
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Table 17: Comparison of the key provisions of the TPNW and NPT.
Activity TPNW NPT
All states parties “Nuclear-weapon states” “Non-nuclear-weapon states”
Research, produce and use 
nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes
 Permitted  Permitted  Permitted
Develop nuclear weapons
 Prohibited  Permitted (implicitly)  Not addressed
Manufacture nuclear weapons
 Prohibited  Permitted (implicitly)  Prohibited
Test nuclear weapons
 Prohibited  Not addressed
Possess and stockpile nuclear 
weapons  Prohibited  Permitted (implicitly)  Prohibited (implicitly)
Transfer nuclear weapons
 Prohibited  Prohibited  Not addressed
Receiving the transfer of nuclear 
weapons  Prohibited  Not addressed  Prohibited
Use nuclear weapons
 Prohibited  Not addressed  Prohibited (implicitly)
Threaten to use nuclear 
weapons  Prohibited  Not addressed  Prohibited (implicitly)
Assist, encourage, or induce 
“nuclear-weapon states” to 
engage in activities prohibited 
under the respective Treaty. 
 Prohibited  Permitted (implicitly)  Permitted (implicitly)
Assist, encourage, or induce 
“non-nuclear-weapon states” to 
carry out acts prohibited under 
the respective Treaty. 
 Prohibited
 Prohibited for “nuclear-
weapon states” to assist, 
encourage, or induce “non-
nuclear weapon states” to 
manufacture or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons or 
control over these devices.
 Transfer of nuclear 
material is prohibited unless 
safeguarded. Otherwise not 
addressed.
Seek or receive assistance from 
another state in the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons
 Prohibited  Permitted (implicitly)   Prohibited
Seek or receive assistance from 
another state in the 
development, possession, 
stockpiling or use of nuclear 
weapons
 Prohibited  Not addressed
Allow stationing, installation or 
deployment of nuclear weapons 
on its territory or at any place 
under its control
 Prohibited  Not addressed
Assist victims of nuclear use 
and testing  
Obligation for all states 
parties in a position to do so.  Not addressed
Remediate environmental 
damage caused by nuclear use 
and testing
 Obligation for all states 
parties in a position to do so.  Not addressed
Provide technical, material and 
financial assistance to states 
affected by nuclear weapons 
use or testing and victim 
assistance
 Obligation for all states 
parties in a position to do so. 
States that have used or tested 
nuclear weapons have a 
responsibility to provide 
assistance to affected states. 
 Not addressed
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6 Safeguards and Verification under the TPNW 
Articles 3 and 4 of the TPNW concern safeguards agree- 
ments to be concluded with the IAEA. The objective of 
IAEA safeguards is to “deter the spread of nuclear weapons 
by the early detection of the misuse of nuclear material or 
technology”.148 Verification measures include on-site 
inspections, visits, and ongoing monitoring and 
evaluation.149  
A number of states and commentators have claimed that 
the verification provisions in the TPNW are weaker than 
those in the NPT. In fact, the reverse is true, as Figure 21 
illustrates.
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements 
Every state party to the TNPW must either conclude and 
enter into force or maintain in force a specific IAEA 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement: (INFCIRC/153 
(Corrected)). This is the most recent version of the IAEA 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. 
Under the NPT, all non-nuclear-weapon states parties are 
obligated to conclude safeguards agreements with the 
IAEA (although the precise agreement to be concluded is 
not specified). This is required in order to verify the respect 
of that state’s NPT duties “with a view to preventing 
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices”.150 Such a 
safeguards agreement must concern “source or special 
fissionable material whether it is being produced, 
processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is 
outside any such facility”.151  Further, the requisite 
safeguards must be applied on all such material that is 
being used in peaceful nuclear activities on any territory 
under the state’s jurisdiction or control.152 
As of March 2019, the IAEA had safeguards agreements 
in force with 183 states. The IAEA concludes three types 
of safeguards agreements:153  Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreements with non-nuclear-weapon states parties to 
the NPT; “voluntary offer” safeguards agreements with 
148 IAEA, “Basics of IAEA Safeguards”, 2018, at: bit.ly/2WJPdvC.




153 IAEA, “Safeguards legal framework”, 2019, at: bit.ly/2KmJ9bl.
154 Safeguards are implemented in three states not party to the NPT — India, Israel, and Pakistan — on the basis of item-specific agreements they have 
  concluded with the IAEA. IAEA, “Safeguards agreements”, 2019, at: bit.ly/2UvGxeL.
155 IAEA, “IAEA Safeguards Overview”, 2019.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
each of the five nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT 
recognised under that Treaty; and item-specific safeguards 
agreements with states not party to the NPT.154  
The IAEA carries out different types of on-site inspections 
and visits under the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreements. Routine inspections are the type most 
frequently used. These may be carried out according to a 
set schedule or may be “of an unannounced or short-
notice character”. Ad hoc inspections are typically 
conducted to verify a state’s reports of its nuclear material 
or of nuclear material being transferred by one state to 
another. The Agency’s right to carry out routine inspections 
under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements is limited 
to those locations within a nuclear facility, or other 
locations containing nuclear material, through which 
nuclear material is expected to flow. These are known as 
strategic points.155 
The IAEA may carry out special inspections if it considers 
that information from a particular state is not adequate. 
Finally, safeguards visits may be made to declared facilities 
to verify design information pertaining to safeguards. 
For example, such visits may be carried out during 
construction to determine the completeness of the 
declared design information or during a facility 
decommissioning, to confirm that sensitive equipment 
was rendered unusable.156  Activities that IAEA inspectors 
perform during and in connection with on-site inspections 
of, or visits to, facilities may include auditing the facility’s 
accounting and operating records and comparing these 
records with the state’s reports to the Agency; verifying the 
inventory of nuclear material and any changes to it; taking 
environmental samples; and applying “containment and 
surveillance” measures, such as seal application or the 
installation of surveillance equipment.157 
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Additional Protocol to the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement
The Additional Protocol158 is a legally binding agreement 
with the IAEA that grants the Agency additional inspection 
authority to that provided in Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreements. A principal aim is to enable the IAEA 
inspectorate to provide assurance about the accuracy and 
completeness of declared activities and the absence of 
undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is 
granted expanded rights of access to both information 
and sites.159
The Additional Protocol requires adhering states to provide 
information about, and grant the IAEA inspector access 
to, all parts of their nuclear fuel cycle — including uranium 
mines, fuel fabrication, enrichment plants, and nuclear 
waste sites — as well as to “any other location where 
nuclear material is or may be present”.160 Activities carried 
out during complementary access may include 
examination of records, visual observation, environmental 
sampling, use of radiation detection and measurement 
devices, and the application of seals and other identifying 
and tamper-indicating devices.161  Under the Additional 
Protocol, each state is required to provide information on 
the manufacture and export of sensitive nuclear-related 
technologies.162  
The text of the TPNW does not make explicit reference to 
the IAEA Additional Protocol. Article 4 of the Treaty, 
however, requires that all current and former163 nuclear-
armed states that join the Treaty conclude and bring into 
force a safeguards agreement with the IAEA sufficient to 
provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of 
declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared 
nuclear materials and activities. In practice, this means at 
least an IAEA Additional Protocol as well as the IAEA 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. In addition, Article 
3(1) of the TPNW provides that if a state party already has 
an Additional Protocol in force when the TPNW enters into 
force, it must maintain it in force.164  As of September 2019, 
Additional Protocols were in force with 134 states while a 
further 14 states had signed an Additional Protocol but 
had yet to bring it into force.165  Article 3(1) also stipulates 
that the obligations to maintain existing safeguards 
agreements are “without prejudice to any additional 
158 Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) Between State(s) and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards, IAEA 
           doc. INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).




163 This does not apply to states that disarmed before the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017, notably South Africa which disarmed at the end of the  
     1980s. However, South Africa already has an IAEA Additional Protocol in force.
164 By the terms of Article 3(1), any state party that has an Additional Protocol in force at the time of entry into force of the Treaty is obliged to maintain it 
           along with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The obligation in paragraph 1 upon each state party is to “maintain its International Atomic Energy 
           Agency safeguards obligations”. See also E. Giorgou, “Safeguards Provisions in the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons”, Blog entry, Arms 
           Control Law, posted 11 April 2018, at: bit.ly/2R3bwK4.
165 IAEA, “Additional Protocol”, 2019, at: bit.ly/2Ieeg5W.
166 Action 28.
relevant instruments that it may adopt in the future”. 
During the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017, a Swedish 
proposal sought to make it an obligation for all states 
parties to conclude and enter into force not only a 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement but also an 
Additional Protocol. Regrettably, the negotiating states did 
not reach agreement to do so. It is, though, hoped that the 
First Meeting of States Parties to the TPNW will strongly 
encourage all states parties which have not yet done so 
to adopt and bring into force an Additional Protocol.
The NPT does not require that its states parties conclude 
and bring into force an IAEA Additional Protocol. The 2010 
NPT Review Conference Action Plan contains a non-
binding call to all states parties which have not yet done 
so to adopt and bring into force an Additional Protocol.166 
This means that, under the NPT, an Additional Protocol is 
voluntary for all states parties.
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Fig 21: Verification in the NPT and the TPNW
VERIFICATION IN THE NPT AND THE TPNW
VERIFICATION OF ELIMINATION
Verification of the elimination 




OF  NUCLEAR MATERIAL
IAEA comprehensive safegards 
agreement mandatory?
 
IAEA additional protocol 
(or instrument of similar or higher 
standard) mandatory?
Non-binding recommendation to 
adopt IAEA additional protocol?




Not required and thus 
voluntary for the five “nuclear-
weapon states”.
Voluntary for all states 
parties.
The 2010 NPT Review 
Conference Action Plan 
“encourages” all states 
parties which have not yet 
done so to conclude and 
bring into force an IAEA 
additional protocol  
(Action 28).
All states that join the TPNW while still 
in possession of nuclear weapons must 
accept a time-bound plan providing for 
the verifiable elimination of their nuclear 
weapons and nuclear-weapon 
programmes. (Art. 4(2))
All states that have disarmed before 
joining the TPNW must demonstrate to 
the international authority designated by 
the States Parties to the Treaty that the 
weapons and programmes have been 
eliminated.1 (Art. 4(1))
Mandatory for all states parties.
(Art. 3(1) and (2) and 4(3))
Mandatory for all nuclear-armed states 
that join the TPNW.2 (Art. 4(2) and (3))
Mandatory for all former nuclear- armed 
states that join the TPNW.3 (Art. 4(1))
Mandatory for all states parties that had 
an IAEA additional protocol in force 
upon the entry into force of the TPNW 
(appx 70% of potential states parties).
(Art. 3(1))
Voluntary for the remaining states 
parties.
A first or subsequent meeting of states 
parties to the TPNW may consider 
adopting a non-binding 
recommendation similar to that 
adopted in the NPT urging all states 
parties to conclude and bring into force 
an IAEA additional protocol.
NPT TPNW
1    This does not apply to states that disarmed before the adoption of the TPNW on 7 July 2017, notably South Africa. However, South Africa already has an 
      IAEA Additional Protocol in force.
2    The text of the TPNW does not make explicit reference to the IAEA Additional Protocol. It requires, however, that all current and former nuclear-armed
      states that join the TPNW conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA sufficient to provide credible assurance of both the non-diversion of declare
      nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. In practice, this means at least an IAEA Additional Protocol as well as the
      IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
3   See footnotes 1 and 2.
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7 Recommendations to the First Meeting of States Parties
Article 8 of the TPNW provides for regular meetings of states 
parties, the first of which is to be held within one year of the 
Treaty’s entry into force. Subsequent meetings will be 
convened every two years unless the states parties agree 
otherwise, with a review conference to be held after five years 
and then every six years thereafter. Extraordinary meetings 
of states parties will be convened if one third of the states 
parties support a written request by any state party. 
The scope of work of the meetings is broad, with each 
meeting of states parties effectively mandated to consider 
any matters “pursuant to and consistent with the provisions 
of” the TPNW, including its status and implementation. The 
Ban Monitor has five recommendations for the First 
Meeting of States Parties. 
 1. The First Meeting of States Parties should elaborate 
and adopt a Declaration of the States Parties and a 
Plan of Action for promoting the full implementation 
and universalisation of the TPNW and stigmatising 
nuclear weapons. The role of civil society and 
international organisations as partners should be 
stressed throughout. All states parties are obligated to 
promote adherence to the Treaty by other states under 
its Article 12.
2. In accordance with Article 4, the First Meeting of States 
Parties is explicitly obligated to set the deadlines for 
the destruction of a state party’s nuclear explosive 
devices and for the removal of a foreign state’s nuclear 
weapons from any area under the jurisdiction or control 
of a state party. It should consider setting a deadline 
of ten years for the destruction of all nuclear weapons, 
renewable upon request to the other states parties 
where necessary. In ten years it may be feasible to 
achieve elimination of even the largest nuclear-weapon 
stockpiles (those of the United States and Russia).167 
Such a deadline is also consistent with practice in the 
disarmament treaties prohibiting anti-personnel mines 
and cluster munitions. A far shorter deadline for 
removal of foreign nuclear weapons (hosting 
arrangements) – for example, no more than three years 
– would seem appropriate. 
167 M. Kütt and Z. Mian (2019) Setting the Deadline for Nuclear Weapon Destruction Under the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Journal for
           Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, at: bit.ly/2oh0fNd.
3. The First Meeting of States Parties should strongly 
encourage each state party that has not yet done so to 
conclude and bring into force an Additional Protocol 
with the IAEA. 
4. The First Meeting of States Parties should establish 
standing committees to address issues related to 
victim assistance and environmental remediation, 
including needs assessments, programmatic 
responses, and international cooperation and 
assistance.
5. The First Meeting of States Parties may need to 
address issues of compliance, such as with respect to 
assisting or encouraging prohibited activities, and 
should consider establishing a standing committee for 
such matters.
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8 State Profiles
The following state profiles contain summary data on 
TPNW status and compliance for each of the world’s 197 
states. It also comprises information on their participation 
in the TPNW negotiations and voting related to the Treaty, 
and information on related treaties and mechanisms. 
The 197 states are categorised according to their basic 
nuclear-weapon policy, with separate sections for the 135 
TPNW supporters, the 22 other non-nuclear armed states, 
the 31 nuclear-weapon-complicit states, and the 9 nuclear-
armed states. See Figure 2 in Chapter 2 for more information 
on this categorization. Within each of the four categories, 
the state profiles are presented in alphabetical order. 
For the nuclear-armed states, an additional page is 
included with data on the status of its nuclear forces, main 
nuclear weapons delivery systems, and doctrine, policies 
and practices. The main source for this information is 
Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris’ nuclear 
notebooks, published by the Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists.  
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Afghanistan
Afghanistan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Afghanistan has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Afghanistan did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Afghanistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Did not vote Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Algeria
Algeria has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On 26 September 2019, at the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International 
Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Algeria’s Foreign Minister Sabri Bouakdoum announced the intention of Algeria 
to ratify the TPNW "as soon as possible". He also said: "We must work together to ramp up the entry-into-force of the TPNW."  
(bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Algeria should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No (Signatory)
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Andorra
Andorra participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Andorra has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Andorra voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Andorra should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (100%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Angola
Angola has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Angola participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote 
adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Angola should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (27 Sep 2018) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Antigua and Barbuda
Antigua and Barbuda has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified 
the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On 19-20 June 2019, Antigua and Barbuda participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, 
to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Antigua and Barbuda should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Austria
Austria was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the 
negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Austria has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in 
Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Speaking at the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of 
Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Alexander Schallenberg, Austria's Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and 
Foreign Affairs, said about the TPNW: "With every additional signature and ratification, states send a very powerful signal that 
having a say on nuclear weapons is not exclusive to states who possess them. The security of all our citizens is equally important 
and equally at risk. We are of course under no illusion. We are under no illusion that the treaty will immediately reduce risk or 
decimate nuclear weapons stockpiles, but it is and remains an essential step. Let us not lose heart." (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Austria should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Austria should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (8 May 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (21%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Azerbaijan has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Azerbaijan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Azerbaijan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Bahamas
The Bahamas voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. The Bahamas has not 
yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Bahamas voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Bahamas should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (75%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes









NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     69    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Bahrain
Bahrain voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Bahrain has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Bahrain voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Bahrain should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (100%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Bangladesh
Bangladesh has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Bangladesh' Minister for Foreign Affairs, A. K. Abdul Momen, deposited the government's instrument of ratification on the
International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at 
the UN Headquarters in New York. Speaking at a plenary session of the UN General Assembly the same day, Minister Momen said: 
"The TPNW, once entered into force, can serve as an important international instrument for stigmatizing nuclear weapons and 
sending an unequivocal message about the inhumane and indiscriminate impact of use of nuclear weapons. We encourage other 
member states to join us as one of the first 50 ratifying states on the road towards the Treaty’s entry into force. We see success of 
TPNW as a critical building block". (bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Bangladesh should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Bangladesh should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (26 Sep 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Barbados
Barbados participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Barbados has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Barbados voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Barbados should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (75%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Belize
Belize voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Belize has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Belize voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. On 19-20 June 2019, Belize participated in a 
regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Belize should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Benin
Benin has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Benin participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote 
adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Benin should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (amended SQP in force)
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Bhutan
Bhutan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Bhutan has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Bhutan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Bhutan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Bolivia
Bolivia has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Bolivia ratified the TPNW on 6 August 2019, after which the "Bolivian Ambassador to the United Nations Sacha Llorenti told 
reporters that he chose the date, which coincides with the 74th anniversary of the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima, so as not to 
forget those who lost their lives in the attack." (bit.ly/2oUFvuB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Bolivia should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Bolivia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (16 Apr 2018) Ratified (6 Aug 2019)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Botswana
Botswana has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Botswana’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Unity Dow, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total 
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters  
in New York.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Botswana should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (25%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Brazil
Brazil was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the 
negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Brazil was the first state to sign the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in 
Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In September 2018, the previous president of Brazil submitted the TPNW to congress for approval, but there is no news about 
the progress in this process. At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total 
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Brazil stated that the "adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons in 2017 represents an evolutionary leap for the disarmament and nonproliferation regime. While the TPNW 
will not bring about the elimination of nuclear weapons on its own, it has significantly raised the moral barrier against these 
weapons." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Brazil should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (30%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks 0 IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Brunei
Brunei has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Brunei voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Brunei should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Bangkok)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Burkina Faso has not 
yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Burkina Faso voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Burkina Faso participated in a regional 
forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW.  
(bit.ly/2m3doYI)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Burkina Faso should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (40%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No (Signatory)
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Burundi
Burundi voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Burundi has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Burundi voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Burundi participated in a regional workshop  
co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Burundi should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No (Signatory)
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Cabo Verde
Cabo Verde has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Cabo Verde voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Cabo Verde should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (amended SQP in force)
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Cambodia
Cambodia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear 
Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Cambodia's Secretary of State, Ouch Borit, made the following statement: "Today 
represents a timely opportunity for the global community to come together in its commitment to promote the universality of the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons by joining the treaty and implementing its prohibition. Having signed the Treaty on 
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Cambodia is a strong supporter of general and complete nuclear disarmament and we are 
fully engaged in commitment to ratify and implement this treaty." (bit.ly/2obi545) 
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Cambodia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (9 Jan 2019) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (25%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Bangkok)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
Fissile material production No Party to the BWC Yes
NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     83    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Cameroon
Cameroon participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Cameroon has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Cameroon voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Cameroon participated in a regional workshop 
co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Cameroon should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No (Signatory)
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Central African Republic
The Central African Republic has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with the all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not 
yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Central African Republic participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in 
Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Central African Republic should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Chad
Chad voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Chad has not yet adhered to the 
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Chad voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Chad should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Chile
Chile has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Chile voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Chile should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (14%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Colombia
Colombia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Colombia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Colombia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (3 Aug 2018) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Comoros
Comoros has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Comoros voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Comoros should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Congo
Congo has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Congo voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Congo should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Cook Islands
The Cook Islands has acceded to the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Cook Islands participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in 
Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Cook Islands should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• The Cook Islands should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
N/A Acceded (4 Sep 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) N/A Party to the NPT No
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) N/A (N/A) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 N/A Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Costa Rica
Costa Rica was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, and Costa
Rica’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations in Geneva, Ambassador Elayne Whyte Gómez, chaired the
negotiations in 2017 that resulted in the adoption of the TPNW. Costa Rica has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty..
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On 26 September 2019 Costa Rica’s President, Carlos Alvarado Quesada, made the following statement about the TPNW in the 
UN: "We have embarked on a path in seeking prohibition and elimination of these terrible weapons. We must fill the existing legal 
vacuum and add a chapter to international law that should have been written many years ago." He also encouraged states who 
have not yet done so to sign and speed up the ratification process, and added: "The treaty bolsters the political standard-setting, 
humanitarian and legal imperatives of nuclear disarmament which are the prime objective of this organization." (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Costa Rica should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Costa Rica should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (5 Jul 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (75%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Côte d’Ivoire
Côte d’Ivoire has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the 
Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Côte d’Ivoire participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 
to promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m3doYI). At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the 
International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Côte d’Ivoire said: "[O]ur country 
is fully committed to nonproliferation and disarmament and intends to bolster its commitment as soon as possible by depositing 
its instruments of ratification for the TPNW." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Côte d’Ivoire should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Cuba
Cuba has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Cuba voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Cuba should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Cuba should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (30 Jan 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (43%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Cyprus
Cyprus voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Cyprus has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Cyprus voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Cyprus should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Democratic Republic of the Congo
The DRC has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The DRC voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The DRC should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (29%) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Djibouti
Djibouti voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Djibouti has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Djibouti voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Djibouti should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (25%) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Dominica
Dominica has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Dominica’s Minister for Foreign and CARICOM Affairs, Francine Baron, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total 
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters  
in New York.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Dominica should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Dominican Republic
The Dominican Republic has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet 
ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Dominican Republic voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Dominican Republic should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (7 Jun 2018) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Ecuador
Ecuador has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Ecuador voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Ecuador should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Ecuador should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (25 Sep 2019)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Egypt
Egypt voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Egypt has not yet adhered to the 
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Egypt voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Egypt should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No (Signed,  Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC No
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El Salvador
El Salvador has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear 
Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, El Salvador said: “´[B]earing in mind that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons 
are a clear threat to peace, El Salvador, which adheres strictly to Article VI of the NPT, has participated in the negotiation process 
of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and ratified it in its entirety on the 30th of January 2019. This is the first 
international instrument that is legally binding prohibiting the use, threat of use, possession, development, acquisition of this type 
of weapon of indiscriminate effect, the only weapons that not have been prohibited under other international legislation.”  
(bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• El Salvador should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• El Salvador should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (30 Jan 2019)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Equatorial Guinea
Equatorial Guinea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Equatorial Guinea 
has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 
1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Equatorial Guinea voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Equatorial Guinea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes









NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     103    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Eritrea
Eritrea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Eritrea has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Eritrea voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Eritrea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Eswatini
Eswatini participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Eswatini has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Eswatini voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Eswatini should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Ethiopia
Ethiopia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Ethiopia has not yet adhered 
to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and 
can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Ethiopia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Ethiopia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No (Signatory)
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Fiji
Fiji has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of 
Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, the Minister for Defense, Inia Seruiratu, indicated that Fiji is in the 
process of ratifying the TPNW. He also said that the TPNW (and the CTBT) need to come into force, and that “Fiji urges all 
member states to ratify these important treaties. The world does not need nuclear weapons.” (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Fiji should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Gabon
Gabon voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Gabon has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Gabon voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Gabon should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Gambia
The Gambia has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Gambia participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to 
promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Gambia should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW
• The Gambia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (26 Sep 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (25%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Ghana
Ghana has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Ghana's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, Shirley 
Ayorkor Botchwey, said that the contry's "internal mechanisms are well advanced towards ratifiication" of the TPNW. She also 
said that Ghana believes that a world without nuclear weapons would be in our collective interest and that the only guarantee to 
ensuring total elimination of such weapons is to completely prohibit them. (bit.ly/2obi545)  Ghana participated in a regional forum 
for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW.  
(bit.ly/2m3doYI)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Ghana should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (18%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes









NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     110    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Grenada
Grenada has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Grenada’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and Labour, Peter David, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination 
of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Grenada should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (100%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Guatemala
Guatemala has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified  
the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In October 2019, the Congress in Guatemala was expected to soon approve ratification of the TPNW.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Guatemala should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (60%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Guinea
Guinea participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Guinea has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Guinea voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Guinea participated in a regional forum for 
ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the Treaty. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Guinea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Guinea-Bissau
Guinea-Bissau has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified  
the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Guinea-Bissau participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to 
promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Guinea-Bissau should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Guyana
Guyana has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On 19-20 June 2019, Guyana and ICAN co-hosted a regional forum in Georgetown to promote adherence to the TPNW.  
(bit.ly/2kRrE6R) Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Guyana's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Karen 
Cummings, said that the TPNW "aims to transform the regional norm of the Caribbean against the possession of nuclear weapons 
into a global norm.” (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Guyana should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Guyana should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (20 Sep 2017)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Haiti
Haiti voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Haiti has not yet adhered to the 
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Haiti did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. On 19-20 June 2019, Haiti participated in a 
regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Haiti should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (25%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Did not vote Party to the PTBT No (Signatory)
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Holy See
The Holy See has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Holy See has on multiple occasions expressed grave concern over the catastrophic humanitarian and environmental effects 
of the use of nuclear weapons. In November 2017, Pope Francis maintained that “the possession of nuclear weapons should be 
firmly condemned." He also said that the existence of nuclear weapons "creates a false sense of security that holds international 
relations hostage and stifles peaceful coexistence" (bit.ly/2kLlNA7).  On 26 September 2019, Secretary of State Cardinal Pietro 
Parolin, said in the UN that the Holy See “acknowledges with satisfaction the increasing number of states who have ratified the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and encourages those states who have already signed it to ratify it as soon as 
possible. We believe that the treaty is an important step towards a nuclear-weapons-free world and complements the NPT.”  
(bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Holy See should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• The Holy See should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (20 Sep 2017)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) N/A Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (22%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 N/A Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Honduras
Honduras has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Congress in Honduras approved ratification of the TPNW on 13 September 2019.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Honduras should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (75%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Indonesia
Indonesia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Indonesia participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to 
promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m2Sucd)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Indonesia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Bangkok)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes









NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     119    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Iran
Iran voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Iran has not yet adhered to the 
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Iran voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. According to Iran, the adoption of the TPNW was a 
“step forward” in the direction of confronting “bullying policies” (bit.ly/2mjID1U). Iran has recently restarted uranium enrichment 
(albeit not to a level sufficient for use in a nuclear explosive device) and has threatened to no longer comply with its obligations 
under the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The United States had previously withdrawn its support for the agreement 
and re-imposed economic sanctions on Iran.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Iran should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No (Signed,  Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks <0.01 t (0 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force No (provisional impl. under the JCPOA)
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Iraq
Iraq voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Iraq has not yet adhered to the 
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Iraq voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate 
and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Iraq said: “The 
international community must work together in order to guarantee the universality of relevant agreements and in a manner that 
would guarantee the final elimination of such lethal weapons and in a manner that bolsters international peace and security. 
Therefore, Iraq voted in favor of the treaty to ban nuclear weapons which was adopted by the General Assembly in July 2017.”  
(bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Iraq should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Ireland
Ireland was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the 
negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Ireland has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but 
has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The legislation to ratify the TPNW is currently before the Irish Parliament. On 26 September 2019, Ireland said in the UN 
General Assembly: “While the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of international disarmament and the 
nonproliferation regime, it was always envisaged that a separate legal instrument would be designed to give particular effect to 
Article VI’s disarmament provisions. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the first multilateral legal instrument on 
nuclear disarmament to be adopted in over 20 years, is the complementary instrument that the NPT anticipated and it conveys a 
powerful vision of a world free from these weapons of mass destruction. Ireland is currently taking the necessary steps to ensure 
that domestic legislation is enacted to allow Ireland to ratify the TPNW and we hope this will be completed before the end of this 
year.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Ireland should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Jamaica
Jamaica has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On 19-20 June 2019, Jamaica participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to promote 
adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Jamaica should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (8 Dec 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Jordan
Jordan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Jordan has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Jordan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Jordan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan inherited nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union but renounced them and has since advocated for nuclear 
disarmament. Kazakhstan has signed and ratified the TPNW. Its hosting of Russian missile tests at the Sary Shagan test site 
means that it is not in compliance with the TPNW’s prohibition on assisting development of nuclear weapons.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Kazakhstan, which has suffered the consequences of Soviet nuclear testing, deposited its instrument of ratification of the 
TPNW to the UN Secretariat on the International Day against Nuclear Tests on 30 August 2019. Those gathered at the ceremony 
observed a one-minute silence in memory of and to honour the victims of nuclear tests. (bit.ly/2YzeB8R)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Kazakhstan should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Kazakhstan should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
• Kazakhstan should request that Russia as soon as the TPNW enters into force must cease the testing of nuclear-capable 
missiles at Sary Shagan. It should submit a statement making it clear that it does not authorise the testing of nuclear-capable 
missiles on its territory and outline the steps it has taken to communicate that position to Russia.
Signed Adhered
Yes (2 Mar 2018) Ratified (29 Aug 2019)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Not compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks <10 t (~350 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Kenya
Kenya voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Kenya has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Kenya voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Kenya participated in a regional workshop co-
hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Kenya should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (20%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Kiribati
Kiribati has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
President Taneti Maamau deposited Kiribati’s instrument of ratification on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear 
Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Kiribati should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Kiribati should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (26 Sep 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Kuwait
Kuwait voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Kuwait has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Kuwait voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Kuwait should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Lao PDR has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Saleumxay Kommasith, deposited Lao PDR’s instrument of ratification on the International Day for 
the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in 
New York.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Lao PDR should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Lao PDR should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (21 Sep 2017) Ratified (26 Sep 2019)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Bangkok)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Lebanon
Lebanon voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Lebanon has not yet adhered 
to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and 
can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Lebanon voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to 
Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, 
Lebanon stated: "We must transfer from a narrow security approach to a comprehensive humanitarian approach. [...] "Activating 
the international instruments that exist must not distract us from looking for a new and complementary instrument. The adoption 
of the TPNW in 2017 ([...] is an important step”. (bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Lebanon should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (40%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes









NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     130    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Lesotho
Lesotho has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Lesotho’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Relations, Lesego Makghoti, signed the TPNW on the International Day for 
the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in 
New York.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Lesotho should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (75%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Liberia
Liberia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Liberia has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Liberia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Liberia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (SQP in force)
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Libya
Libya has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Libya voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Libya should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Liechtenstein
Liechtenstein has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified  
the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Preparatory work for Liechtenstein's ratification of the TPNW is ongoing. Speaking in the UN General Assembly on 26 September 
2019, Liechtenstein said: “Along with many other states, Liechtenstein sees important potential in the TPNW to restore the original 
balance enshrined in the NPT. [...] Most importantly, it draws a legal line against all attempts to justify the use of nuclear weapons. 
The horrendous and indiscriminate suffering these weapons infallibly inflict on civilians leaves no room for such justification. In 
a time of eroding international norms, the TPNW is a sole beacon of hope and a lesson for multilateralism in a world increasingly 
suffering from unsustainable big power politics.” (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Liechtenstein should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (40%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Madagascar
Madagascar has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified  
the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Madagascar voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Madagascar should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Malawi
Malawi has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Malawi voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Malawi should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Malaysia
Malaysia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear 
Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Malaysia said that the TPNW "complements and strengthens the  nuclear 
disarmament architecture and we urge all states to have an open and focused approach towards this  treaty" (bit.ly/2obwUU6). 
Malaysia participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to 
promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m2Sucd)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Malaysia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (40%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Bangkok)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Maldives
The Maldives has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Maldives’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Abdulla Shahid, signed and deposited the country’s instrument of ratification for the 
TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level 
Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York. Speaking at a plenary session of the UN General Assembly on the same day, 
Minister Shahid said that the Maldives ratified the TPNW because it strongly believes in “our shared commitment as a member 
state to the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and also because the well-being, prosperity and advancement of humanity is a 
collective responsibility of all.” (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Maldives should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• The Maldives should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
* After the vote on the TPNW on 7 July 2017, "the delegation of Maldives informed the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour." 
(A/72/206, note 2).
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019) Ratified (26 Sep 2019)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote* Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Malta
Malta voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Malta has not yet adhered to the 
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Malta voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Malta should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Mauritania
Mauritania voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Mauritania has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Mauritania voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Mauritania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Mauritius
Mauritius voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Mauritius has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Mauritius voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Mauritius participated in a regional workshop 
co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Mauritius should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (20%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Mexico
Mexico was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the 
negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Mexico has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in 
Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On 8 July 2017, the Mexican government published a statement in which it welcomed the TPNW and stated that the adoption 
of the treaty was “in line with Mexico’s longstanding and well-known diplomatic tradition of nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation”. At the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Mexico said that it invited all those that have not signed or 
ratified the TPNW "to speed up their respective processes.” (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Mexico should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Mexico should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (16 Jan 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (38%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Mongolia
Mongolia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Mongolia has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Mongolia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to
Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26
September 2019, Mongolia said that its internal process towards ratifying the TPNW is underway. (bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Mongolia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (unilateral)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Morocco
Morocco voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Morocco has not yet adhered 
to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and 
can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Morocco voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Morocco should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes









NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     144    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Mozambique
Mozambique voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Mozambique has not 
yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Mozambique voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Mozambique should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Myanmar
Myanmar has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Myanmar participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to 
promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m2Sucd)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Myanmar should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Bangkok)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Namibia
Namibia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Namibia participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote 
adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Namibia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (8 Dec 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (20%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Nepal
Nepal has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear 
Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Minister of Foreign Affairs Pradeep Kumar Gyawali said that Nepal has initiated its 
process of ratification for the TPNW. He added: “We call upon all countries to sign and ratify it for its early entry into force.”  
(bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Nepal should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (25%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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New Zealand
New Zealand was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including
during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. New Zealand has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with
all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On 5–7 December 2018, New Zealand hosted a regional workshop in Auckland, to promote adherence to the TPNW  
(bit.ly/2mnZJfd). Together with Thailand and UNODA, Thailand also hosted a regional workshop on the TPNW in Bangkok on 31 
August 2018 (bit.ly/2m2Sucd). In the UN General Assembly on 26 September 2019, New Zealand said that the TPNW significantly 
strengthens the norm against any use of nuclear weapons. It also said: "As a member of the core group of supporters, New 
Zealand will continue to work closely, including with our valued civil society partners, to advance the Treaty and give reality to its 
object and purpose." (bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• New Zealand should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• New Zealand should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (31 Jul 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (83%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Nicaragua
Nicaragua has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Nicaragua voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Nicaragua should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Nicaragua should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (22 Sep 2017) Ratified (19 Jul 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Niger
Niger participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Niger has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Niger voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Niger participated in a regional workshop cohosted 
by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Niger should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Nigeria
Nigeria was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the 
negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Nigeria has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, 
but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Nigeria participated in a regional forum for ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja on 15–16 August 2019 to promote
adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m3doYI). At the High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International 
Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in the UN on 26 September 2019, Nigeria said that “Prohibiting and completely 
eliminating nuclear weapons remains the reasonable guarantee against their possession or usage in order to ensure global peace. 
[…] Nigeria will continue to engage other nations on the need for the treaty to be taken as an important global instrument for the 
promotion of international disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.” (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Nigeria should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Oman
Oman voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Oman has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Oman voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Oman should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Palau
Palau has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Palau participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 
5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Palau should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Palau should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (3 May 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Panama
Panama has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Panama voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Panama should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Panama should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (11 Apr 2019)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (60%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Papua New Guinea
Papua New Guinea voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Papua New Guinea 
has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 
1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Papua New Guinea voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated at a regional workshop 
to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Papua New Guinea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Paraguay
Paraguay has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Paraguay voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018, and in August 2018, the senate foreign affairs 
committee made a positive recommendation for ratification (https://bit.ly/2McgJ1l). No progress has been reported since then, 
however.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Paraguay should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No (Signatory)
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Peru
Peru has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
At the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total 
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, Peru said: “The only guarantee against the grave threat inherent 
in nuclear weapons for mankind is the pressing need to achieve the prohibition and total elimination. [...] [W]e hope that all 
countries will one day accede and particularly those with nuclear arsenals. This legally binding instrument will not detract from 
the current disarmament and nonproliferation regime, on the contrary it will strengthen and complement it and will contribute to 
implementation of Article VI of the NPT.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Peru should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Philippines
The Philippines has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified 
the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
At the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total 
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, the Philippines made the following statement: “While we see the 
importance of building trust and confidence, particularly among nuclear weapons states, we believe that we should proceed with 
the pursuit of disarmament without delay to honor our commitments under the NPT. The Philippines is a signatory to the Treaty 
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a landmark agreement that fortifies the nuclear disarmament architecture. This treaty 
represents the universalisation of the Philippines’ hope for the elimination of nuclear weapons in line with the specific provision 
of our constitution and the treaty on the Southeast Asia nuclear-weapons-free zone. The treaty also fulfills the goals set out in the 
NPT. It delegitimises once and for all the use of nuclear weapons.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Philippines should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (53%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Bangkok)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Qatar
Qatar voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Qatar has not yet adhered to the 
TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Qatar voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Qatar should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Republic of Moldova
Moldova voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Moldova has not yet adhered 
to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and 
can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Moldova voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Moldova should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (40%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Rwanda
Rwanda did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Rwanda maintains policies 
and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the 
Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Rwanda voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Rwanda should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Kitts and Nevis has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified 
the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mark Anthony Brantley, signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of 
Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Saint Kitts and Nevis should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Saint Lucia
Saint Lucia has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On 19-20 June 2019, Saint Lucia participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in Georgetown, Guyana, to 
promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kRrE6R)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Saint Lucia should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Saint Lucia should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (27 Sep 2018) Ratified (23 Jan 2019)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (75%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 
1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On 19-20 June 2019, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines participated in a regional forum co-hosted by Guyana and ICAN in 
Georgetown, Guyana, to promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2kRrE6R). Speaking in the UN on 26 September 2019, Saint 
Vincent and the Grenadines’ Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves encouraged states which have not yet signed and ratified the TPNW 
“to do so in our collective pursuit to bring peace to every corner of the globe.” (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Saint Vincent and the Grenadines should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (8 Dec 2017) Ratified (31 Jul 2019)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Samoa
Samoa has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On 26 September 2019, Samoa’s Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi said in the UN that his country had signed and rapidly 
ratified the TPNW to underscore its commitment to the NPT goals. He also said that the Treaty's “success over time will depend on 
the commitment of each and every UN member state. Each new signature and ratification of the treaty ban will strengthen global 
norms against these weapons of terror and move us closer to a nuclear-weapon-free world. And the only guarantee humankind 
has against the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons is through the non-possession and total elimination of all nuclear 
weapons.” (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Samoa should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Samoa should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (26 Sep 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (60%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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San Marino
San Marino has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
San Marino voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• San Marino should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• San Marino should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (26 Sep 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Sao Tome and Principe
Sao Tome and Principe has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet 
ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Sao Tome and Principe voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Sao Tome and Principe should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Saudi Arabia has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Saudi Arabia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Saudi Arabia wants to extract and 
enrich uranium for its new nuclear energy programme, including construction of two nuclear reactors. It is already in talks with 
companies from China, France, Russia, South Korea, and the United States for the project, but is, so far, unwilling to agree to an 
associated ban on enriching uranium and on reusing nuclear material. It has pledged to acquire nuclear weapons should Iran do 
so.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Saudi Arabia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (25%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Senegal
Senegal voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Senegal has not yet adhered 
to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and 
can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Senegal voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Senegal should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Seychelles
Seychelles has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified  
the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Seychelles voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Seychelles should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Sierra Leone has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Sierra Leone voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated in a regional forum for 
ECOWAS members hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m3doYI)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Sierra Leone should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Solomon Islands
Solomon Islands voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Solomon Islands has 
not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of 
the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Solomon Islands voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated at a regional workshop to 
promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Solomon Islands should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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South Africa
South Africa produced nuclear weapons in the late 1970s but decided in 1989 to give them up and has since advocated for 
nuclear disarmament. It was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including 
during the negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. South Africa has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the 
prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On 16–17 August 2018, South Africa and ICAN co-hosted a regional workshop in Pretoria, to promote adherence to the
TPNW (bit.ly/2kHK228). Speaking in the UN on 26 September 2019, South Africa said it was pleased to be among the first 25 
member states of the TPNW. It urged all states that have not signed the TPNW to do so as soon as possible, and added:  “South 
Africa reaffirms our view that the TPNW is a bold and positive step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons as it 
strengthens the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty." (bit.ly/2obi545
RECOMMENDATIONS
• South Africa should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• South Africa should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (25 Feb 2019)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (30%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks <1 t (~35 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Sri Lanka has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Sri Lanka voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Sri Lanka should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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State of Palestine
Palestine has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Palestine signed the TPNW on 20 September 2017 and deposited its instrument of ratification on 22 March 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Palestine should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Palestine should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (22 Mar 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) N/A Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (60%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 N/A Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (SQP approved)
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Sudan
Sudan voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Sudan has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Sudan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by 
South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Sudan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Suriname
Suriname voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Suriname has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Suriname voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Suriname should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Thailand
Thailand was at the forefront of the diplomatic process towards a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, including during the 
negotiation of the TPNW in 2017. Thailand has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions 
in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
On 31 August 2018, Thailand, together with New Zealand and UNODA, hosted a regional workshop in Bangkok, to promote 
adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m2Sucd). On 26 September 2019, Thailand stated at the UN General Assembly that the TPNW 
"truly reflects a global call to rid the world of these terrible weapons. It is now the time we turn the momentum into concrete 
actions. Therefore, as a ratifying state to the treaty, Thailand calls on all states to sign and ratify the treaty at the earliest 
opportunities.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Thailand should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Thailand should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (20 Sep 2017)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (46%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Bangkok)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Timor-Leste
Timor-Leste has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified 
the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Timor-Leste participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 
to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m2Sucd)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Timor-Leste should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2018) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (100%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (SQP signed)
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Togo
Togo has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Togo participated in a regional forum hosted by ICAN in Abuja, Nigeria on 15–16 August 2019 to promote adherence to the
TPNW.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Togo should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Tonga
Tonga voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Tonga has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Tonga did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. It participated at a regional workshop to
promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Tonga should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Did not vote Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Trinidad and Tobago
Trinidad and Tobago has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Trinidad and Tobago’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and CARICOM, Dennis Moses, signed the TPNW and deposited the 
government's instrument of ratification on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 
2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York. Speaking at a plenary session at the UN General 
Assembly on the same day, he said: “We view this treaty as an option for immediate action on nuclear disarmament, which is 
necessary in this challenging international security environment. We therefore encourage states that have not yet done so to sign 
and ratify the treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons.” He added that the TPNW is part of Trinidad and Tobago's efforts towards a 
sustainable development agenda. (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Trinidad and Tobago should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW. 
• Trinidag and Tobago should also ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019) Ratified (26 Sep 2019)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (75%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Tunisia
Tunisia voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Tunisia has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Tunisia voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Tunisia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Turkmenistan 
maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign 
and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Turkmenistan voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Turkmenistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Tuvalu
Tuvalu has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Tuvalu participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 
5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Tuvalu should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Uganda
Uganda voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Uganda has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Uganda voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Uganda participated in a regional workshop co-
hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Uganda should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (29%) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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United Arab Emirates
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. The 
UAE has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in 
Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The UAE voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The UAE should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (14%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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United Republic of Tanzania
Tanzania has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Minister for Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation, Palamagamba J.A.M. Kabudi, signed the TPNW on the International 
Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN 
Headquarters in New York. Speaking about the TPNW in a plenary session of the UN General Assembly on the same day, the 
Minister said: "The treaty is important, not only because it complements existing international instruments on nuclear weapons, 
but also because it places those weapons on the same legal footing as other weapons of mass destruction. In order to make the 
treaty enter into force, I encourage those countries that have not yet signed the treaty to do so as soon as practicable.”  
(bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Tanzania should urgently ratify the TPNW, and continue to encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (25%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Uruguay
Uruguay has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Speaking about the TPNW at the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the 
International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September 2019, Uruguay said: “[A]s in previous years, we 
urge all states who have not yet done so to accede and ratify.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Uruguay should continue to encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Uruguay should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (25 Jul 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Vanuatu
Vanuatu has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Vanuatu participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, 
on 5–7 December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Vanuatu should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Vanuatu should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (26 Sep 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Venezuela
Venezuela has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Venezuela voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Venezuela should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Venezuela should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (20 Sep 2017) Ratified (27 Mar 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (25%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Viet Nam
Viet Nam has signed and ratified the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Viet Nam participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by Thailand, New Zealand and UNODA in Bangkok on 31 August 2018 to 
promote adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m2Sucd).
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Viet Nam should encourage other states to adhere to the TPNW.
• Viet Nam should ensure that all the TPNW obligations are implemented into national law.
Signed Adhered
Yes (22 Sep 2017) Ratified (17 May 2018)
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Bangkok)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Yemen
Yemen voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Yemen has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Yemen voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Yemen should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT No (Signed)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Zambia
Zambia has signed the TPNW and is in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1, but has not yet ratified the Treaty.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Zambia’s Foreign Minister Joseph Malanji signed the TPNW on the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons 
on 26 September 2019, during a special High-Level Ceremony at the UN Headquarters in New York. 
Zambia participated in a regional workshop co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote 
adherence to the TPNW (bit.ly/2m9WdFB).
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Zambia should urgently ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
Yes (26 Sep 2019) No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (33%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Zimbabwe
Zimbabwe voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Zimbabwe has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Zimbabwe voted yes on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Zimbabwe participated in a regional workshop 
co-hosted by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Zimbabwe should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (20%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted yes Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Argentina
Argentina voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017. Argentina has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Argentina abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Speaking about the TPNW in the UN
General Assembly on 26 September 2019, Argentina said that "The spirit underlying the treaty is shared by Argentina, for which 
reason we voted for its adoption. Argentina is analyzing the impact of the treaty in other important spheres of the current regime 
in regards to nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the cornerstone of which is the NPT.” (bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Argentina should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (40%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Tlatelolco)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks 0 IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
Fissile material production Yes (LEU) Party to the BWC Yes





















Bosnia and Herzegovina did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can 
therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Bosnia and Herzegovina voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Bosnia and Herzegovina should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Finland
Finland did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Finland maintains policies 
and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the 
Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Committee on Foreign Affairs in the Finnish Parliament gave a statement on the TPNW in June 2018. According to the 
Committee, the TPNW “supports and complements” the NPT and CTBT. The TPNW “could lead to changed expectations, priorities 
and views also in states outside of the treaty.” The Committee argued that Finland should “continue to analyse the contents of the 
treaty and compare it to other central initiatives in the area.” The Committee did not offer a straightforward recommendation with 
respect to adherence or not, but concluded that Finland should cooperate with Sweden and monitor the Swedish stance on the 
TPNW (bit.ly/2mkxaz9). Finland abstained on the UN General Assembly's resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Finland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Georgia
Georgia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Georgia maintains policies 
and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the 
Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Georgia abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Georgia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Kyrgyzstan has not 
yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Kyrgyzstan abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. At the UN General Assembly’s High-Level 
Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 
September 2019, Kyrgyzstan among other issues spoke about the importance of remediating areas impacted by uranium mining. 
(bit.ly/2obwUU6)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Kyrgyzstan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Mali
Mali participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Mali has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Mali abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Mali participated in a regional workshop co-hosted 
by South Africa and ICAN on 16–17 August 2018 in Pretoria to promote adherence to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2m9WdFB)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Mali should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT No (Signatory)
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Marshall Islands
The Marshall Islands voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017, but has not yet 
signed or ratified it. The Marshall Islands’ hosting of US missile tests at Kwajalein Atoll means that it is not in compliance with 
the TPNW’s prohibition on assisting illegal activities relating to nuclear weapons.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Marshall Islands abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. The Marshall Islands’ foreign 
minister John Silk has said that his government cannot back the TPNW without US involvement, but has also communicated that 
ongoing internal consultations have prompted the government to take more time for consideration before joining the Treaty (The 
Marshall Islands Journal, vol. 49, no. 44 (2 November 2018)).
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Marshall Islands should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. 
• The Marshall Islands should request that the United States cease the testing of nuclear-capable missiles at Kwajalein Atoll.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Not  compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Micronesia
Micronesia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Micronesia maintains 
policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify 
the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Micronesia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Micronesia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (SQP signed)
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Monaco
Monaco participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Monaco has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Monaco voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Monaco should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (67%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Nauru
Nauru did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Nauru maintains policies and 
practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty 
without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Nauru did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Nauru is expected to soon sign the TPNW. It 
participated at a regional workshop to promote adherence to the TPNW which was hosted by New Zealand in Auckland, on 5–7 
December 2018. (bit.ly/2mnZJfd)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Nauru should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Did not vote Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Niue
Niue is not a member or observer of the UN and was therefore not entitled to participate in the TPNW negotiations. Niue has 
not yet adhered to the Treaty, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of 
the TPNW. Niue can therefore accede to the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Niue is party to the South Pacific nuclear-weapon-free zone (Treaty of Rarotonga), but has not signalled whether it intends to sign 
and ratify the TPNW.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Niue should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) N/A Party to the NPT No
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) N/A (N/A) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 N/A Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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North Macedonia
North Macedonia participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. North 
Macedonia has not yet adhered to the TPNW, but it currently maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all  
of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty and can therefore sign and ratify without making changes to existing practices  
or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
North Macedonia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution in 2018. As of writing, North Macedonia was in the process 
of joining NATO, and if it does so without repudiating the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, it will be 
deemed to be encouraging assistance with acts prohibited by the TPNW and not in compliance with Art 1(1)(e).
RECOMMENDATIONS
• North Macedonia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It 
should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, 
and refrain from endorsing future NATO statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• North Macedonia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty, and until it is in a 
position to do so, it should - in line with its obligations under the NPT - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (50%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Serbia
Serbia did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not yet signed or ratified the Treaty. Serbia maintains policies and 
practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty 
without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Serbia abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Serbia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Singapore
Singapore participated in the TPNW negotiations, but was the only state to abstain on the vote when the Treaty was adopted. 
Singapore has not adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in 
Article 1 of the Treaty and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Singapore is categorized by the Ban Monitor as "undecided" on the TPNW. In First Committee of the UN General Assembly in 
2018, the representative of Singapore said his country is committed to the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, the only guarantee 
against their use. Singapore regretted that concerns it has about the TPNW were not taken into account when the instrument was 
negotiated. "While there are multiple pathways towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, all parties must be involved in the process," 
he said, adding that Singapore will continue to work constructively toward that goal. (bit.ly/2nOeKYC)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Singapore should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (17%) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Bangkok)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Abstained Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Somalia
Somalia participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Somalia has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Somalia did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Somalia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ No (Signed, Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Did not vote Party to the PTBT No (Signatory)
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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South Sudan
South Sudan participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. South Sudan has not 
yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
South Sudan did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• South Sudan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT No
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ No (Pelindaba)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Did not vote Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC No




















NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     213    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Sweden
Sweden voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017, but the government has 
decided to not adhere to the Treaty for the time being. Sweden maintains policies and practices that are compliant with  
all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing 
practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Sweden abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution in 2018, before announcing in July 2019 that it would "refrain from 
signing or pursuing ratification of the TPNW at the present time." The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also indicated, however, 
that Sweden might reassess its position following the NPT review conference in 2020, and that Sweden will participate in the first 
meeting of states parties to the TPNW as an observer. There has been extensive debate in the Swedish Parliament and in the 
media about the government's decision to not adhere to the TPNW. (bit.ly/2kr6r3l)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Sweden should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (45%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Switzerland
Switzerland voted in favour of adopting the TPNW at the UN Diplomatic Conference on 7 July 2017, but has not yet adhered to 
the Treaty. Switzerland maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, 
and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In June 2018, the Swiss Government published an interdepartmental working group (IDAG) report on the implications of accession 
to the TPNW. “At the current stage”, the report concluded, “the reasons against an accession of Switzerland outweigh the potential 
opportunities accompanying a signature and ratification of this treaty” (bit.ly/2nGIhQr). Both houses of the Swiss Parliament 
subsequently instructed the government to sign and ratify without delay (bit.ly/2kTeiqI). The Swiss Government plans to update 
the IDAG report and review its decision by the end of 2020, and contends that this fulfills the mandate given by Parliament  
(bit.ly/2ktmTQF). Parliament and NGOs disagree. Bern and Geneva have signed ICAN’s Cities Appeal.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Switzerland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (14%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted yes Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Syrian Arab Republic
Syria participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Syria has not yet adhered to 
the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty, and can 
therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Syria did not vote on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Syria should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (11%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT No
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Did not vote Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks <0.001 t IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Tajikistan
Tajikistan participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Tajikistan has not yet 
adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Tajikistan abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Tajikistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Ukraine
Ukraine boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. Ukraine maintains policies and practices that 
are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the TPNW, and can therefore sign and ratify the Treaty without making 
changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Ukraine abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Ukraine should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty. Uzbekistan has not 
yet adhered to the TPNW, but maintains policies and practices that are compliant with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the 
Treaty, and can therefore sign and ratify it without making changes to existing practices or policies.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Uzbekistan abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Uzbekistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (No data) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Semipalatinsk)
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Albania
Albania boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Albania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Albania voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Albania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Albania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Armenia
Armenia participated in the TPNW negotiations, but did not cast a vote on the adoption of the Treaty and has not adhered to it. 
It is deemed to be a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. It may sign 
and ratify the TPNW, but will have to renounce Russian retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf in order to 
become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Armenia abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Armenia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Armenia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (0%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Did not vote Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Australia
Australia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not 
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Australia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to 
its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Australian government has opposed the idea of a ban on nuclear weapons since the beginning. It has argued that a key 
problem with the TPNW is that it "seeks to delegitimise extended deterrence” (bit.ly/2mX63ek). In December 2018, the Labor Party 
committed to “sign and ratify the Ban Treaty” after taking into account the need to ensure complementarity with the NPT and an 
effective verification and enforcement architecture (bit.ly/2mmfEdT). Melbourne and Sydney are among 20 cities in Australia that 
have committed to ICAN’s Cities Appeal. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Australia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should renounce 
the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and refrain from 
endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Australia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do so, 
it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration 




Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ Yes (Rarotonga)
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Belarus
Belarus did not participate in the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state 
and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Belarus may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make 
changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Belarus abstained on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. Speaking at the UN General Assembly’s High-
Level Plenary Meeting to Commemorate and Promote the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Belarus 
stated that "The NPT must remain a cornerstone of the international nuclear disarmament regime. Trying to replace it with other 
international agreements is counterproductive.” (bit.ly/2obi545)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Belarus should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Belarus should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Not compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks <1  t (~35 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Belgium
Belgium boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Belgium may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In September 2019, 152 Belgian mayors signed an open letter urging Belgium to join the TPNW (bit.ly/2kKlHc0). 22 cities
in Belgium have joined ICAN’s Cities Appeal.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Belgium should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Belgium should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Not compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Not compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks <1 t (~35 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Bulgaria
Bulgaria boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Bulgaria may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In 2017, the Bulgarian government said that "simply prohibiting" nuclear weapons will not bring about a world without nuclear 
weapons. Nuclear disarmament "is only possible within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty", the Bulgarian 
government maintained. (bit.ly/2lXIRMf)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Bulgaria should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Bulgaria should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Canada
Canada boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Canada may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, Canada’s Foreign Minister Chrystia Freeland stated: “Over the past year, we have seen leaders from the global 
disarmament community drive the negotiation and signing of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The popularity 
of this initiative speaks to the desire of countries, activists and communities to accelerate the work toward disarmament. It also 
reflects frustration and disappointment at the pace of global efforts so far. We believe that this is a legitimate criticism”  
(bit.ly/2FFEoDD). Toronto and Vancouver are among five Canadian cities that have committed to ICAN’s Cities Appeal.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Canada should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Canada should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks <10 t (~350 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Croatia
Croatia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Croatia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Croatia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Croatia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Croatia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Czechia
Czechia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Czechia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, the Czech delegation to the UN General Assembly's First Committee stated that it was “not convinced” that the
TPNW “will help to enhance the security of any country or diminish nuclear arsenals. In contrary, we see risks that it is
posing to the nuclear disarmament.” (bit.ly/2nQocuy)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Czechia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Czechia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Denmark
Denmark boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not 
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Denmark may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to 
its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
A ban on nuclear weapons would conflict with NATO commitments, said Denmark’s foreign minister in 2017. (bit.ly/2krOgux). In 
2018, Denmark voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Denmark should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Denmark should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Estonia
Estonia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Estonia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Estonia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Estonia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Estonia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Germany
Germany boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not 
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Germany may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to 
its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The German government has consistently opposed the idea of a treaty banning nuclear weapons. Opposition parties Grüne and 
Linke favour German adherence (bit. ly/2krGFfn), and support for TPNW keeps growing in the German Parliament. 166 federal 
parliamentarians have signed the ICAN Parliamentary Appeal. A new cross-party working group on the TPNW (Parlamentskreis 
Atomwaffenverbot) was established in September 2019 (bit.ly/2ojf2GU). Three federal states and almost 50 cities have signed 
ICAN's Cities Appeal, including Berlin and Munich.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Germany should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Germany should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Not compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Not compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks <1 t (~35 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Greece
Greece boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Greece may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Greece voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Greece should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Greece should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Hungary
Hungary boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Hungary may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
According to the Hungarian government, the TPNW may "intentionally or unintentionally … lead to the erosion of the NPT regime." 
(bit.ly/2kwHFz2)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Hungary should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Hungary should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks Yes Party to the CWC Yes
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Iceland
Iceland boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Iceland may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Iceland is undertaking an inquiry into the TPNW. The Icelandic Foreign Ministry made an official submission to the inquiry in April 
2018. The Ministry argued that the TPNW conflicted with NATO’s nuclear policy and that Iceland should not join the treaty.  
(bit.ly/2m1uRRt)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Iceland should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Iceland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Italy
Italy boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Italy may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In September 2017, the Italian parliament adopted a resolution committing the government to “pursue a nuclear weapon free 
world” and “in a way compatible with its NATO obligations and with the positioning of allied states, to explore the possibility of 
becoming a party to the legally binding treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons” (bit.ly/2lY88FY). According to the government, the 
NPT “provides the only realistic legal framework to attain a world without nuclear weapons, in a way that promotes international 
stability and is based on the principle of undiminished security for all.” (bit.ly/2kKjldb)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Italy should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Italy should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do 
so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common 
aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states 
parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Not compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Not compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted yes Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks <1 t (~35 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes


















NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     237    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Japan
Japan boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Japan may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In 2017, the Japanese government stated that the “ban treaty concept has been unable to obtain understanding and
involvement of nuclear-weapon states”, and that it would therefore “be difficult for Japan to participate” (bit.ly/2kKsSAW).
In October 2018, the Foreign Minister of Japan, Taro Kono, asserted: “As for the promotion of the Treaty on the Prohibition 
ofNuclear Weapons, Japan has still not decided anything. However, Japan is not thinking of signing the TPNW, so our response 
will be based on that (bit.ly/35hYv74)”.  Hiroshima, Nagasaki and many more Japanese cities have signed ICAN’s Cities Appeal.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Japan should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Japan s should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks <10 t (~350 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks 47 t (~9,400 weapon equivalents) Party to the CWC Yes
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Latvia
Latvia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Latvia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Latvia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Latvia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Latvia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do 
so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common 
aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states 
parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Lithuania
Lithuania boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not 
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Lithuania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to 
its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, the Lithuanian delegation to the UNGA First Committee declared that, "Given the current geopolitical context, we do not 
agree that delegitimization of nuclear weapons is a realistic addition to the harmonization of the disarmament and security ends." 
(bit.ly/2m4sUne)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Lithuania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Lithuania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Luxembourg
Luxembourg boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and 
not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Luxembourg may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make 
changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Luxembourg voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Luxembourg should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Luxembourg should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a 
position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards 
the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with 
its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Montenegro
Montenegro boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and 
not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Montenegro may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make 
changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Montenegro voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Montenegro should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Montenegro should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Netherlands
The Netherlands was the only nuclear-weapon-complicit state to participate in the negotiations of the TPNW, but also the only 
state that voted against the adoption of the Treaty on 7 July 2017. The Netherlands has not adhered to the TPNW, and is not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1 of the Treaty. The Netherlands may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have 
to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In November 2018, the Dutch House of Representatives adopted a series of motions calling on the government to intensify its 
advocacy for nuclear disarmament, including to champion the TPNW within NATO and investigate the compatibility of the TPNW 
with existing Dutch legislation. The Dutch foreign and defence ministers responded that there are no fundamental obstacles within 
the Dutch law preventing the Netherlands from joining. (bit.ly/2P730d7)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The Netherlands should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It 
should renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, 
and refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of nuclear weapons.
• The Netherlands should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a 
position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards 
the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with 
its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Not compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Not compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) Yes (30%) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text Voted no Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks <1 t (~35 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Norway
Norway started the initiative on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, which resulted in a majority of states 
negotiating and adopting the TPNW. But Norway boycotted the negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-
weapon-complicit state and not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Norway may sign and ratify the TPNW, 
but will have to make changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In February 2018, the Norwegian Parliament asked the Government to do an inquiry into the consequences of joining the TPNW. 
In the resulting report, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that because of weaknesses in the TPNW's nuclear disarmament 
verification arrangements and the fact that Norway "cannot join the TPNW without coming into conflict with our membership 
in NATO" the government deems that Norway should not join the TPNW (bit.ly/2pmTcTH). Norway’s capital Oslo and 15 other 
Norwegian cities have endorsed ICAN's Cities Appeal.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Norway should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Norway should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to it. Until it is in a position to do so, it 
should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the goal of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings 
of states parties as an observer, and work with its parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks <0.01 t (0 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Poland
Poland boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Poland may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Poland voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Poland should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Poland should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Portugal
Portugal boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Portugal may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Portugal voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Portugal should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Portugal should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT No (Signatory)
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Republic of Korea
South Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and 
not in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. South Korea may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make 
changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In the words of the South Korean delegation to the NPT PrepCom in 2018, the TPNW, "crafted without the participation of nuclear-
weapon states cannot but bear intrinsic limitation." (bit.ly/2mqPAyq)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• South Korea should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• South Korea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a 
position to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards 
the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with 
its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Romania
Romania boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not 
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Romania may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to 
its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
According to the Romanian delegation to the 2018 NPT PrepCom, “A viable road to nuclear disarmament in the current security 
environment should concentrate first and foremost on improving the geopolitical conditions” (bit.ly/2mnh6N6).
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Romania should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Romania should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Slovakia
Slovakia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Slovakia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, Slovakia’s state secretary for foreign affairs declared that "we do not believe that the mere existence of a legally binding 
international instrument banning nuclear weapons will attain the goal of zero. No shortcuts can lead us toward this direction. That 
is the reason, why Slovakia is not in the position to support the Treaty on Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons" (bit.ly/2mjLzvs).
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Slovakia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Slovakia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Slovenia
Slovenia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Slovenia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Slovenia voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Slovenia should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Slovenia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD No (Observer)
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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Spain
Spain boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Spain may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
The Spanish government agreed in September 2018 to sign the TPNW. The agreement was made during negotiations on the  
2019 budget, when left-wing party Podemos obtained a commitment from the government to sign the Treaty in exchange for  
Podemos’ support for the 2019 budget. The government has not commented on whether or when it will implement this decision  
(bit.ly/2koiOgA). The city of Granollers and five other Spanish cities have signed ICAN’s Cities Appeal.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Spain should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Spain should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do 
so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common 
aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states 
parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes


















NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     251    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Turkey
Turkey boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-weapon-complicit state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Turkey may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its 
policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Turkey voted no on the UN General Assembly resolution on the TPNW in 2018.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Turkey should ensure that nuclear weapons do not have a role in its national defence plans and security policies. It should 
renounce the retention and potential use of nuclear weapons on its behalf, for instance through a declaratory statement, and 
refrain from endorsing future alliance statements in support of weapons of mass destruction.
• Turkey should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should – in line with its obligations under the NPT – welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the 
common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its 
states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Not compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Not compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes
Highly enriched uranium stocks No IAEA AP in force Yes
Civilian plutonium stocks No Party to the CWC Yes
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China
China boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance 
with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. China may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and 
practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In a joint statement with France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States in 2018, China said: "The TPNW will not be 
binding on our countries, and we do not accept any claim that it contributes to the development of customary international law; 
nor does it set any new standards or norms. We call on all countries that are considering supporting the TPNW to reflect seriously 
on its implications for international peace and security.” (bit.ly/2mrUHhO) (bit.ly/2pyMY2S)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• China should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that 
any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and 
eliminate its nuclear arsenal. 
• China should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do 
so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear arsenals 
- welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its 
meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Not compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT No (Signed,  Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (Voluntary offer agreement)
Highly enriched uranium stocks 14 t (~933 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes (Modified)
Civilian plutonium stocks 0.04 t (~8 weapon equivalents) Party to the CWC Yes
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Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***




WARHEAD RANGE WEIGHT LENGTH DIAMETER
DF-4 ICBM Silo 5 10 3,300 kt 5,500+ km 82 t 28 m 2.25 m
DF-5 A/B ICBM Silo 20 40 200–5,000 kt 13,000 km 183 t 32.6 m 3.35 m
DF-21/26 M/IRBM Road-mobile 108 114 200–300 kt 2,150–4,000 km 14.7 t 10.7 m 1.4 m
DF-31 (A/AG) ICBM Silo/Road-mobile 54 54 200–300 kt 7,200–11,200 km 42 t 13 m 2.25 m
JL-t2 SLBM Submarine 48 48 200–300 kt 7,000–8,000 km 42 t 13 m ?








A Chinese DF-21A transporter errector vehicle on display at the Beijing 
Military Museum, 2007 (Max Smith)
DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE
China maintains a so-called no-first-use policy, meaning that the Chinese government has declared that it will only use nuclear 
weapons in response to a nuclear attack. China has long claimed to rely on a "minimum deterrent", but recent developments 
suggest that China might be in the process of altering its policy. China has traditionally maintained that it will not use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states and states in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Having ratified the relevant protocols to the 
treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Semipalatinsk, China has legally committed not to use nuclear weapons against 
the members of the Latin American and Caribbean, South Pacific, African, and Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties. 
China has not ratified the equivalent protocol for the South-East Asian zone.
China is believed not to deploy nuclear warheads on missiles in normal circumstances, but some believe that China has already 
fitted, or will soon fit, nuclear warheads to missiles on its nascent submarine force. There have also been reports that some 
Chinese officials are advocating "increasing the readiness of China’s nuclear missiles".1 China routinely conducts nuclear readiness 
drills. In January 2019, Chinese state media reported that Chinese forces had simulated the launch of a nuclear-armed ICBM 
against "an imaginary enemy".2 In a bid to enhance its second-strike capability, China has positioned much of its land-based 
strategic forces in hardened bunkers deep inside mountains. That said, China does not appear to have yet adopted a "launch on 
warning" posture, retaining its traditional "ready the forces on warning" posture.3
Since the 1990s, China’s approach to multilateral nuclear disarmament diplomacy has been one of caution. At the UN, China often 
choses to abstain on controversial resolutions instead of picking a side, a stance that is probably informed by China’s shared 
history and close relationships with the non-aligned world. In 2016, China was the only permanent member of the UN Security 
Council to abstain on the vote in the General Assembly that mandated the 2017 negotiation of the TPNW; France, Russia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States all voted against.
1  Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Chinese nuclear forces, 2019", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 4 (2019), at: bit.ly/2ZuC0Yx.
2  Liu Xuanzun, "China’s Rocket Force conducts mock ICBM strike exercise", Global Times (22 January 2019), at: bit.ly/34dA0HY.
3  Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "The Pentagon’s 2019 China Report", Federation of American Scientists (6 May 2019), at: fas.org/
category/china/. 
Nuclear testing**
Number of nuclear explosive tests 45
Last explosive test 1996
* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
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Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
North Korea boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. North Korea may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes 
to its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In 2017, the delegation of North Korea to the UN General Assembly First Committee stated that the North Korean government 
could not support the TPNW. North Korea “consistently supports the total elimination of nuclear weapons and the efforts for 
denuclearization of the entire world. However as long as the U.S. who constantly threatens and blackmails the [Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea] with nuclear weapons rejects the NBT [Nuclear Ban treaty] the DPRK is not in position to accede to  
the treaty”.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• North Korea should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that 
any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and 
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• North Korea should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to do 
so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, 
attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Not compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Did not vote Party to the NPT No (1985-2003)
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT No (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Abstained Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  Yes (not implemented)
Highly enriched uranium stocks 0 t (~0 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks - Party to the CWC No
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Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME TYPE DELIVERY PLATFORM NO. WARHEADS  (AVAILABLE)
YIELD PER 
WARHEAD RANGE WEIGHT LENGTH DIAMETER
Hwasong 14 ICBM Road-mobile (TEL) ? ? ? 6,700–10,400 km 33.8 t 19.5 m 1.7 m
Hwasong 15 ICBM Road-mobile (TEL) ? ? ? 8,500–13,000 km ~71–21 t ~22.5 m ~2.4 m
Taepodong 2 ICBM Launch pad ? ? ? 12,000 km ~80 t ~30  m 2.0–2.2 m
Most of the North Korean nuclear weapons delivery system is under development. In addition to the list above, it includes IRBMs (Hwasong 
10/12), MRBMs (Hwasong 6/7) and possibly an SLBM (Bukkeukseong).
Hwasong-15
North Korea’s new road mobile Hwasong-15 (HS-15) intercontinental 
ballistic missile (unknown)
DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE
North Korean officials have occasionally made statements that have been interpreted to go in the direction of a no-first-use policy. 
For example, in May 2016, the North Korean news agency quoted Kim Jong-un, the supreme leader of North Korea, as having 
averred that North Korea will not use a nuclear weapon unless North Korea’s sovereignty is "encroached upon by any aggressive 
hostile forces with nukes".1 Other statements have suggested that North Korea might be willing to use nuclear weapons pre-
emptively. In March 2016, for example, in reaction to the commencement of a US–South Korean military exercise, North Korea 
threatened a "pre-emptive nuclear strike of justice" and to turn Washington and Seoul into "flames and ashes".2 Most analysts 
believe that the North Korean regime will use nuclear weapons to protect itself against any perceived threat to its survival.
In August 2017, US President Donald Trump contended that North Korea "best not make any more threats to the United States", 
adding that "they [North Korea] will be met with fire and fury and frankly power, the likes of which this world has never seen 
before."3 Many feared war was imminent. Instead, Trump and Kim met for a high-level summit in Singapore on 12 June 2018. 
North Korea committed to "work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula". The US administration represented 
this as a significant diplomatic victory. In reality, the summit declaration added little if anything to North Korea’s standing policy.
North Korea has executed a number of nuclear and missile tests in recent years, attracting widespread criticism from other 
governments. Over the course of 2018 and 2019, North Korea has conducted at least 9 ballistic missile tests, some of them 
involving multiple missiles (i.e. multiple missiles launched on a single day). North Korea has not carried out any nuclear or long-
range ballistic missile tests since 2017, focusing instead on developing its short-range missiles. North Korea’s nuclear-weapon 
programme should be considered as a nuclear weapon and missile development programme rather than a programme to 
"modernise" existing forces. Unlike other nuclear-armed states that have used bomber aircraft as their initial delivery means, North 
Korea has so far concentrated its efforts on the development of ballistic missiles (short, medium, and long-range).
1  BBC, "North Korea ‘will not use nuclear weapons’ unless threatened" (8 May 2016), at: bbc.in/32fIvjY.
2  The Guardian (AP), "North Korea threatens to reduce US and South Korea to ‘Flames and Ash’" (7 March 2016), at: bit.ly/2ZomwKp.
3  Peter Baker and Choe Sang-Hun, "Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ Against North Korea if It Endangers U.S.", New York Times (8 August 
2017), at: nyti.ms/2HtIO2s. .
Nuclear testing**
Number of nuclear explosive tests 6
Last explosive test 2017
* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
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France
France boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance 
with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. France may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and 
practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In July 2018, an information mission set up by the parliamentary foreign affairs commission concluded that France should 
“mitigate its criticism of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and the countries that have contributed to its 
adoption, to show that we understand and take into account the concerns of States and their desire for more balanced global 
governance” (bit.ly/2krrvX). Paris and a dozen other French cities have joined ICAN's Cities Appeal.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• France should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that 
any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and 
eliminate its nuclear arsenal. 
• France should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear 
arsenals - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, 
attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Not compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Not compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Not compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT No
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (Voluntary offer agreement)
Highly enriched uranium stocks 30.6 t (~2,040 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes (Modified)
Civilian plutonium stocks 65.4 t (~13,080 weapon equivalents Party to the CWC Yes
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Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME TYPE DELIVERY PLATFORM NO. WARHEADS  (AVAILABLE)
YIELD PER 
WARHEAD RANGE WEIGHT LENGTH DIAMETER




Strategic bomber / 
fighter plane
? ? 300 kt 300–500 km 860 kg 5.38 m 0.38 m
Mirage 2000N
The Mirage 2000N, designed to carry a 300 kt nuclear armed air-to-surface 
cruise missile (photo: Jerry Gunner)
DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE
In a 2013 White Paper on defence and national security, the French government asserted that use of nuclear weapons by 
France "would only be conceivable in extreme circumstances of legitimate self-defence." The White Paper further postulates 
that nuclear deterrence protects the country from "any State-led aggression against its vital interests, of whatever origin 
and in whatever form. It rules out any threat of blackmail that might paralyse its freedom of decision and action."1
 
France does not participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, but the French nuclear arsenal has been claimed to 
contribute to general NATO deterrence since 1974. Like the United Kingdom, France maintains a "continuous at sea 
deterrent" mission, whereby at least one of the country’s four ballistic missile submarines will always be on patrol. When 
at sea, the submarines carry 16 SLBMs with six nuclear warheads on each missile. As other nuclear-armed states, France 
routinely prepares for the use of nuclear weapons. In February 2019, the French Air Force conducted an 11-hour nuclear 
exercise, practicing "to sneak a nuclear-capable cruise missile through simulated enemy air defences."2 
France has issued non-binding assurances that it will not use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party 
to the NPT (provided that the aggressor is not allied to a nuclear-armed state).  In ratifying the relevant protocols to the 
treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Semipalatinsk, France has committed not to use nuclear weapons against 
the members of the Latin American and Caribbean, South Pacific, African or Central Asian NWFZ treaties.
France was long antipathetic towards the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Taking a firm stance against 
the concept of nuclear non-proliferation in the late 1950s (when France was still a non-nuclear state), France did not 
accede to the NPT until 1992. Today, official French policy states that "France has not given up on the goal of disarmament, 
including nuclear disarmament."  At the 2018 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee, France claimed to remain 
"committed to the objective of a world without nuclear weapons", but qualified its statement by adding "when conditions 
allow".  France has actively sought to discredit disarmament initiatives such as the humanitarian initiative and the TPNW, 
lobbying other states not to sign and ratify the Treaty.
1  Government of France, "French White Paper: Defence and National Security" (2013), pp. 67, 73.
2  Sebastian Sprenger, "French Air Force rehearses a long-range nuclear strike", Defense News (5 February 2019), at: bit.ly/30JFNCJ.
Nuclear testing**
Number of nuclear explosive tests 210
Last explosive test 1996
* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
*** Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "French nuclear forces, 2019", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 1 (2019), at: bit.ly/2MKhqBr. See 
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India
India boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance 
with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. India may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and 
practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In 2018, the Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly First Committee stated that "the "Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons, negotiated outside the CD, does not create any obligations for India." (bit.ly/2kTNEhi)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• India should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that 
any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and 
eliminate its nuclear arsenal. 
• India should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to 
do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear 




Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Not compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Not compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT No
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT No (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (Item-specific agreement)
Highly enriched uranium stocks 4 t (~267 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes (Modified)
Civilian plutonium stocks 0.4 t (~80 weapon equivalents) Party to the CWC Yes
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Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME TYPE DELIVERY PLATFORM NO. WARHEADS  (AVAILABLE)
YIELD PER 
WARHEAD RANGE WEIGHT LENGTH DIAMETER
Prithvi 2 SRBM Road-mobile (TEL) 24 24 12 kt 350 km 4,600 kg 8.56 m 1.1 m
Agni 1 SRBM Rail/Road-mobile (TEL) 20 20 40 kt 700–900 km 12 t 15 m 1.0 m
Agni 2 MRBM Rail/Road-mobile (TEL) 8 8 40 kt 2,000–3,500 km 16 t 21 m 1.3 m
Agni 3 IRBM Rail/Road-mobile (TEL) 8 8 40 kt 3,500–5,000 km 50 t 17 m 2.0 m
Dhanush SRBM Ship 2 4 12 kt 400 km 4,500 kg 8.53 m 0.9 m
India also has nuclear-capable fighter planes, and is reported to develop SLBM capability.
Agni 2
An Agni-2 intermediate range ballistic missile on a road-mobile launcher 
(TEL), New Delhi, 2004 (Photo: Antônio Milena)
DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 
India has traditionally maintained a no-first-use policy. According to the Indian government, India will only contemplate the use of 
nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack,1 and India’s force structure is based on the principle of a 
"credible minimum deterrent" designed to provide an "adequate retaliatory capability should deterrence fail." It has therefore usually 
been assumed that any use of nuclear weapons by India would be retaliatory rather than pre-emptive, and that it will be focused 
on "counter-value targets" (i.e. the adversary’s cities) rather than "counter-force targets" (the adversary’s nuclear forces). However, 
according to certain commentators, India may now be in the process of altering its doctrine. India might attempt a counter-force 
strike against Pakistan should it believe the latter to be contemplating a nuclear attack against India.2 According to one set of 
observers, "India is developing a suite of capabilities and increasingly making statements about preemption and counterforce."3
India has not offered legally binding security assurances to any state. The protocols to the various nuclear-weapon-free zone 
treaties containing such assurances for zone members are not open for Indian accession. India has not signed or ratified the NPT, 
CTBT, or TPNW, but has on numerous occasions stated that it supports global nuclear disarmament.
While successive Indian governments have claimed to favour nuclear disarmament also after 1998 – the Indian delegation to 
the UN General Assembly First Committee in 2017 asserted that "India remains committed to the goal of a nuclear weapons free 
world"4 – India has gradually expanded its nuclear capabilities. India formally supports the commencement of negotiations on 
a fissile material cut-off treaty, but has been reluctant to discuss existing stocks of such material, preferring a treaty that would 
only ban future production. In contrast to Pakistan, which possesses a much smaller stock of fissile material and has opposed 
negotiations on a treaty that only prohibits future production, India retains enough fissile material to produce thousands of new 
nuclear warheads.5 The Indian government did not participate in the negotiation of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in 2017.
1  Arms Control Association, "Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: India" (January 2018), at: bit.ly/2UdLBlo.
2  Rajesh Rajagopalan, "India’s nuclear strategy: A shift to counterforce?", Observer Research Foundation (30 March 2017). at: bit.ly/32dAw6W.
3  Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang, "India’s Counterforce Temptations", International Security 43, no. 3 (2019), p. 7.
4  Statement by India to the UN General Assembly First Committee (9 October 2017), at: bit.ly/32beUrz.
5  International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Fissile material stocks" (January 2017), at: http://fissilematerials.org/.
Nuclear testing**
Number of nuclear explosive tests 3
Last explosive test 1998
* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.



















NUCLEAR WEAPONS BAN MONITOR     261    TPNW Status and Compliance 2019
Israel
Israel boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance 
with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Israel may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and 
practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Israel opposes the TPNW. In 2017, the Israeli delegation to the UN General Assembly First Committee stated that "Israel wishes to 
emphasize its view that the treaty does not create, contribute to the development of, or indicate the existence of customary law 
related to the subject or the content of the Treaty." (bit.ly/2lXKnhp)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Israel should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that 
any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and 
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• Israel should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position to 
do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear 




Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Not compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT No
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT No (Signed,  Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (Item-specific agreement)
Highly enriched uranium stocks 0.3 t (~20 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks - Party to the CWC No (Signatory)
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Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME TYPE DELIVERY PLATFORM NO. WARHEADS  (AVAILABLE)
YIELD PER 
WARHEAD RANGE WEIGHT LENGTH DIAMETER
Jericho 2 MRBM Silo/rail/TEL 25 ? ? 1,500–1,800 km 22 t 15 m 1.35 m
Jericho 3 IRBM Silo/rail/TEL 25 ? ? 4,000+ km 29 t 15.5-16 m 1.56 m
Israel is also believed to have SLCM capability, and that the country maintains 30 nuclear gravity bombs to be delivered by aircraft.
Jericho 3
The launch of a Jericho 3 missile (photo: unknown)
DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 
Israel is believed to have acquired nuclear weapons in 1967, and to have slowly expanded its stockpile ever since.  Although Israel 
has never confirmed the existence of a nuclear arsenal, experts estimate that it reached a level of around 80 nuclear warheads for 
delivery by aircraft, ground-based missiles and, possibly, sea-launched cruise missiles by 2004 and that this number has remained 
stable since that date. Kristensen and Norris estimate that Israel stores its nuclear warheads at five locations across the country.1
Israel is not confirmed to have conducted any nuclear tests. However, Israel is believed to have received access to early French 
testing data, and is believed by some to have conducted a nuclear test near the Prince Edward Islands off Antarctica in 1979 
(the so-called Vela incident), possibly in cooperation with South Africa. There is no reliable public estimate of Israel’s spending on 
nuclear weapons.
Maintaining a policy of nuclear "opacity", Israel has never made its nuclear doctrine public. Instead, Israeli officials have insisted 
that Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East. Writing in 2017, Kristensen maintained that Israel’s 
nuclear warheads were not on alert in normal circumstances, increasing the amount of time needed to launch a nuclear strike.2 
Israel has not officially admitted to possessing nuclear weapons, and has thus not offered legally binding security assurances to 
any state. The protocols to the various NWFZ treaties are not open for Israeli accession.
Israel officially "supports a vision of the Middle East free from war and hostility, and from weapons of mass destruction and their 
means of delivery."3 However, Israel has resisted calls to negotiate a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle 
East, claiming its security interests are not being sufficiently accommodated. Israel reportedly "values the NPT and recognizes 
its contribution to the non-proliferation regime",4 but has not acceded to the agreement. Israel has not ratified the CTBT, but 
contributes to the CTBT verification scheme by supplying data from its national seismic stations to the International Data Centre.
1  Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 73, no. 5 
(2017), at: bit.ly/2NEA1yL.
2  Hans M. Kristensen, "Alert Status of Nuclear Weapons", AIP Conference Proceedings 1898 (2017), p. 1.
3  Statement of Israel to the UNGA First Committee (13 October 2016), at: bit.ly/348sGx5.
4  Statement of Israel to the UNGA First Committee (13 October 2017), at: bit.ly/30JcsIL.
Nuclear testing**
Number of nuclear explosive tests ?
Last explosive test ?
* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
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Pakistan
Pakistan boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in 
compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Pakistan may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to 
its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
An official spokesperson of the Pakistani government stated in August 2017 that Pakistan "cannot become a party" to the TPNW. 
"Pakistan does not consider itself bound by any of the obligations enshrined in this Treaty." (bit.ly/2msHhlP)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Pakistan should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that 
any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and 
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• Pakistan should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear 




Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Not compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Abstained Party to the NPT No
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT No (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (Item-specific agreement)
Highly enriched uranium stocks 3.4 t (~227 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force No
Civilian plutonium stocks - Party to the CWC Yes
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Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***




WARHEAD RANGE WEIGHT LENGTH DIAMETER
Ghaznavi (Hatf 3) SRBM Road-mobile ~16 ~16 5-12 kt 290 km 700 kg 8.5 m 0.8 m
Ghauri (Hatf 5) MRBM Road-mobile ~24 ~24 5-12 kt 1,250–1,500 km 700 kg 15.9 m 1.35 m
Shaheen 2 (Hatf 6) MRBM Road-mobile ~12 ~12 5-12 kt 1,500–2,000 km 700 kg 17.2 m 1.4 m
Babur (Hatf 7) GLCM Ground launched ~12 ~12 5-12 kt 350-700 km ~500 kg 6.2 m 0.52 m
Nasr (Hatf 9) SRBM Road-mobile ~24 ~24 low kt 60 km 1,200 kg 6 m 0.4 m
Pakistan is also believed to be able to deliver nuclear weapons by aircraft (F-16 / Mirage III), and there are indications that the country is develop-
ing weapons for use on ships or submarines.
HATF 3, 4 & 5
Pakistani nuclear-capable missiles on display in Karachi, 2008 (photo: 
unknown)
DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 
The government of Pakistan has pledged "no first use against non-nuclear weapons states", but "Pakistan’s policy on first use 
against states that possess nuclear weapons, particularly India, remains vague."1 Pakistan has traditionally kept its nuclear 
warheads "de-mated", meaning that the fissile cores are stored separately from the rest of the warheads. This practice 
increases the time required to employ the weapons, likely reducing the risk of nuclear strikes following miscalculation or 
accidents. In recent years, a number of commentators have expressed concern about Pakistan’s development of tactical 
nuclear weapons, which they fear will lower the nuclear threshold.2
Pakistan has not offered legally binding security assurances to any state. The protocols to the various nuclear-weapon-free-
zone treaties containing such assurances are not open for Pakistani accession. Since 1990, however, Pakistan has advocated 
the negotiation of a global treaty containing negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon states.
Pakistan frequently conducts nuclear drills and tests of nuclear-capable missiles. Over the course of 2018 and the first nine 
months of 2019, Pakistan carried out at least seven nuclear missile tests, including of intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
(Hatf-5 and Shaheen II), short-range ballistic missiles (Nasr), and a sea-launched cruise missile that likely had nuclear capacity.
Pakistan has long claimed to favour global nuclear disarmament, even after its acquisition of nuclear weapons in the 1990s. In 
practice, however, Pakistan has expanded its nuclear capabilities and blocked the commencement of negotiations on a Fissile 
Material (Cut-off) Treaty.  Pakistan did not participate in the negotiation of the 2017 TPNW.
1  Arms Control Association, "Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan" (April 2017), at: bit.ly/2NFE3H8.
2  Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris, and Julia Diamond, "Pakistani nuclear forces, 2018", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 74, no. 5 (2018), 
at: bit.ly/30K9B1Z.
Nuclear testing**
Number of nuclear explosive tests 2
Last explosive test 1998
* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
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Russian Federation
Russia boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not in compliance 
with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. Russia may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make changes to its policies and 
practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
Russia is opposed the TPNW. In a 2017 statement to the UNGA First Committee, the Russian government said it "cannot assess 
this Treaty the TPNW positively." (bit.ly/2kwgHrg)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Russia should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, and that 
any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to verifiably reduce and 
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• Russia should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear 
arsenals - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, 
attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Not compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Not compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (Voluntary offer agreement)
Highly enriched uranium stocks 679 t (~45,267 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes (Modified)
Civilian plutonium stocks 59 t (~11,800 weapon equivalents) Party to the CWC Yes
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Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***




WARHEAD RANGE WEIGHT LENGTH DIAMETER
SS-18  M6 Satan ICBM Silo 46 460 500/800 kt 11,000 km 211.1 t 34.3 m 3 m
SS-19  M3 Stiletto ICBM Silo 20 120 400 kt 10,000 km 105.6 t 27 m 2.5 m
SS-25 Sickle ICBM Mobile 90 90 800 kt 11,000 km 45 t 23 m 1.8 m
SS-27 Mod 1/2 ICBM Silo/Mobile 160 522 100–800 kt 10,500–11,000 km 47.2 t 22.7 m 1.86 m
SS-N-18 M1 Stingray SLBM Submarine 16 48 200 kt 6,500 km 35.3 t 14.6 m 1.8 m
SS-N-23 M1 SLBM Submarine 96 384 500 kt 11,000 km 47 t 21.9 m 1.9 m
SS-N-32 SLBM Submarine 48 288 100–150 kt 8,300 km 36.8 t 12.1 m 2.0 m
AS-15A/23B ALCM Bomber 68 786 200–250 kt 6,500–13,200 km 1,210 kg 6.04 m 0.514 m
The Russian nuclear weapons arsenal also includes a number of nonstrategic and defensive weapon systems, including short-range ballistic 
missiles. The range listed for the ALCMs is the range of the delivery platform (Tupolev bombers).
SS-18 M6 SATAN
The R-36 missile (NATO reporting name: SS-18 Satan) is the largest of 
all the ICBMs, here pictured at the Museum of Strategic Rocket Forces, 
Ukraine (Photo: Clay Gilliland)
Nuclear testing**
Number of nuclear explosive tests 715
Last explosive test 1990
DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 
Measured by the sheer number of nuclear warheads in its possession, Russia retains the world’s largest nuclear arsenal. 
According to the current Russian doctrine, Russia reserves "the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear 
and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the 
Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy".1 Russia possesses 
a larger arsenal of "tactical" or "non-strategic" nuclear weapons than other nuclear-armed states, suggesting that Russia retains 
a comparatively greater role for the battlefield use of nuclear weapons (as opposed to "strategic" use against cities or nuclear 
assets) than other nuclear-armed states.
The Russian Federation has ratified the protocols containing negative security assurances for members of the Latin American and 
Caribbean, South Pacific, African, and Central Asian NWFZs. Russia has thereby committed not to use nuclear weapons against 
members of these zones. Russia/the Soviet Union has offered a number of non-binding security assurances over the years, but 
Russia does not have a no-first-use policy.
Russian officials often assert that Russia is committed to the creation of a world without nuclear weapons. In practice, however, 
Russia has snubbed offers of multilateral arms control negotiations, including proposals to reduce tactical nuclear weapons, and 
sought to discredit diplomatic efforts such as the humanitarian initiative for nuclear disarmament. At the same time, Russia has 
reportedly approached the United States to discuss the extension of the New START agreement, but has apparently not found a 
willing interlocutor. 
1 Russian Embassy to the United Kingdom, "The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation" (2014), at: https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029. 
* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: https://fas.org/issues/
nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/.
** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
*** Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, "Russian nuclear forces, 2019", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 75, no. 2 (2019), at: bit.ly/2L5l8U8. See 
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United Kingdom
The United Kingdom boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not 
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. The United Kingdom may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make 
changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In 2017, the UK government said that the UK “does not intend to sign, ratify or become party to" the TPNW. It further stated that  
“The unpredictable international security environment we face today demands the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent for the 
foreseeable future” (bit.ly/2mp3twV ). The cities of Edinburgh and Manchester have joined ICAN’s Cities Appeal. In July 2018, the 
governing body of the Church of England, the Synod, adopted a motion calling on the UK government to “respond positively” to the 
TPNW and bring about nuclear disarmament. (bit.ly/2ms2psg)
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The United Kingdom should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international 
security, and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to 
verifiably reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• The United Kingdom should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a position 
to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear arsenals - 
welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, attend its meetings 
of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Not compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Not compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Not compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Not compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT Yes (Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (Voluntary offer agreement)
Highly enriched uranium stocks 21.2 t (~1,413 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes (Modified)
Civilian plutonium stocks 110.3 t (~22,060 weapon equivalents) Party to the CWC Yes
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Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***




WARHEAD RANGE WEIGHT LENGTH DIAMETER
UGM-133A Trident II D5 SLBM Submarines ? 215 100 kt 7,400+ km 59 t 13.58 m 2.11 m
The United Kingdom draws its missiles from the "commingled US/UK pool of missiles". These Trident II missiles are serviced and maintained to 
precisely the same standards as those of the United States (bit.ly/2p6GM20).
Vanguard Class submarine
Royal Navy Vanguard Class submarine HMS Vigilant returning to HMNB 
Clyde after her extended deployment (CPOA(Phot) Thomas McDonald/MOD)
DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 
The United Kingdom espouses a first-use posture and a so-called continuous-at-sea deterrence (CASD) policy, meaning that 
at least one nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine will always be on patrol. The UK government claims that its nuclear 
arsenal offers a credible and independent minimum deterrent,1 but critics have questioned not only whether UK nuclear use 
is credible, but also whether the UK nuclear arsenal is really independent from the United States, and whether UK nuclear 
weapons are actually deterring anyone from doing something they want to do. The British nuclear-weapon programme 
has traditionally been justified by UK government officials as a deterrent against Soviet/Russian aggression. And as the UK 
nuclear force is by all accounts not large enough to threaten the nuclear forces or infrastructure ("counterforce targets") of 
Russia, any deterrence relies on an implicit threat to use nuclear weapons against Russian population centres ("counter-
value" targets). From the late 1960s onwards, British nuclear doctrine and procurement have ostensibly been centred on the 
so-called Moscow criterion, that is, the ability to demolish the Russian capital and its inhabitants.2
Successive British governments have framed the United Kingdom as a "responsible nuclear-weapon state" and expressed 
support for the goal of nuclear disarmament. At the 2018 NPT Review Conference Preparatory Committee in Geneva, the 
UK delegation stated that "[w]e firmly believe a consensus, step-by-step approach to multilateral disarmament is the best 
way of making progress towards our shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons."3 However, as discussed above, 
British policy makers often make quite different statements to their domestic audiences, representing disarmament as 
irresponsible, effeminate, or humiliating. For example, in a 2015 op-ed, then UK Foreign Secretary (now Prime Minister), 
Boris Johnson, likened nuclear disarmament to castration.4 
The United Kingdom formally supports the commencement of negotiations on a fissile material treaty, but has been 
reluctant to discuss existing stocks of such material, preferring a treaty that would only ban future production. The United 
Kingdom retains enough fissile material to produce thousands of new nuclear warheads.5 And despite being a party to 
the NPT, which commits the United Kingdom to pursue negotiations "in good faith" on nuclear disarmament, the United 
Kingdom has never participated in any nuclear disarmament negotiations.
1 UK Ministry of Defence, "The UK’s Nuclear Deterrent" (19 February 2018), at: bit.ly/2Zq4LKL. 
2 John Baylis, "British Nuclear Doctrine", Contemporary British History 19, no. 1 (2005). 
3 Statement by the United Kingdom to the 2018 NPT PrepCom (26 April 2018), at: bit.ly/2zw86bW.
4 Boris Johnson, "If we want to be taken seriously, we have to defend ourselves", The Telegraph (16 February 2015), at: bit.ly/30K9sLZ. 
5 International Panel on Fissile Materials, "Fissile material stocks" (January 2017), at: http://fissilematerials.org/. 
Nuclear testing**
Number of nuclear explosive tests 45
Last explosive test 1991
* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
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United States of America
The United States boycotted the TPNW negotiations and has not adhered to the Treaty. It is a nuclear-armed state and not 
in compliance with all of the prohibitions in Article 1. The United States may sign and ratify the TPNW, but will have to make 
changes to its policies and practices to become compliant.
LATEST DEVELOPMENTS
In a 2017 statement about the TPNW, the United states declared that it “will not support the treaty”. Nuclear disarmament “will 
require a transformation of the international security environment.” (bit.ly/2kwlcCa) In August 2018, the California Senate approved 
resolutions urging the United States to embrace the TPNW and restrict the US president’s unchecked authority to launch a first 
nuclear strike. The states of Oregon and New Jersey have also approved legislation supporting the TPNW. Washington D.C., Los 
Angeles, and seven other U.S. cities have committed to ICAN’s Cities Appeal.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• The United States should acknowledge that nuclear deterrence is not a sustainable solution for its own or international security, 
and that any perceived benefits are far outweighed by the risk of nuclear accidents or war. It should move rapidly to reduce and 
eliminate its nuclear arsenal.
• The United States should urgently sign and ratify the TPNW, and encourage other states to adhere to the Treaty. Until it is in a 
position to do so, it should - in line with its unequivocal undertaking under the NPT to accomplish the total elimination of its nuclear 
arsenals - welcome the TPNW as a valuable contribution towards the common aspiration of a world without nuclear weapons, 
attend its meetings of states parties as an observer, and work with its states parties on practical steps towards disarmament.
Signed Adhered
No No
Compliance with Article 1(1) of the TPNW
Art 1(1)(a) The prohibition on developing, producing, manufacturing, or otherwise acquiring Not compliant
The prohibition on testing Compliant
The prohibition on possessing or stockpiling Not compliant
Art 1(1)(b) The prohibition on transferring Not compliant 
Art 1(1)(c) The prohibition on receiving transfer or control Compliant
Art 1(1)(d) The prohibition on using Compliant
The prohibition on threatening to use Not compliant
Art 1(1)(e) The prohibition on assisting prohibited activities Not compliant
The prohibition on encouraging or inducing prohibited activities Not compliant
At 1(1)(f) The prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance to engage in prohibited activities Not compliant
Art 1(1)(g) The prohibition on allowing stationing, installation, or deployment Compliant
TPNW process Related treaties and mechanisms
Vote on mandate resolution (A/RES/71/258) Voted no Party to the NPT Yes
Participated in treaty negotiations (% women) No (N/A) Party to a NWFZ No
Vote on adoption of treaty text N/A Ratified the CTBT No (Signed,  Annex 2 state)
Vote on UNGA resolution 2018 Voted no Party to the PTBT Yes
Member of the CD Yes
Fissile material IAEA CSA in force  No (Voluntary offer agreement)
Highly enriched uranium stocks 574.5 t (~38,300 weapon equivalents) IAEA AP in force Yes (Modified)
Civilian plutonium stocks 8 t (~1,600 weapon equivalents) Party to the CWC Yes
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Main nuclear weapons delivery systems***
NAME TYPE DELIVERY PLATFORM NO. WARHEADS  (AVAILABLE)
YIELD PER 
WARHEAD RANGE WEIGHT LENGTH DIAMETER
LGM-30G Minuteman III ICBM Silo 400 800 300kt–335kt 13,000 km 34.4 t 18.2 m 1.85 m









16 282 0.3-340 kt 11,000 km 320 kg 3.56 m 0.33 m
AGM-86B
AGM-86B Air-Launched Cruise Missile dropped from a B-52H Stratofortress, 
Utah, 2014 (U.S. Air Force photo/Staff Sgt. Roidan Carlson)
DOCTRINE, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE 
The United States maintains a first use policy and significant "counter-force" capabilities. According to the Trump 
administration’s "Nuclear Posture Review" of February 2018, the United States will "only consider the employment of nuclear 
weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interest of the United States, its allies, and partners."1 The United 
States has long maintained that it will not use nuclear weapons "against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the 
NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations." However, this assurance is not legally binding and it 
is not clear how the United States defines "in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations". The United States 
has only offered legally binding assurances not to use nuclear weapons against the parties to the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco. 
Washington has refused to ratify the protocols containing such assurances for members of the South Pacific, South-East 
Asian, African, and Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zones.
In 2018, the United States abandoned its longstanding policy of seeking disarmament through a "step-by-step" approach 
and launched instead an initiative to "create the conditions for nuclear disarmament" (later renamed "creating the 
environment for nuclear disarmament" (CEND)). According to the US government, the security environment is currently not 
auspicious for nuclear reductions or implementation of Article VI of the NPT. Consequently, the international community 
should focus not on further disarmament steps, but rather on creating an environment in which the United States, 
Russia, and other nuclear-armed major powers would feel secure enough to reduce and eliminate their weapons of mass 
destruction. For the US government, necessary changes include, inter alia, the verified unilateral disarmament of DPR 
Korea, universal application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols in non-nuclear-weapon states, a 
guarantee that Iran "is never again able to position itself dangerously close to nuclear weaponization", and an improvement 
in "transparency about nuclear policies, plans, and doctrines".  In 2019, the United States decided not to disclose the current 
number of nuclear weapons in the Defense Department’s nuclear weapons stockpile, walking back close to a decade of US 
nuclear transparency policy.2
1 US Department of Defense, "Nuclear Posture Review" (February 2018), p. 21.
2 Hans M. Kristensen, "Pentagon Slams Door On Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Transparency", Federation of American Scientists (17 April 2019), 
at: bit.ly/2PnjHoA.
Nuclear testing**
Number of nuclear explosive tests 1,030
Last explosive test 1992
* Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, "Status of World Nuclear Forces", Federation of American Scientists, at: bit.ly/2gfYTZB.
** Arms Control Association, "The Nuclear Testing Tally" (updated September 2017), at: bit.ly/32awkVj.
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Text of the Treaty
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
 
The States Parties to this Treaty, 
 
Determined to contribute to the realization of the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations, 
 
Deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences that would result from any use of nuclear 
weapons, and recognizing the consequent need to 
completely eliminate such weapons, which remains the 
only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never 
used again under any circumstances, 
 
Mindful of the risks posed by the continued existence 
of nuclear weapons, including from any nuclear-weapon 
detonation by accident, miscalculation or design, and 
emphasizing that these risks concern the security of all 
humanity, and that all States share the responsibility to 
prevent any use of nuclear weapons, 
 
Cognizant that the catastrophic consequences of 
nuclear weapons cannot be adequately addressed, 
transcend national borders, pose grave implications for 
human survival, the environment, socioeconomic 
development, the global economy, food security and the 
health of current and future generations, and have a 
disproportionate impact on women and girls, including as 
a result of ionizing radiation, 
 
Acknowledging the ethical imperatives for nuclear 
disarmament and the urgency of achieving and maintaining 
a nuclear-weapon-free world, which is a global public good 
of the highest order, serving both national and collective 
security interests, 
 
Mindful of the unacceptable suffering of and harm 
caused to the victims of the use of nuclear weapons 
(hibakusha), as well as of those affected by the testing of 
nuclear weapons, 
 
Recognizing the disproportionate impact of nuclear-
weapon activities on indigenous peoples, 
 
Reaffirming the need for all States at all times to comply 
with applicable international law, including international 
humanitarian law and international human rights law, 
 
Basing themselves on the principles and rules of 
international humanitarian law, in particular the principle 
that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose 
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, the rule of 
distinction, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, 
the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, the 
prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause 
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules 
for the protection of the natural environment, 
 
Considering that any use of nuclear weapons would be 
contrary to the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict, in particular the principles and rules of 
international humanitarian law, 
 
Reaffirming that any use of nuclear weapons would also 
be abhorrent to the principles of humanity and the dictates 
of public conscience, 
 
Recalling that, in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, States must refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of 
the United Nations, and that the establishment and 
maintenance of international peace and security are to be 
promoted with the least diversion for armaments of the 
world’s human and economic resources, 
 
Recalling also the first resolution of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, adopted on 24 January 
1946, and subsequent resolutions which call for the 
elimination of nuclear weapons, 
 
Concerned by the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, 
the continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and 
security concepts, doctrines and policies, and the waste 
of economic and human resources on programmes for 
the production, maintenance and modernization of nuclear 
weapons, 
 
Recognizing that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear 
weapons constitutes an important contribution towards 
the achievement and maintenance of a world free of 
nuclear weapons, including the irreversible, verifiable and 
transparent elimination of nuclear weapons, and 
determined to act towards that end, 
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 Determined to act with a view to achieving effective 
progress towards general and complete disarmament 
under strict and effective international control, 
 
Reaffirming that there exists an obligation to pursue in 
good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading 
to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and 
effective international control, 
 
Reaffirming also that the full and effective implementa-
tion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, which serves as the cornerstone of the nuclear 
disarmament and non-proliferation regime, has a vital role 
to play in promoting international peace and security, 
 
Recognizing the vital importance of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime as a 
core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation regime, 
 
Reaffirming the conviction that the establishment of the 
internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on 
the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the 
States of the region concerned enhances global and 
regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-
proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the 
objective of nuclear disarmament, 
 
Emphasizing that nothing in this Treaty shall be 
interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of its States 
Parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, 
 
Recognizing that the equal, full and effective participation 
of both women and men is an essential factor for the 
promotion and attainment of sustainable peace and 
security, and committed to supporting and strengthening 
the effective participation of women in nuclear 
disarmament, 
 
Recognizing also the importance of peace and 
disarmament education in all its aspects and of raising 
awareness of the risks and consequences of nuclear 
weapons for current and future generations, and 
committed to the dissemination of the principles and 
norms of this Treaty, 
 
Stressing the role of public conscience in the furthering 
of the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for 
the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and recognizing 
the efforts to that end undertaken by the United Nations, 
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 
other international and regional organizations, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, religious leaders, parliamentari-
ans, academics and the hibakusha, 




1. Each State Party undertakes never under any 
circumstances to: 
 
(a) Develop, test, produce, manufacture, otherwise acquire, 
possess or stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices; 
 
(b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices directly or indirectly; 
 
(c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices directly or indirectly; 
 
(d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices; 
 
(e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage 
in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty; 
 
(f) Seek or receive any assistance, in any way, from anyone 
to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party 
under this Treaty; 
 
(g) Allow any stationing, installation or deployment of any 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in 




1. Each State Party shall submit to the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, not later than 30 days after this 
Treaty enters into force for that State Party, a declaration 
in which it shall: 
 
(a) Declare whether it owned, possessed or controlled 
nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and 
eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, including 
the elimination or irreversible conversion of all nuclear-
weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into force 
of this Treaty for that State Party; 
(b) Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), declare whether it owns, 
possesses or controls any nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices; 
 
(c) Notwithstanding Article 1 (g), declare whether there are 
any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction or 
control that are owned, possessed or controlled by 
another State. 
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 2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 





1. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, 
does not apply shall, at a minimum, maintain its Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency safeguards obligations in 
force at the time of entry into force of this Treaty, without 
prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may 
adopt in the future. 
 
2. Each State Party to which Article 4, paragraph 1 or 2, 
does not apply that has not yet done so shall conclude 
with the International Atomic Energy Agency and bring into 
force a comprehensive safeguards agreement (INF-
CIRC/153 (Corrected)). Negotiation of such agreement 
shall commence within 180 days from the entry into force 
of this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall 
enter into force no later than 18 months from the entry 
into force of this Treaty for that State Party. Each State 
Party shall thereafter maintain such obligations, without 
prejudice to any additional relevant instruments that it may 
adopt in the future. 
 
Article 4 
Towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons 
1. Each State Party that after 7 July 2017 owned, possessed 
or controlled nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices and eliminated its nuclear-weapon programme, 
including the elimination or irreversible conversion of all 
nuclear-weapons-related facilities, prior to the entry into 
force of this Treaty for it, shall cooperate with the 
competent international authority designated pursuant to 
paragraph 6 of this Article for the purpose of verifying the 
irreversible elimination of its nuclear-weapon programme. 
The competent international authority shall report to the 
States Parties. Such a State Party shall conclude a 
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic 
Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assurance of 
the non-diversion of declared nuclear material from 
peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of 
undeclared nuclear material or activities in that State Party 
as a whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall 
commence within 180 days from the entry into force of 
this Treaty for that State Party. The agreement shall enter 
into force no later than 18 months from the entry into force 
of this Treaty for that State Party. That State Party shall 
thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards 
obligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant 
instruments that it may adopt in the future. 
 
2. Notwithstanding Article 1 (a), each State Party that 
owns, possesses or controls nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices shall immediately remove them 
from operational status, and destroy them as soon as 
possible but not later than a deadline to be determined by 
the first meeting of States Parties, in accordance with a 
legally binding, time-bound plan for the verified and 
irreversible elimination of that State Party’s nuclear-
weapon programme, including the elimination or 
irreversible conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related 
facilities. The State Party, no later than 60 days after the 
entry into force of this Treaty for that State Party, shall 
submit this plan to the States Parties or to a competent 
international authority designated by the States Parties. 
The plan shall then be negotiated with the competent 
international authority, which shall submit it to the 
subsequent meeting of States Parties or review conference, 
whichever comes first, for approval in accordance with its 
rules of procedure. 
 
3. A State Party to which paragraph 2 above applies shall 
conclude a safeguards agreement with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency sufficient to provide credible assur-
ance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material 
from peaceful nuclear activities and of the absence of 
undeclared nuclear material or activities in the State as a 
whole. Negotiation of such agreement shall commence 
no later than the date upon which implementation of the 
plan referred to in paragraph 2 is completed. The agree-
ment shall enter into force no later than 18 months after 
the date of initiation of negotiations. That State Party shall 
thereafter, at a minimum, maintain these safeguards ob-
ligations, without prejudice to any additional relevant in-
struments that it may adopt in the future. Following the 
entry into force of the agreement referred to in this para-
graph, the State Party shall submit to the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations a final declaration that it has 
fulfilled its obligations under this Article. 
 
4. Notwithstanding Article 1 (b) and (g), each State Party 
that has any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices in its territory or in any place under its jurisdiction 
or control that are owned, possessed or controlled by 
another State shall ensure the prompt removal of such 
weapons, as soon as possible but not later than a deadline 
to be determined by the first meeting of States Parties. 
Upon the removal of such weapons or other explosive 
devices, that State Party shall submit to the Secretary-
General of the United Nations a declaration that it has 
fulfilled its obligations under this Article. 
 
5. Each State Party to which this Article applies shall 
submit a report to each meeting of States Parties and each 
review conference on the progress made towards the 
implementation of its obligations under this Article, until 
such time as they are fulfilled. 
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6. The States Parties shall designate a competent 
international authority or authorities to negotiate and verify 
the irreversible elimination of nuclear-weapons 
programmes, including the elimination or irreversible 
conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities in 
accordance with paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of this Article. In 
the event that such a designation has not been made prior 
to the entry into force of this Treaty for a State Party to 
which paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article applies, the Secretary-
General of the United Nations shall convene an 
extraordinary meeting of States Parties to take any 




1. Each State Party shall adopt the necessary measures 
to implement its obligations under this Treaty. 
 
2. Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, 
administrative and other measures, including the 
imposition of penal sanctions, to prevent and suppress 
any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Treaty 




Victim assistance and environmental remediation 
1. Each State Party shall, with respect to individuals under 
its jurisdiction who are affected by the use or testing of 
nuclear weapons, in accordance with applicable 
international humanitarian and human rights law, 
adequately provide age-and gender-sensitive assistance, 
without discrimination, including medical care, 
rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide 
for their social and economic inclusion. 
 
2. Each State Party, with respect to areas under its 
jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities 
related to the testing or use of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices, shall take necessary and 
appropriate measures towards the environmental 
remediation of areas so contaminated. 
 
3. The obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 above shall 
be without prejudice to the duties and obligations of any 
other States under international law or bilateral agreements. 
 
Article 7 
International cooperation and assistance 
1. Each State Party shall cooperate with other States 
Parties to facilitate the implementation of this Treaty. 
 
2. In fulfilling its obligations under this Treaty, each State 
Party shall have the right to seek and receive assistance, 
where feasible, from other States Parties. 
 3. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide 
technical, material and financial assistance to States 
Parties affected by nuclear-weapons use or testing, to 
further the implementation of this Treaty. 
 
4. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide 
assistance for the victims of the use or testing of nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
 
5. Assistance under this Article may be provided, inter alia, 
through the United Nations system, international, regional 
or national organizations or institutions, non-governmental 
organizations or institutions, the International Committee 
of the Red Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross 
and Red Crescent Societies, or national Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies, or on a bilateral basis. 
 
6. Without prejudice to any other duty or obligation that it 
may have under international law, a State Party that has 
used or tested nuclear weapons or any other nuclear 
explosive devices shall have a responsibility to provide 
adequate assistance to affected States Parties, for the 




Meeting of States Parties 
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to 
consider and, where necessary, take decisions in respect 
of any matter with regard to the application or 
implementation of this Treaty, in accordance with its 
relevant provisions, and on further measures for nuclear 
disarmament, including: 
(a) The implementation and status of this Treaty; 
  
(b) Measures for the verified, time-bound and irreversible 
elimination of nuclear-weapon programmes, including 
additional protocols to this Treaty; 
 
(c) Any other matters pursuant to and consistent with the 
provisions of this Treaty. 
 
2. The first meeting of States Parties shall be convened 
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations within one 
year of the entry into force of this Treaty. Further meetings 
of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations on a biennial basis, unless 
otherwise agreed by the States Parties. The meeting of 
States Parties shall adopt its rules of procedure at its first 
session. Pending their adoption, the rules of procedure of 
the United Nations conference to negotiate a legally 
binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading 
towards their total elimination, shall apply. 
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3. Extraordinary meetings of States Parties shall be 
convened, as may be deemed necessary, by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations, at the written request of any 
State Party provided that this request is supported by at 
least one third of the States Parties. 
 
4. After a period of five years following the entry into force 
of this Treaty, the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall convene a conference to review the operation of the 
Treaty and the progress in achieving the purposes of the 
Treaty. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall 
convene further review conferences at intervals of six 
years with the same objective, unless otherwise agreed 
by the States Parties. 
 
5. States not party to this Treaty, as well as the relevant 
entities of the United Nations system, other relevant 
international organizations or institutions, regional 
organizations, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies and relevant non-governmental 
organizations, shall be invited to attend the meetings of 




1. The costs of the meetings of States Parties, the review 
conferences and the extraordinary meetings of States 
Parties shall be borne by the States Parties and States not 
party to this Treaty participating therein as observers, in 
accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment 
adjusted appropriately. 
 
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations in the circulation of declarations under 
Article 2, reports under Article 4 and proposed amendments 
under Article 10 of this Treaty shall be borne by the States 
Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of 
assessment adjusted appropriately. 
 
3. The cost related to the implementation of verification 
measures required under Article 4 as well as the costs 
related to the destruction of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices, and the elimination of nuclear-
weapon programmes, including the elimination or 
conversion of all nuclear-weapons-related facilities, should 




1. At any time after the entry into force of this Treaty, any 
State Party may propose amendments to the Treaty. The 
text of a proposed amendment shall be communicated to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall 
circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views 
on whether to consider the proposal. If a majority of the 
States Parties notify the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation that they 
support further consideration of the proposal, the proposal 
shall be considered at the next meeting of States Parties 
or review conference, whichever comes first. 
 
2. A meeting of States Parties or a review conference may 
agree upon amendments which shall be adopted by a 
positive vote of a majority of two thirds of the States 
Parties. The Depositary shall communicate any adopted 
amendment to all States Parties. 
 
3. The amendment shall enter into force for each State 
Party that deposits its instrument of ratification or 
acceptance of the amendment 90 days following the 
deposit of such instruments of ratification or acceptance 
by a majority of the States Parties at the time of adoption. 
Thereafter, it shall enter into force for any other State Party 
90 days following the deposit of its instrument of 
ratification or acceptance of the amendment. 
 
Article 11 
Settlement of disputes 
1. When a dispute arises between two or more States 
Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this 
Treaty, the parties concerned shall consult together with 
a view to the settlement of the dispute by negotiation or 
by other peaceful means of the parties’ choice in 
accordance with Article 33 of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
 
2. The meeting of States Parties may contribute to the 
settlement of the dispute, including by offering its good 
offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start 
the settlement procedure of their choice and recommending 
a time limit for any agreed procedure, in accordance with 
the relevant provisions of this Treaty and the Charter of 




Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this 
Treaty to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to the 
Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States 




This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States at 
United Nations Headquarters in New York as from 20 
September 2017. 
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Article 14 
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession 
This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or 




Entry into force 
1. This Treaty shall enter into force 90 days after the fiftieth 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession has been deposited. 
 
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession after the date of the 
deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, this Treaty shall enter into force 90 
days after the date on which that State has deposited its 









Duration and withdrawal 
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. 
 
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national 
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if 
it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject 
matter of the Treaty have jeopardized the supreme 
interests of its country. It shall give notice of such 
withdrawal to the Depositary. Such notice shall include a 
statement of the extraordinary events that it regards as 
having jeopardized its supreme interests. 
 
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect 12 months after 
the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal by 
the Depositary. If, however, on the expiry of that 12-month 
period, the withdrawing State Party is a party to an armed 
conflict, the State Party shall continue to be bound by the 
obligations of this Treaty and of any additional protocols 
until it is no longer party to an armed conflict. 
 
Article 18 
Relationship with other agreements 
The implementation of this Treaty shall not prejudice 
obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to 
existing international agreements, to which they are party, 




The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby 




The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish 
texts of this Treaty shall be equally authentic. 
 
DONE at New York, this seventh day of July, two thousand 
and seventeen. 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
ALCM  Air-launched cruise missile
ANZUS  Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (Treaty).
ASCM Anti-ship cruise missile
BWC Biological Weapons Convention
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
CWC Chemical Weapons Convention
DR Congo Democratic Republic of the Congo
GLCM Ground-launched cruise missile
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAN International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
ICBM Intercontinental ballistic missile
INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
INFCIRC Information Circular
IRBM Intermediate-range ballistic missile
Lao PDR Lao People’s Democratic Republic
LEU Low enriched uranium
MIRV Multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPA Norwegian People’s Aid
NPT Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
NWCS Nuclear-weapon-complicit states
NWFZ  Nuclear-weapon-free zone
Pu  Plutonium
SNOWCAT  Support of nuclear operations with conventional air tactics
SLBM  Submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM Submarine-launched cruise missile
SRBM Short-range ballistic missile
SSBN Submersible ship, ballistic missile, nuclear powered
START  Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TPNW  Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons
UAE United Arab Emirates
UK United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UNODA United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
US  United States
WMD Weapons of mass destruction
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